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Abstract 
 
 
Whether software is licensed under terms which ‘close off’ or make accessible the 
underlying code that comprises software holds profound implications for development 
due to the centrality of this good to contemporary life.  In the 2000s, developing 
countries adopted policies to promote free and open source software (F/OSS) for 
reasons of technological autonomy and to reduce spending on royalties for foreign 
produced proprietary software.  However, the adoption of such policies varied across 
countries. 
 
Focusing upon Argentina and Brazil, two countries that reflect contrasting policy 
outcomes in promoting F/OSS, I explain why and how different policies came to be 
adopted by analysing the way in which institutions and patterns of association affected 
the lobbying power of advocates and opponents of F/OSS promotion.  Advocates are 
generally weak actors, yet they might strengthen their lobbying power through 
embeddedness within political and state institutions which offer opportunities to 
mobilise resources and forge ties with political decision-makers.  Opponents are 
generally strong, business actors, yet their lobbying power may be attenuated by weak 
concentration in business association, reducing their capacity to mobilise and coordinate 
support. 
 
In Argentina, where F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness was weak and 
concentration in business association was strong, the government was prevented from 
promoting F/OSS, despite signs that it wished to do so.  In Brazil, where F/OSS 
advocates’ institutional embeddedness was strong and concentration in business 
association was weak, the government promoted F/OSS despite vociferous opposition 
from amongst the largest firms in the world.  
 
Based on empirical data encompassing interviews, media reports and documents 
gathered from government, business and activist sources, my research informs 
understanding of the political origins of policy choice in an area where existing 
academic explanation has tended to emphasise the role of economics or ideas.  I also 
contribute to theory in comparative political economy by identifying the mechanisms by 
which patterns of association and institutions affect actors’ lobbying power.   
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1 Introduction 
 
At the turn of the millennium, developing countries around the world began to consider 
and adopt policies to promote free and open source software (F/OSS).1  In contrast to 
‘closed source’ proprietary software (PS), F/OSS is licensed under terms which make 
the underlying source code freely available to inspect, modify, distribute, compile and 
run.
2
  These attributes offer a range of benefits for development, not least the 
opportunity to avoid paying royalties on imported PS (Ghosh, 2004; May, 2006; Wade, 
2002; Weber, 2003; Weerawarana and Weeratunga, 2004).  Yet the degree to which 
developing countries have sought to take advantage of these benefits through policy has 
varied; though many countries have embraced F/OSS, many countries have adopted or 
maintained policies that favour PS instead. 
 
The development implications of policies that affect the way in which software is 
licensed are profound, yet our understanding of cross-national variation in these policies 
remains limited. This thesis addresses this gap in our understanding of this important 
phenomenon. 
 
Prevailing explanations of software licensing policies tend to stress the role of agency 
and ideas.  In mainstream media commentary, for example, F/OSS promotion is 
regarded as a response to the domination of the global software industry by US firms, 
principally Microsoft, and is purportedly associated with governments of a leftist, 
nationalist orientation (see Festa, 2001).  Academic studies of F/OSS policies in 
developing countries reflect a similar emphasis on agency and ideas in explaining these 
policies.  In her analyses of the politics surrounding the Brazilian government’s 
promotion of F/OSS, Schoonmaker (2007; 2009) provides an explanation for F/OSS 
promotion that tends to privilege the role of agency and ideas, by focusing upon the 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this thesis, free software and open source software will be considered one and the same for 
simplicity.  It is however important to point out that free software and open source software are distinct 
and licensed under different terms that hold important implications.  Free software may not be relicensed 
under terms that would ‘close-off’ the source code and requires code with which it is merged to also be 
licensed under free software terms.  By contrast, open source software may be relicensed under different 
terms and thus ‘closed’ and does not require code with which it is merged to be relicensed under open 
source terms (Carranza Torres, 2004; Söderberg, 2008: 37; St. Laurant, 2004; Vaidhayanthan, 2003: 156). 
2
 Although the ‘free’ in free software refers to freedom or liberty rather than meaning free as in gratis, a 
corollary of this freedom is that F/OSS may be used without the need to pay licensing fees.   
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rationale and goals that motivated this policy.  Kapczynski (2008), attending to how the 
politics of framing influence policies relating to F/OSS more generally and Shaw (2008; 
2011), in accounts of how bureaucrats’ technocratic expertise and social ties enabled 
these actors to precipitate F/OSS promotion in Brazil, similarly provide explanations 
that stress the role of agency and ideas.  Although these explanations of policy are 
insightful, they offer incomplete understanding of why or how policies came to be 
adopted.  It is unclear, outside ideas in themselves, why certain ideas prevailed over 
others in influencing policy choices, or, why F/OSS advocates were more successful 
than the purveyors of alternative ideas in translating their ideas into policy.  Ideas may 
play an important role in shaping policy choices, but they are likely to be intertwined 
with interest-based and institutional factors that may be equally if not more important in 
driving policy outcomes (Drahos, 2008; Hall, 1997).  To understand more fully the 
reasons for policy choice, it is necessary to incorporate into analysis consideration of 
the characteristics of surrounding interests and institutions that mediate actors’ 
capacities to influence policy. 
 
The limitations of agency and ideas in explaining cross-national variation in software 
licensing policy are illustrated with regard to Latin America.  In general, patterns of 
policy variation in this region appear to corroborate an association between political 
bias.  The most emphatic promotion of F/OSS occurred under the governments of Hugo 
Chávez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador – governments of a leftist, populist 
orientation (Conaghan, 2011; López Maya, 2011) generally viewed as amongst the most 
radical in the region (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011; Panizza, 2009; Philip and Panizza, 
2011).  By contrast, the policy was conspicuous by its absence in countries such as 
Mexico and Colombia, where governments were right of centre and closely aligned with 
the US (see Burton, 2011; Livingstone, 2011; Raby, 2011).  F/OSS promotion was also 
either absent or tenuous amongst more moderate leftist governments such as those of 
Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet in Chile and Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay (see 
Lanzaro, 2011; Roberts, 2011).  Such patterns of variation chime with Jorge 
Castañeda’s (2006) notion of the “two lefts”.  Whilst F/OSS promotion appeared 
consistent with the “wrong left” which is characterised as populist, “nationalist [and] 
strident”, it was apparently resisted by the “right left”, which is depicted as market 
orientated, “reformist, and internationalist”.  Yet away from the more extreme examples 
of leftist and rightist bias, the role of ideas appears less significant in explaining policy 
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variation.  Under the governments of the Kirchners in Argentina and Lula in Brazil – 
two mutually contrasting exponents of Castañeda’s two lefts – policy outcomes 
diverged from what trends in the wider region would have predicted. 
 
The Kirchner governments typified Castañeda’s “wrong left”.  Considered populist and 
leftist (Panizza, 2005), displaying recalcitrance towards the IMF and international 
creditors in negotiating repayment of Argentina’s debt and an increasing propensity to 
intervene in the market (Etchemendy and Garay, 2011; Panizza, 2014; Riggirozzi, 2009; 
Tussie, 2009), the Kirchner governments’ appeared quintessential proponents of F/OSS.  
Yet the policies of the Kirchners were amongst the most favourable to PS anywhere in 
South America.  Whilst calls to promote F/OSS in the public sector were resisted, the 
government worked with Microsoft to deliver policies across a range of areas.  
Symbolising the Kirchner governments’ embrace of PS, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner 
made a point of receiving Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer to much media fanfare in the 
presidential palace. 
 
In contrast to the Kirchners, Lula and his governments were extolled by Casteñeda as 
models of the “right left”.  Viewed as moderate, continuing the market-orientated 
policies of the preceding Cardoso administration (Hunter, 2008; 2011; Panizza, 2009; 
Power, 2008) and maintaining cordial ties with the US (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007), 
the political bias of the Lula governments suggested they would resist F/OSS 
promotion.  Yet under Lula, Brazil became synonymous with F/OSS, arguably doing 
more to promote F/OSS than any other country anywhere else.  Promoting F/OSS 
across a range of policy areas, the government even pushed for F/OSS’ development 
benefits to be acknowledged in international fora.  In a move that symbolised his 
government’s resolve in promoting F/OSS, President Lula rebuffed Bill Gates’ attempts 
to hold an audience with him. 
 
In this thesis I explain software licensing policy in Argentina and Brazil, South 
America’s largest economies and most politically influential countries, where policy 
outcomes deviated from trends in wider Latin America and what prevailing 
explanations of these policies would have predicted.  In doing so, I provide new 
understanding of the politics of software licensing by demonstrating how policy is 
shaped by surrounding conditions as well as ideas and agency.  In addition to showing 
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the relative importance of different causal factors in bringing policies about in 
Argentina and Brazil, I also contribute to understanding of how politics may shape 
policy more broadly by identifying and explicating the mechanisms by which causal 
factors operate.  Presenting findings based on extensive fieldwork based research, I not 
only redress the limited academic scholarship that the politics of software licensing 
have so far received but also a lack of empirical knowledge surrounding policies, an 
issue signalled by frequent citation of anecdotal information from press and Internet 
sources in wider academic discussion of these policies (see Lerner and Schankerman, 
2010: 157; Weber and Bussell, 2005: 76).  
 
Through a theoretical framework informed by scholarship in comparative political 
economy, I argue that two factors – one concerning institutions, the other the 
organisation of interests – accounted for most of the variation in policy across Argentina 
and Brazil.  Institutions and the organisation of interests condition the capacity of the 
actors that surround software licensing to translate their preferences into policy by 
mediating their lobbying power.  The way in which interests are organised influence 
actors’ lobbying power by affecting actors’ ability to mobilise resources and support.  
Institutions may affect actors’ lobbying power by offering access to resources that can 
facilitate mobilisation of support and by providing ties that may enable access to 
political decision-makers. 
 
I argue that the Kirchner governments adopted policies that favoured PS because PS 
advocates’ lobbying power was strong on account of strong cohesion in the organisation 
of the software sector whilst F/OSS advocates’ lobbying power was weak on account of 
their isolation from incumbent political forces and the state.  Strong sectoral cohesion 
enhanced PS advocates’ lobbying power by increasing their ability to mobilise and 
coordinate the sector whilst F/OSS advocates’ isolation from government limited their 
lobbying power as they possessed limited capacity to mobilise resources and lacked ties 
with political-decision makers.   
 
I contend that the Lula governments adopted policies that favoured F/OSS because 
F/OSS advocates lobbying power was strong due to strong participation by these actors 
within incumbent political parties and the state whilst PS advocates’ lobbying power 
was weak on account of fragmented organisation in the software sector.  F/OSS 
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advocates’ strong embeddedness within the government strengthened their lobbying 
power by offering resources and ties to political-decision makers whilst low cohesion in 
the organisation of the software sector attenuated PS advocates’ lobbying power by 
reducing their capacity to mobilise and coordinate the sector. 
Software and Development 
 
Due to the centrality of software to contemporary life – a phenomenon by no means 
restricted to more affluent countries as the pervasiveness of software grows with ever 
cheaper technology – software lies at the heart of opportunities for development.  
Software is integral to contemporary production (Evans, 1995; Schware, 1992a) and 
productivity across the economy as a whole (Marques, 2009), the information economy 
(Ó Riain, 2004; Singsangob, 2003) and technology generally (Manovich, 2013) and is 
subsequently key to economic success.  Comprising code that embodies rules, software 
also represents an “architecture of control” which may be used to monitor, regulate and 
govern populations (Albrecht and McIntyre, 2005; Graham, 2005; Kapczynski, 2008: 
823; Lessig, 2006: 38; Lyon, 2003; 2009).  By affecting human rights, civil liberties and 
democracy, software poses political as well as economic implications for development.  
The way in which software is licensed affects who controls as well as who benefits from 
this technology and the state plays a key role in determining who these actors are by 
influencing the prevalence of different software licensing schemes through the policies 
that it adopts. 
 
Software has become increasingly significant to development as knowledge has grown 
more important to the generation of wealth (Castells, 2010a).  As its importance has 
risen, knowledge has become vital to power in the international system, underpinning 
not only economic strength but also coercive capacity (Strange, 1994).  The ascendance 
of knowledge has been accompanied by an attendant rise in efforts to protect knowledge 
through property rights (Coriat and Orsi, 2002; Evans, 1997a; Landes and Posner, 
2004).  With production and trade in information based goods dominated by the US and 
other developed nations, these countries have headed efforts to protect knowledge, 
advocating a notion of intellectual property (IP) as private property and raising levels of 
IP protection.   
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Championing their interpretation of IP as the means to harness the economic potential 
of knowledge (Chang, 2002), developed countries have pressed for stronger protection 
of IP to be implemented in developing countries (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002; 
Maskus, 2000; Sell, 2003; Sell and Prakash, 2002; Sum, 2003).  But whilst strong IP 
protection benefits IP owners, it raises the costs of knowledge for users, impeding 
knowledge transfer and follow-on innovation.  Where strong protection of IP protects 
developed countries’ competitiveness in knowledge based industries, it negatively 
affects net importers of knowledge based goods in the developing world, contributing to 
a ‘digital divide’ between the global North and South.   
 
Because of the significance that ICT holds for wealth creation, the way in which 
property rights are applied to ICT has major ramifications for welfare distribution 
within and between developed and developing countries, as well as rates of innovation 
and economic growth (Weber and Bussell, 2005).  Property rights in ICT thus represent 
one of the principle determinants of the balance of power between North and South, 
facilitating the maintenance of economic and political power asymmetries that favour 
the North.  Although the North’s superior power advantage suggests its continued 
dominance over the South, these dynamics are by no means predetermined due to the 
potential of technological change to precipitate economic, social and political 
transformation (Boas and Dunning, 2005; Schumpeter, 1994).  
 
Despite the constraints IP places on flows of informational goods and knowledge from 
North to South, innovations in IP, made possible through technological change, offer 
new opportunities for developing countries to bridge the digital divide.  F/OSS 
represents perhaps the most radical of these innovations, inverting the notion of IP as 
private property by licensing software under terms that allow its unrestricted use, 
reproduction, distribution and adaptation (Rodriguez, 2005; St. Laurant, 2004).  As the 
North pressures Southern countries to enforce IP rights, F/OSS allows compliance with 
high levels of IP protection whilst avoiding payment of licensing fees for PS (May, 
2006). 
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Benefits of F/OSS 
 
F/OSS may offer political and economic benefits that are absent with relation to PS.  
Those benefits that are perhaps most widely cited relate to the use of software, 
principally the fact that use of F/OSS forgoes the necessity to pay license fees.  As 
detractors of F/OSS are quick to point out, use of F/OSS is not necessarily cost free as 
license fees may represent just one of a number of costs associated with using software 
(Lerner and Schankerman, 2010) yet it may avoid financial expenditure.  Opportunities 
for avoiding license fee payments are particularly important in developing countries.   
 
As fees for PS licenses sold in developing countries tend to reflect prices in developed 
countries, the lower purchasing power of users in developing countries means licensing 
costs as a share of the total cost of IT ownership are considerably greater (Ghosh, 2003; 
May, 2006; Sum, 2003: 383).  As developed countries, principally the US, dominate 
production of PS (Singsangob, 2003), F/OSS also allows developing countries to spend 
elsewhere scarce foreign exchange that would otherwise be used to pay royalties for 
foreign PS (Wade, 2002).   
 
F/OSS allows users to escape what Wade (2002: 452) describes as the “software-
hardware arms race”, where new releases of PS tend to require ever increasing 
computing power that necessitates expenditure on more powerful hardware.  A wide 
range of F/OSS systems software together with the opportunities that F/OSS offers for 
software customisation allow continued utilisation and improved performance of older, 
less powerful hardware that is likely to be in abundance in developing countries. 
 
F/OSS may increase user independence, by avoiding the lock-in associated with 
proprietary systems.  PS firms use limited compatibility with competing goods to 
increase switching costs and thus maintain customers.  Proprietary standards allow PS 
firms to raise revenue through planned obsolescence.  F/OSS interacts with open 
standards that reduce dependence on particular suppliers. 
 
The opportunities F/OSS offers for software to be modified allow software to be 
adapted to user-defined needs (Weerawarana & Weeratunga, 2004: 30).  This 
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characteristic of F/OSS allows developing countries rather than foreign vendors to 
determine how software is used by providing opportunities to adapt software to local 
needs. 
 
By allowing software source code to be studied, F/OSS facilitates acquisition of skills 
and knowledge that make it ideal for use in education (Deek and McHugh, 2007: 317; 
Lerner and Tirole, 2005: 112).  Embodying peer production and the practice of hacking 
F/OSS also promotes learning at a more fundamental level by encouraging an 
understanding of technology as something that may be manipulated, developed or 
produced by the individual themselves for their own ends rather than supplied by a firm 
as a ‘black box’.3    
Software Production 
 
As firms in developed countries dominate production of PS, developing countries are 
likely to be net importers of PS (Correa, 1996; Shadlen et al., 2005).  Switching from 
PS to F/OSS offers opportunities to reduce import bills whilst generating local 
economic activity (Weerawarana & Weeratunga 2004). 
 
A dominant share of PS imports is likely to correspond to systems software and generic 
applications in horizontal, mass market segments.  These areas of the market are 
characterised by “low application specificity” and “high interest in reproduction” and 
PS firms operating in these market segments rely heavily on appropriation (Softex, 
2005a).  The availability of free and open source alternatives to PS systems and 
horizontal applications software offering functionality equivalent to that offered by their 
PS counterparts means imports of PS may be easily substituted with F/OSS.  At the 
same time, such substitution presents limited threats to local production and provision 
of services associated with software.  Economies of scale are important in information 
based industries, creating barriers to entry for firms in developing countries.  The 
importance of economies of scale tends to favour first movers (Evans and Wurster, 
1997) and as US corporations were the first to colonise the realm of software, the 
                                                 
3
 Contrary to the popular media framing of hacking as nefarious and inimical to the public good, hacking 
refers to the creative pursuit of experimenting with, adapting, fixing or enhancing technological artefacts 
(see Söderberg, 2008).  Hacking may be conceived as both a productive activity and ‘learning by doing’. 
 20 
software industry is predominantly concentrated in the hands of US corporations.  
Because foreign firms already generally dominate areas of the market where PS firms 
depend heavily upon appropriation, local producers of software often operate in other 
areas of the market.  Local firms often compete in niche market segments, such as in 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and accounting software where knowledge in local 
laws and regulations offers them a competitive advantage (López, 2003; Marques, 
2009).  Software in these areas of the market is less generic, interests in reproduction 
are lower and firms depend less upon appropriation of the software itself.  Because local 
producers are less dependent on appropriation, F/OSS not only presents lower threats to 
these firms but might also offer benefits.  In areas of the market where dependence upon 
appropriability of software is low, F/OSS presents commercial opportunities.   
 
Businesses might profit from F/OSS through a range of business models and strategies 
in areas such as embedded software, and low and high value added services 
encompassing software customisation, training, support and maintenance (Softex, 
2005a).  Due to firms’ inability to appropriate F/OSS source code, the economic rents 
associated with these opportunities are generally lower than those associated with PS 
(Söderberg, 2008).  However, in developing countries, the service orientated business 
opportunities that F/OSS offers may be valuable in generating more highly skilled 
employment (Weerawarana and Weeratunga, 2004). 
 
Perhaps the most important economic benefit that might be derived from F/OSS 
concerns the ability to harness the productive capacity of networks through peer 
production.  The production of F/OSS – where software is produced by developers or 
hackers connected through computer networks via the Internet – embodies peer 
production (Benkler, 2002; 2006).  Across society generally, F/OSS enables knowledge 
transfer and human capital accumulation that is impossible under PS.  This facet of 
F/OSS suggests greater efficiency in the utilisation of knowledge that might stimulate 
commercial activity.  Whilst high-fixed costs present an issue for development where a 
PS model is utilised, because F/OSS harnesses network production, it helps to overcome 
this issue.  The economic upshot of F/OSS is not as simple as “PS firms losing 
revenue”, but about harnessing the network production.  Unlike firms’ revenues, the 
economic benefits of network production are hard to quantify, not least because some of 
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the benefit encompasses consumer savings.  Yet, as with technology generally, these 
benefits are likely to affect productivity across the economy as a whole.   
Democracy  
 
As well as economic benefits, F/OSS also offers political benefits.  F/OSS facilitates 
democracy by reducing costs and thus increasing social access to software.  Because 
access to F/OSS is not dependent upon a market transaction, F/OSS frees users from the 
market and thus control by market forces.  However, there is also another dimension to 
the way in which F/OSS facilitates democratisation.  The source code which comprises 
software represents rules which restrict, govern and control social behaviour (Lessig, 
2006; Silveira, 2004: 42).  By controlling access to source code, the terms under which 
software is licensed determine who may set these rules as well as view them.  If society 
is to be democratic, these rules need to be formulated through public input and be 
subject to public scrutiny.  Such input and scrutiny is denied by PS because it closes off 
access to source code, effectively permitting dictatorship by software.  If the state is to 
uphold democratic principles, the software it uses must be licensed under free/open 
source terms. 
Autonomy 
 
The independence from vendors that F/OSS offers software users is inherently political.  
Domination of systems and generic applications software by US PS firms means use of 
this software leaves countries exposed in security terms.  In the wake of the Snowden 
revelations (Mazzetti and Schmidt, 2013), use of technology for the purpose of covert 
surveillance and espionage has gained a high profile, yet such use is by no means new 
(see Aldrich, 2011; Todd and Bloch, 2003).  In relation to PS specifically, rumours of a 
NSA backdoor in Microsoft Windows emerged in the late 1990s (Campbell, 1999; Todd 
and Bloch, 2003: 52).  The ubiquity of Windows makes it an ideal intelligence 
gathering platform and use of Windows for this purpose is consistent with the notion 
that Microsoft was not broken up following its US antitrust suit because of its 
importance to US interests (see Peritz, 2010: 205).  In the same way that openness 
enhances accountability, so too does it enhance security by allowing code to be audited 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2006: 7).  F/OSS may also contribute to autonomy by 
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increasing self reliance in IT (Weerawarana and Weeratunga, 2004).  As touched upon 
above, the opportunities that F/OSS offers to adapt and learn about software allows 
developing countries to become more self-reliant in IT by facilitating the capacity to 
produce this good.     
Rationale for the State to Intervene in the Way Software is Licensed 
 
Although F/OSS offers a range of potential benefits for development, these benefits 
look unlikely to be realised in the absence of state intervention because the incentive 
structures and economics that surround software licensing tend to militate against 
F/OSS gaining greater prevalence.  Interests tend to aggregate around selective benefits, 
incentives for aggregation rising with the size of benefits and extent to which free-riders 
may be excluded (Olson, 1965; 1982).  Whilst rivalrous and excludable characteristics 
provide strong incentives for firm formation and investment in advertising around PS, 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable attributes mean these incentives will be weak in the 
case of F/OSS.  As an upshot, public awareness of PS is disproportionate to that of 
F/OSS (Comino and Manenti, 2005).  The effects of these knowledge asymmetries on 
F/OSS’ prevalence interact with other factors which tend to further diminish awareness 
of F/OSS in the wider population.  Information goods such as software are characterised 
by high fixed costs of production and low marginal costs of reproduction which mean 
competition is based on economies of scale – as firm size becomes decisive to 
competing on price, markets are prone to capture by a single firm as only the strongest 
survives (Lerner and Schankerman, 2010; Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  As mentioned 
above, economies of scale tend to favour first movers and in market segments where PS 
gained popularity before F/OSS, PS has tended to maintain a dominant market share.  
The tendency for tipping in markets for informational goods is further intensified by 
network effects, where a good’s value increases with its popularity (Weber, 2003).  
Network effects are associated with positive feedback and where goods benefit from 
these effects, they will become more popular.  By the same token, where goods enjoy 
limited popularity, positive feedback will act to diminish popularity.  Another facet of 
information goods which combines with the general dynamics that surround F/OSS to 
limit its wider adoption concerns the fact that information goods are experience goods, 
where their value only becomes apparent with use.  If the existing dominance of PS, 
together with low publicity and network effects lead to scarce awareness of F/OSS in 
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the population, even where awareness exists users are unlikely to recognise interests in 
F/OSS until they use it. 
How the State Might Promote F/OSS 
 
The state might influence the prevalence of F/OSS through a range of policies.   
Government use of software may play a central role in a wider strategy to promote 
F/OSS (Weerawarana and Weeratunga, 2004).  Software usage within the government 
affects software use in wider society because citizens have to interact with the software 
deployed by government to access government services (Lerner and Schankerman, 
2010; Rens, 2011).  The state also represents one of the largest IT users and may also 
influence use of software in wider society through demand (ibid.).  As well as raising 
awareness and encouraging use of F/OSS within the public at large, government use of 
F/OSS may stimulate economic activity linked to F/OSS (Schoonmaker, 2009a; 
Weerawarana and Weeratunga, 2004).  Education is another strategic policy area for the 
promotion of F/OSS because it may raise awareness, engender recognition of F/OSS’ 
value through use, facilitate learning and encourage the harnessing of peer production, 
raising implications for productivity across the economy.  F/OSS might be promoted 
through education by adopting F/OSS in schools and incorporating study of F/OSS 
within the teaching curriculum.  Policies aimed at improving social access to ICTs are 
another arena in which F/OSS might be promoted.  As with education, social access 
policies may raise awareness and engender recognition of F/OSS’ value within the 
wider population.  Social access policies include the provision of access to computers 
and the Internet through public computer centres and initiatives to make computer 
ownership more affordable.  Sectoral policies may be used to stimulate economic 
activity around F/OSS and may dovetail with initiatives to adopt F/OSS in the public 
sector, education or programmes to promote social access to ICTs.  F/OSS may offer 
opportunities to create local employment in service related activities such as training, 
maintenance and customisation that might increase IT self sufficiency in more 
peripheral areas.  Industrial policies may dovetail with policies in other areas, such as 
government use of software, education and social access to ICTs.  Foreign policy offers 
governments opportunities to promote F/OSS on the international stage.  Such policies 
might include collaboration with other states, lobbying for F/OSS to be adopted through 
international organisations or recognised at international meetings and fora.   
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Defining Software Licensing Policy 
 
In the context of this research, the term ‘software licensing policy’ will be used to refer 
to national government initiatives backed by senior politicians that affect the way in 
which software is licensed.  These initiatives may include ‘non-action’, occur in any 
policy area and do not necessarily acknowledge the way in which software is licensed.  
This definition is important for several reasons.  Firstly, it avoids conflation with the 
adoption, implementation and enforcement of legislation relating to the protection of 
software under copyright.  In the research, the focus is upon the terms under which 
software is licensed, not whether it is licensed or not, or whether it is being used, 
reproduced or distributed in contravention of these licensing terms, i.e. piracy.  
Secondly, policy is distinguished from the purchasing decisions and initiatives of 
government IT administrators that are likely to be motivated solely by financial and 
technical concerns rather than a political logic.  Thirdly, policy is not restricted to ‘IT 
policies’ per se.  Precisely because software is so pervasive, policies in virtually any 
policy area may involve software and thus affect the way in which software is licensed.  
In the research, policies will be separated into five categories: government use, where 
technology is adopted or procured; economic, encompassing employment as well as 
industrial/sectoral policies; education; social access to ICTs; and foreign policy, i.e. 
declarations and positions in international fora.  Fourthly, inclusion of initiatives that 
make no reference to software licensing is important because where initiatives involve 
PS, it is in PS vendors’ interests that the way in which software is licensed is viewed as 
a non-issue.  Framing of the technical as non-political constitutes a deliberate strategy 
on the part of actors that seek to control technology to exclude other actors that might 
debase their power (Evangelista, 2005).  Fifthly, it is important to recognise ‘non 
action’ as a policy because this option often reflects PS firms’ preferences.  Whilst 
individual firms have interests in policies favouring their products, PS firms publically 
advocate ‘letting the market decide’ how software is licensed as their market position 
places them in a strong position to out-compete F/OSS.   
Defining Policy Variation 
 
To identify policy variation across countries and associate it with implications for 
software use and covariation in potential causal factors, the ways in which policy might 
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vary must first be defined.  This task may be fulfilled by constructing a typology of 
software policy.  Figure 1-1, below, provides a typology that captures variation 
expected to affect the way in which software is licensed. 
 
The x-axis relates to whether a policy favours F/OSS or PS, or seeks a neutral position 
with regard to how software is licensed.  The y-axis relates to the advocated level of 
intervention that a policy encompasses, raising implications for the degree to which 
policy will affect the way in which software is licensed.  Intervention is categorized at 
three levels, the first being “absent or low”, where a policy encompasses non-action or 
declarations.  The second level, “active”, encompasses agency in pursuit of a policy 
objective, but does not resort to coercive measures such as mandates.  An active policy 
may involve the provision of goods including education but also recommendations or 
preferences.  Such a policy would encompass the provision of computers in educational 
initiatives, schemes to increase social access to ICTs, publicity and internal government 
guidelines or directives.  The third level, “mandate”, encompasses a statutory obligation 
to use software licensed under particular terms or to follow a process intended to ensure 
that software adoption or procurement decisions consider the way in which software is 
licensed. 
 
Further to the variation captured in the x and y axes of the typology, policy might also 
vary in terms of implementation.  Whilst the research is concerned with this variable, 
with politics forming the focus of the research, emphasis is placed on whether a policy 
went ahead – whether resources were released, actions took place or a policy was 
enforced – rather than its effectiveness.  Policy implementation will be captured by 
including in the typology only those initiatives where there exist reasonable grounds to 
suggest a policy was carried out. 
 
Another way in which policy may vary concerns whether or not a policy’s effects upon 
software licensing are expressed or made explicit in policy objectives.  Where an 
initiative favours software licensed under a particular licensing scheme, whether 
discrimination is expressed or not, such an initiative serves to promote a particular way 
of licensing software.  This variation is captured in the typology by detailing policies 
where discrimination is acknowledged in black and those where discrimination is 
unexpressed or implicit in grey.  
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The implications a policy bears for the way in which software is licensed may be 
discussed with relation to the quadrant within which a policy falls inside the typology.  
It is argued that only policies falling in quadrants A2 and A3 – corresponding to the 
cross-hatched area in Figure 1-1 – are likely to make a significant difference to the 
prevalence of F/OSS.  Precisely because the dominance of PS is so entrenched, only 
active discrimination in favour of F/OSS is likely to increase its prevalence.  Policies 
falling in A1 are thus likely to have little effect in terms of increasing usage of F/OSS.  
‘Neutral’ policies are unlikely to disrupt the market dominance of PS, even if they seek 
to ensure all licensing options are considered.  The notion of taking a ‘neutral’ stance in 
IT adoption emerged in the early 2000s (CompTIA, n.d.), and as this idea was pushed 
by PS advocates (see ISC; Lueders, 2005; Microsoft, n.d.; Moody, 2006; Oksanen et al., 
2005; Sasso, 2004), it appears that it suited their interests.4  Even if a policy actively 
seeks ‘neutrality’ (B2) or mandates that all software licensing schemes should be 
considered when adopting or procuring software (B3), the incentives facing public 
administrators are likely to lead to decisions that favour use of PS, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 2.  Statements expressing support for neutrality or non-action (B1) favour the 
continued dominance of PS.  Explicit promotion of PS (C1-3) is unlikely not least 
because the market dominance of PS, together with advertising and network 
externalities, makes such a policy unnecessary.  However, where policies involve large 
scale use of PS, they represent de facto promotion of PS regardless of whether such 
promotion was deliberate and would be plotted in quadrant C2.  If policies falling in A2 
and A3 reflect a pro-F/OSS stance, those plotted in B1 and C2 are suggestive of a pro-
PS position. 
 
                                                 
4
 Of course, in so far as technology reflects values, ‘neutral technology’ is an oxymoron. 
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Figure 1-1 – Typology of Software Licensing Policies 
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Variation in Software Licensing Policy across Latin America 
 
In this section, the typology presented in Figure 1-1 is employed to compare software 
licensing policies across Latin America between 1999 and 2010.  The time-frame under 
observation begins in 1999 because it was in this year that the first legislative proposals 
for the promotion of F/OSS emerged (Hahn, 2002).  F/OSS only began to gain wider 
recognition within the IT industry at the end of the 1990s (Moody, 2001), making 
policy comparisons before 1999 pointless.  From 2000 onwards, a wave of legislative 
projects to favour the use of F/OSS appeared as the issue of software licensing gained 
political recognition (CSIS, 2008; Hahn, 2002).  Partly for the scarcity of reliable data 
and partly for limited space, the comparison presented here has been restricted to South 
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American countries, Cuba and Mexico.  The comparison is split into two time periods, 
1999 to the end of 2002 or T1 which corresponds to the period prior to the Lula and 
Kirchner governments and 2003 to 2010 or T2 which corresponds to the period in 
which these governments were in power. 
 
Figure 1-2 presents policy outcomes in T1.5  It can be seen that with the exception of 
Cuba and Mexico, policies were implicit and tended to favour PS.  Figure 1-2 presents 
only those policies for which documentary evidence has been found but it is probable 
that in terms of government use of software, the policies of all South American 
countries would appear in B1.  In the T1 period, F/OSS was still only beginning to enter 
the realm of national politics in Latin America and it is unsurprising that bar the 
exceptions of Cuba and Mexico, there is an absence of policies in A2 and A3.  During 
T1, legislative projects relating to F/OSS promotion were submitted at a national level 
in Peru (Villanueva Nuñez, 2001; Villanueva Nuñez and Rodrich Ackerman, 2002) as 
well as in Argentina (Dragan, 2000) and Brazil (Bittencourt, 2001; Miranda, 2002; 
Pinheiro, 1999; Wanderer, 2000) but none were approved.   
 
Figure 1-3 shows software licensing policies in the T2 period.  The range of policy 
variation in T2 presents a sharp contrast to that in T1.  After 2002, it can be seen that 
there are broadly two, separate groups of countries based on policy outcome – a group 
with policies favourable to F/OSS that fall in A2 and A3, and another with policies 
favourable to PS that fall in B1 and C2.  The pattern of policy variation lends credence 
to the notion that software licensing policies are associated with political bias, with 
governments further to the left more likely to favour F/OSS and governments further to 
the right more likely to favour PS.  Where governments were leftist, they tended to 
adopt policies favourable to F/OSS.  With the exception of Alan García’s 2006-2011 
government in Peru, which reflected a more market orientated bias (Tanaka, 2008), the 
governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil (2003-2010), Cuba, Rafael Correa in 
Ecuador (2007 onwards), Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay (2005-2010), Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela (1999-2013) and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008-2012) were all left of 
centre (Corrales, 2008; Lambert, 2011; Lievesley, 2009).  Moreover, it appears that the 
more leftwing a government is – or characteristic of Castañeda’s notion of the ‘wrong 
                                                 
5
 Numbers in superscript refer to Table 1 in Appendix 1 which presents further detail for each policy, 
including secondary sources.  
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left’ – the more emphatic its support for F/OSS.  Within the group of F/OSS friendly 
governments, it was those more radical governments – those of Hugo Chávez and 
Rafael Correa – which mandated use of F/OSS.  With the exception of Cuba, amongst 
the governments that promoted F/OSS, those that stopped short of forcing the issue 
were less radical.  That of García was centre-right, those of Vázquez and Lula reflected 
a liberal inclination, representing exponents of the ‘right left’ (Castañeda, 2006) and that 
of Lugo whilst viewed as progressive, was a coalition, the mainstay of which was a 
rightist political party (Lambert, 2008).  By contrast, governments that were further to 
the right tended to adopt policies favourable to PS.  The centre-left governments of 
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010)(Silva, 2011) were 
considered closely aligned with market orientated policies (Tussie and Heidrich, 2008) 
and the ‘right left’ (Castañeda, 2006) whilst those of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) in 
Colombia and Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2010) in Mexico 
were right of centre (Burton, 2011; Dawson, 2011; Raby, 2011).  The two countries that 
stand out in the comparison, challenging the putative association between political bias 
and software licensing policy are Argentina and Brazil.   
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Figure 1-2 – National Software Licensing Policies in T1 (1999 – 2002) 
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Figure 1-3 – National Software Licensing Policies in T2 (2003 – 2010) 
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If the policies of centre-right governments such as García’s or other ‘right left’ 
governments like Vázquez’s appear in A2 alongside those of the Lula governments, the 
Lula governments stand out for the number and range of F/OSS initiatives adopted.  
Whilst F/OSS initiatives were adopted in Peru and Uruguay – in each case, educational 
initiatives involving the One Laptop Per Child programme – in both these countries 
government procurement policies were favourable to the use of PS.  Whilst the number 
and range of F/OSS friendly policies adopted in Brazil suggest F/OSS promotion was a 
priority there, the same cannot be said of Peru and Uruguay where only one, 
comparatively narrow F/OSS initiative involving partnership with a third party, 
appeared alongside policies favourable to PS.  Furthermore, although the mandates 
adopted in Venezuela and Ecuador reflect willingness to go further in terms of 
intervention on behalf of promoting F/OSS, the range of initiatives adopted in Brazil 
reflect greater effort toward this goal.  In short, despite their more liberal leanings, the 
Lula governments stand out as the leading proponents of F/OSS amongst other 
governments with policies appearing in A2 an A3. 
 
The policies of the Kirchner governments stand out, because despite these governments’ 
characterisation as populist and radical, they apparently favoured PS across a range of 
policy areas.  Whilst the initiative featured in B2 – one which involved the provision of 
computers for schools, with both F/OSS and PS being loaded on to these computers – 
the initiative was arguably more favourable to PS as the government signed an 
agreement with Microsoft which included training (MECyT, 2004) whilst the free and 
open source software was reportedly unusable (FVL A, 2010a).  If the Lula 
governments reflect a government-wide policy of promoting F/OSS, the Kirchner 
governments reflect a general policy favourable to PS.   
 
Each favouring a distinct way of licensing software across a range of policy areas, the 
Kirchner and Lula governments are emblematic of contrasting policy positions on 
software licensing.  Depicting the divergence in software licensing policy in Argentina 
and Brazil in T2, Figure 1-4 illustrates the change in policies between T1 and T2.   
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Figure 1-4 – Change in Software Licensing Policy in Argentina and Brazil between 
T1 and T2  
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Explaining Variation in Software Licensing Policy 
 
This thesis argues that the variation in software licensing policy across Argentina and 
Brazil stems principally from two factors: the degree to which F/OSS advocates were 
embedded within institutions such as political parties and the state and the level of 
concentration that existed in the organisation of the software sector. 
 
Whilst ideas and motivations for promoting F/OSS may exist, they have to be acted 
upon if they are to be translated into policy.  However, the incentive structures that limit 
the aggregation of interests around FOSS suggest agency towards promoting F/OSS is 
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likely to be low.  Not only is mobilisation around F/OSS promotion likely to be low, but 
where interests are diffuse and heterogeneous, as those surrounding F/OSS ordinarily 
are, capacity for political action is likely to be inhibited by reduced opportunities for 
cooperation and organisation (Olson, 1965).  In contrast, mobilisation around PS is 
likely to be strong and highly capable of coordinating political action as interests are 
concentrated and homogenous, facilitating coordination and organisation.  By 
interacting with incentives, the economics of information goods are only likely to 
intensify the asymmetries in collective action surrounding software licensing. 
 
Because PS advocates are likely to be strong and oppose F/OSS promotion, it would 
appear that F/OSS promotion has to win backing from the highest levels of government 
if it is to be adopted.  Yet precisely because mobilisation and public awareness 
surrounding software licensing are imbalanced in the way that they are likely be, 
political leaders’ incentives suggest they are more likely to adopt policies that favour 
PS.  With pressure from PS advocates likely to be high and public awareness of F/OSS 
low, the political tradeoffs are balanced in favour of PS.   
 
If the incentives surrounding software licensing appear to diminish the likelihood of 
F/OSS promotion arising, why would governments promote F/OSS and how would they 
come to do so?  I argue that institutional configurations and patterns in the organisation 
of interests hold the key to this puzzle by affecting how actors with distinct interests 
might influence policy. 
 
In the literature on comparative political economy, the organisation of interests and 
institutions comprise two key types of variable which affect policy choice (Gourevitch, 
1986; Haggard, 1990; Hall, 1989: 10–12; 1997).  Patterns in the organisation of 
interests have a bearing on policy choice by conditioning actors’ capacity to mobilise 
resources and support and, as a consequence, their ability to lobby political decision-
makers.  By mediating the aggregation of interests, institutions may similarly affect 
policy choice by affecting actors’ capacities to mobilise resources and support.  
Institutions may also affect policy choice by providing ties to those areas of the state 
that hold authority over policymaking, offering opportunities to influence policy 
through these ties.  The ways in which these two types of variable affect opportunities 
for collective action and actors’ capacities offer insights into how weak actors such as 
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F/OSS advocates might become stronger and how the power of strong actors such as PS 
advocates might be attenuated, precipitating conditions in which F/OSS promotion may 
take hold.  If institutions can facilitate collective action, then they might offer F/OSS 
advocates opportunities to mobilise support and increase their influence over policy.  
F/OSS advocates are more likely to garner the benefits of institutions where they are 
‘embedded’ within them, i.e. affiliated to or located within institutions.  Such 
embeddedness may thus indicate the extent to which F/OSS advocates will be able to 
influence policy.  Although incentives for collective action tend to strengthen interests 
around PS, fragmentation in the organisation of the software sector might attenuate PS 
advocates’ influence over policy.  The level of cohesiveness within the organisation of 
the software sector may consequently indicate PS advocates’ capacity to influence 
policy.  It is argued that different configurations in F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness and software sector cohesion across Argentina and Brazil yielded the 
variation that occurred in software licensing policy across these countries between 2003 
and 2010.  Chapter 2 explains in greater detail the mechanisms by which institutions 
and interests might affect policy outcomes. 
1.1 Research Design 
 
In view of the research aims of explaining how as well as why software licensing 
policies came to be adopted, the research has been designed to illuminate the 
mechanisms by which the two explanatory factors – F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness and software sector cohesiveness – yielded policy outcomes as well as 
identify associations between these factors and policy outcomes.  A small-N study, 
encompassing comparison across two case studies is ideal for addressing these aims. 
 
Case studies allow phenomena to be investigated in detail and in depth, facilitating 
identification of the mechanisms that connect causes with effects and understanding of 
how mechanisms operate (George and Bennett, 2005; Mahoney, 2007; Mahoney and 
Goertz, 2006).  Case studies also enable a high degree of “conceptual validity” (George 
and Bennett, 2005: 19).  By offering advantages in the conceptualisation of policies and 
political phenomena which are difficult to measure, they allow “contextualized 
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comparison[s]” (ibid: 19) that are “analytically equivalent” (Locke and Thelan, 1998, 
quoted in George and Bennett, 2005: 19).   
Such conceptualisation enables the operationalisation of the two causal factors upon 
which the research is focused, both of which are based upon observable phenomena and 
coded dichotomously (weak versus strong).  Where F/OSS advocates’ participation 
within or affiliation to institutions is used as an indicator of their ‘institutional 
embeddedness’, the institutional organisation of the software sector is used as an 
indicator of ‘sectoral cohesion’. 
 
One of the trade-offs of using a small-N methodology is that findings are contingent 
upon the conditions that exist in the cases under investigation.  This means case studies 
are only able to inform ‘contingent’ or ‘partial’ as opposed to universal generalisations 
(George and Bennett, 2005; Lijphart, 1971).  In view of the research focus on 
explaining policy outcomes in the cases under study, this limitation is not an issue here. 
1.1.1 Research Methods 
 
A small-N study permits a mix of comparative, within-case and counterfactual methods, 
all of which are employed here.   
 
The method of “structured, focused comparison” (George and Bennett, 2005: 67–72), is 
utilised to identify factors that drove policy outcomes across the two cases studies.  By 
holding other factors relatively constant, the role played by F/OSS advocates’ 
institutional embeddedness and software sector cohesiveness in driving policy outcomes 
may be inferred from covariation between policy outcomes and these putative causal 
factors.  By dividing both cases into two time periods, 1999 to 2002 and 2003 to 2010, 
the research analyses how different configurations of the two explanatory factors of 
theoretical interest covaried with policy outcomes across cases (or spatially) and 
longitudinally. 
 
Although associations between independent and dependent variables are used to 
identify the relative importance of independent variables in driving outcomes on the 
dependent variable, it is not possible, through this method alone, to verify whether 
observed covariation between variables reflects causal relationships.  Furthermore, in 
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this study, where the research is concerned with assessing the causal importance of two 
independent variables together, it is not possible through comparison to verify whether 
an outcome is driven by one of these variables alone or both at the same time.  These 
issues may be addressed through within case analysis (George and Bennett, 2005: 153, 
159). 
 
Within case process tracing (Bennett, 2008; 2010; Fairfield, 2013; George and Bennett, 
2005; Mahoney, 2000) – a method equivalent to that described by Brady et al. (2006: 
355) in their discussion of “causal process observations (CPOs)” – entails gathering  
“insight[s] or piece[s] of data that provide … information about context, process or 
mechanism”, which are used to elucidate the “intervening casual process – the causal 
chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the 
outcome of the dependent variable” (ibid: 206).  By enabling causation to be inferred 
through the sequence of events or steps that link cause(s) and effect(s), process tracing 
embodies a way of inferring causation that is distinct to that entailed in comparative 
methods – including large-N cross-case statistical studies – where causation is instead 
inferred through correlation (Bennett, 2010; George and Bennett, 2005).  The way in 
which causation is inferred through use of process tracing enables explication of causal 
mechanisms, the identification of causal direction, specification of how multiple causes 
may lead to an outcome and avoidance of misattribution of causation on the basis of 
spurious association (George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett, 2008; 2010).   
 
Process tracing also offers analytic leverage in addressing the issue of endogeneity, 
where “the values of the explanatory variables are caused by dependent variables” 
(Munck, 2004: 111).  By offering opportunities to observe the operation of mechanisms 
through sequences of discrete steps over time, process tracing allows inference as to 
whether causal relationships are characterised by circularity or not.  It enables 
inferences into “whether change in the independent [variable(s)] in fact preceded 
change in the dependent variable and, more significantly, by what process change in the 
independent [variable(s)] produced the outcome” (Munck, 2004: 113).  Process tracing 
not only permits inference as to whether endogeneity actually exists.  By extension, it 
also makes it possible to identify where an outcome was driven by circular 
relationships, factors independent of the outcome or a mixture of both. 
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The research complements comparative and within case methods with counterfactual 
analysis (Brady, 2008; Fearon, 1991) to bolster causal inference.  Van Evera (1997: 25) 
describes counterfactual analysis as “examining history, trying to ‘predict’ how events 
would have unfolded had a few elements of the story been changed”.  Counterfactual 
analyses rely upon theories (Van Evera, 1997: 25–26) as well as contextual knowledge 
(Collier, 2011: 825; Fearon, 1991: 175–176) – in effect, observations – that enable 
predictions to be made regarding the effect of a factor on an event.  Counterfactual 
analysis may be used to test hypotheses regarding the role of a factor in driving an 
event.  As Fearon (1991: 189) explains, “a cause of a particular historical event may be 
established by imagining the effect of its (counterfactual) absence”.  In this research, 
counterfactuals are utilised to adjudicate between potential explanations where multiple 
hypotheses are consonant with a given outcome. 
 
Employing cross-case comparison, process tracing and counterfactual analysis together, 
the research strengthens the overall causal analysis by deriving causal inference from 
multiple, independent sources. 
1.1.2 Case Selection 
 
The benefits of examining the relationships between the explanatory factors of 
theoretical interest and policy through a comparison of Argentina and Brazil are that 
other factors expected to matter to policy are either similar or vary in ways that negate 
their significance in shaping policy outcomes.  As Gerring (2006: 133) notes, “[s]ome 
flexibility is admissible on the vector of controls … that are ‘held constant’ across … 
cases.  Nonidentity [being] tolerable if the deviation runs counter to the predicted 
hypothesis”. 
 
As already noted, political bias varied across the two cases in a way that ran counter to 
the policy outcomes observed.  Both prior to as well as after 2003, government 
attributes appeared to favour F/OSS promotion in Argentina whilst militate against it in 
Brazil.  If in Argentina, the 2002-3 Duhalde administration was not identified as leftist 
like the subsequent Kirchner governments, its rejection of the prescriptions of the IMF, 
move away from neoliberalism towards more interventionist policies and 
accommodation of social demands (Godio, 2004; Panizza, 2009: 244; 2014; Riggirozzi, 
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2009) appeared congruent with F/OSS promotion.  By contrast, the pro-market and US 
friendly orientation of the Cardoso government in Brazil (Vigevani and Oliveira, 2007) 
looked coherent with policies beneficial to PS.  From 2003 onwards, the distinctions 
between governments in the two countries only appeared to widen, as the Kirchners 
moved increasingly toward the left whilst Lula maintained the liberal orientation of his 
predecessor.  Consequently, whilst conditions in Argentina looked increasingly 
favourable for F/OSS promotion, they continued to appear unfavourable in Brazil. 
 
A country’s power vis-à-vis the US is likely to matter to software licensing policy 
because as the principle benefactor of trade in PS and the most powerful state in the 
international system, the US possesses strong interests in PS and the capacity to 
pressure other states into complying with its preferences.  US concern over F/OSS 
promotion in developing countries, as well as its attentiveness to the interests of 
Microsoft, is signalled in the US government cables published by WikiLeaks (2011a; 
2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 2011e) and the intervention of the US ambassador to Peru over a 
Peruvian legislative proposal to promote F/OSS (Chan, 2004).  In terms of stature on 
the international stage, whilst Brazil is the more powerful of the two, comprising the 
largest countries in South America and as members of MERCOSUR, Argentina and 
Brazil possess similar positions within the international system as well as power vis-à-
vis the US (De Cruz et al., 1993; Klom, 2003; Tulchin, 1996).  Both countries are 
capable of resisting powerful actors in the international system, as demonstrated by 
Brazil’s successful stand against the US government over the cost of US produced AIDs 
drugs, a conflict in which the US backed down (Nunn et al., 2009) and Argentina’s 
tough stance in renegotiating its international debt with the IMF, in which it won out 
(Benton, 2009; Levitsky, 2008).  This capacity to resist external pressure suggests that 
both countries should be equally capable of promoting F/OSS in the face of opposition 
from US software firms and the US government.  
 
In relation to institutional arrangements, both countries possess federal, presidential 
systems of government in which the presidency is in a comparatively strong position to 
influence legislative output (Alston et al., 2008; Jones, 1997; Mainwaring, 1997; 
Mustapic, 2002; Spiller and Tommasi, 2008).  The ability of Argentinean and Brazilian 
presidents to determine legislative outcomes is bolstered by strong legislative powers, 
which allow the capability to legislate by decree (Jones, 1997: 285; Mustapic, 2002; 
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Santos and Vilarouca, 2008: 70; Shugart and Carey, 1992: 140–1) and the capacity to 
influence the legislative branch through the provision of resources (Calvo and Murillo, 
2005; Samuels, 2006; Santos and Vilarouca, 2008).  From 2003, presidents’ leverage 
over the legislature was further enhanced by strong ruling party discipline (Jones, 2002; 
Samuels, 2004) in combination with majorities or generally strong coalitions in 
congress (Levitsky and Murillo, 2008; Samuels, 2008; Santos and Vilarouca, 2008).  
The relative strength of presidents vis-à-vis legislatures in Argentina and Brazil largely 
removes executive-legislative relations as a factor that might explain policy variation 
across these countries. 
 
Although both countries witnessed a downsizing of the state in the 1990s (Amann, 
2003; Manzetti, 2000; Oszlak, 2003), bureaucratic capacity is typically viewed as 
relatively low in Argentina (Bambaci, 2007; Spiller and Tommasi, 2008) whilst 
relatively high in Brazil (Alston et al., 2008; Montero, 2006).  Whilst bureaucratic 
capacity may affect perceptions of the administrative viability of adopting F/OSS and as 
a consequence, choices in software licensing policy, as will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 2, adoption of F/OSS has as much or more to do with the way in which 
IT administration is organised within the state as it has with capacity in so far as this 
concerns material resources. 
Attributes of the Software Sector 
 
The benefits of comparing Argentina and Brazil include the fact that the software 
sectors in both countries reflected broad similarities during the period under study.  The 
characteristics of the software sector are likely to have an impact on policy outcomes for 
political as well as economic reasons.  As well as affecting the economic tradeoffs 
associated with favouring different software licensing schemes through policy, these 
characteristics will influence sectoral interests, policy preferences, capacity for 
collective action and structural power.   
 
The sector’s size and participation in exports provide an indication of the sector’s 
economic importance and structural power.  Table 1 presents data reflecting the size of 
the software sector together with its participation in national exports in Argentina and 
Brazil through the 2000s.  The Brazilian software sector is several times the size of its 
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Argentinean counterpart in absolute terms, corresponding to the much greater size of the 
Brazilian economy.  However, in both countries the sector accounts for less than 1% of 
total production.  The relatively small size of the sector in both Argentina and Brazil 
reflects its limited economic importance and correspondingly low structural power in 
these countries. 
 
Table 1 – Software Sector as a Share of National Production and Exports 
 
        
 2000 2001 2003 2004 2007 2008 2009 
  Argentina  
        Software sector revenues as % 
of GDP 
0.71§  0.72§ 0.72§ 0.72§ 0.70 0.70 
        Software exports as % of total 
exports 
0.11  0.52 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.83 
  Brazil  
        Software sector revenues as % 
of GDP 
 0.71‡  0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 
        Software exports as % of total 
exports 
0.06   0.12 0.17 0.15 0.2 
Source: Data for GDP and total exports from World Bank. Unless indicated otherwise, sectoral data is 
elaborated from ABES (2005; 2008; 2009; 2010) for Brazil and from CESSI (2011a) for Argentina; 
‡Botelho, Stefanuto & Veloso (2002); §Lopez & Ramos (2008). 
 
The balance of trade in an economic activity provides another indication of its economic 
significance and political leverage.  Although data on Argentina is incomplete, it may 
be assumed that the balance of trade in software was broadly similar in both countries 
through the 2000s.  The software sector in Brazil reflected a negative trade balance in 
the 2000s, imports exceeding exports by at least ten times throughout this period.  There 
is scarce data on the value of software imports in Argentina in the 2000s, but even 
though Argentinean software exports grew on average by around 20% between 2003 
and 2007 (López and Ramos, 2008) – there occurring a similar trend in Brazil (Softex, 
2009) – it is likely the balance of sectoral trade was negative in Argentina too 
throughout the 2000s.  For the two years where data exists, 2000 and 2002, the value of 
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imported software products was US$627 million and US$326 million respectively 
whilst software exports were just US$35 million and US$70 million (Chudnovsky et al., 
2001; López, 2003).  Notwithstanding the growth in Argentinean software exports after 
2003, the value of these exports did not exceed the value of imports for the year 2000 
until 2010 when they registered US$629 million (CESSI, 2011a).  As it may be 
assumed that the value of software imports also witnessed significant growth over this 
ten year period, if it took ten years for the value of exports to match that of imports in 
2000, it seems likely the value of imports in 2010 still significantly surpassed the value 
of exports. 
 
The composition of the sector will affect sectoral interests and preferences on software 
licensing policy.  Whilst it is possible to deduce the software licensing interests of 
different segments of the sector, there is a scarcity of data breaking down activity within 
the sector in sufficient detail or in such a way as to observe the relative sizes of these 
segments.  In the absence of such data, it is necessary to study indicators that might act 
as proxies for observing interests in software licensing. 
 
Whilst crude indicators, the participation of products and services and imported and 
locally produced products within sectoral sales offer proxies to observe the relative 
weight of interests in PS and F/OSS.  Without a breakdown of service activities it is not 
possible to say how far these activities connect to software licensing if at all.  However, 
whilst services may be associated with PS, they are not dependent on appropriability 
and most of this activity is likely to be unrelated to PS.  Firms based around services are 
unlikely to challenge F/OSS promotion and may even support it if the services they 
provide are connected to or may benefit from FOSS.  Products are more likely to face a 
threat from F/OSS, yet the level of threat is likely to vary across imported and locally 
produced products.  Imported products are likely to be dominated by package software 
easily substituted by F/OSS and reflect the interests of multinational PS vendors and 
their local distributors.  As discussed above, local producers of software products are 
likely to face a lower threat from F/OSS.   
 
Table 2 offers a view on the participation of services, imported and locally produced 
products in sectoral revenues across Argentina and Brazil, reflecting broadly similar 
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trends in both countries.6  The figures presented in Table 2 suggest that the relative 
importance of services within the sector was slightly higher in Brazil than in Argentina.  
However, from the mid 2000s, services grew in Argentina, suggesting the relative 
importance of services was the same if not greater in Argentina than in Brazil.    With 
regard to software products, it can be see that in both Argentina and Brazil, imports 
accounted for around two thirds of products sold, implying interests hostile to F/OSS 
promotion dominated the sector in these countries.  In Brazil, around 70% of firms 
involved in the commercialisation of software products were dedicated to distribution 
(ABES, 2005; 2006; 2007), an activity generally associated with imports.  As the share 
of imports in products was similar across both countries, it can be assumed that a 
similarly high percentage of firms were dedicated to resale of imported products in 
Argentina.  Firms specialising in the local production of software products accounted 
for around 30% of sales and were concentrated in market segments where they 
possessed a competitive advantage in knowledge of local accounting and tax regimes 
(Chudnovsky et al., 2001; Botelho et al., 2005).   
 
                                                 
6
 Due to a scarcity of published data, it is not possible to compare the two countries in the same years.  
The years for which data exists for Argentina is unfortunate as these years coincide with recession, 
economic crisis and a 2002 devaluation and the figures are consequently likely to be distorted by 
contraction of domestic demand and changes in exchange rates.  Due to the devaluation, vendors of 
imported products witnessed the local currency value of their revenues increase whilst firms developing 
software locally saw their revenues drop (López, 2003: 83). 
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Table 2 – Revenue & Structure of Software Sector in Brazil and Argentina 
 
 
  
 Argentina Brazil 
 
    
 2000 2002 2004 2006 
     Activity % % % % 
     Sale of software products 49 52 39.5 35.9 
     
- Developed locally 17 (35†) 9 (17†) 10.7 (27†) 11.7 (32†) 
     
- Imported 32 (65†) 43 (83†) 28.8 (73†) 24.2 (67†) 
     Sale of services 51 48 60.5 64.1 
     Total Sales 100 100 100 100 
     Exports 1.75 9.22 2.11 7.87 
Source: Argentine figures from Lopéz (2003)(exports elaborated).  Brazilian figures elaborated from 
ABES (2005; 2007). †As percentage of total products sold. 
 
The composition of trade is another factor that might influence the relative political 
weight of different segments of the sector.  Whilst in both countries through the 2000s 
the balance of trade in software was likely negative and software exports grew (Softex, 
2009: 38), this growth was more pronounced in Argentina.  Exports accounted for 20% 
of sectoral revenues in Argentina in 2003 (López and Ramos, 2008: 7) whilst just over 
5% in Brazil in 2006 (Softex, 2009: 38).  In Argentina, the growth in exports was 
related mainly to services including activities such as Business Process Operations 
(BPO) and call centres (López and Ramos, 2008) that had little if anything to do with 
software per se.  It would appear that in Brazil too, the increases in exports were 
associated with services (Softex, 2009: 38).  As increases in exports were generally 
associated with services, it can be assumed these increases bore limited significance in 
terms of influencing the power of firms with interests in pushing or resisting the 
promotion of F/OSS. 
 
Concentration in the software sector may affect sectoral preferences toward software 
licensing policy by influencing the capacity of multinationals to mobilise and coordinate 
the sector.  Although multinationals’ interests in software licensing vary, amongst the 
most important possess strong interests in PS, Microsoft being the prime example.  As 
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the principle opponent of F/OSS promotion, Microsoft’s market power is likely to affect 
the preferences of the sector overall as it allows the firm to mobilise support amongst 
local resellers through downstream linkages.  Table 3 shows that software sectors in 
both Argentina and Brazil reflected high levels of concentration around multinational 
firms at the beginning of the 2000s.   The fact that the years featured coincide with the 
crisis in Argentina likely accentuates the participation of foreign firms in sectoral 
revenues in Argentina.  However, if concentration around the interests of foreign firms 
remained higher in Argentina through the 2000s, it is uncertain whether concentration 
necessarily favoured interests opposed to F/OSS.  In 2005, in both Argentina and Brazil, 
IBM – a firm with interests in F/OSS as well as PS – led the sector in terms of overall 
revenues.  However, in terms of revenue derived exclusively from software, Microsoft 
was by far the principle firm in Brazil, these revenues being more than double those of 
the next largest firm, which was also IBM (Marques, 2009: 75).  Figures for revenue 
derived exclusively from software are unavailable for Argentina, but in terms of overall 
revenues, Microsoft was only the eleventh highest selling firm in the Argentinean sector 
(López and Ramos, 2008: 36).   
 
Table 3 – Comparison of the Composition of Revenues and Employment in the 
Software Sector in Argentina and Brazil, 2000 & 2002 
 
 
  
 Revenues Employment 
 
    
 
Argentina Brazil Argentina Brazil 
 
      By origin 2000 2002 2002 2000 2002 2002 
       Foreign firms 66% 81% 53% 42% 36% 11% 
       Local firms 34% 19% 47% 58% 64% 89% 
 
      TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Sources: López (2003) and data elaborated from Roselino (2006). 
 
Regarding how wider economic circumstances might have affected the costs and 
benefits of different software licensing models in the 2000s, mention should be made of 
the economic crisis and subsequent devaluation in Argentina at the beginning of the 
decade.  Whilst Brazil suffered its own financial crisis in 1998 and subsequent 
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devaluations, these events lacked the severity of those in Argentina.  A severe economic 
crisis and devaluation might be expected to affect the tradeoffs associated with different 
software licensing schemes and the relative absence of such events in Brazil might be 
viewed as problematic in terms of control.  However, as with political bias, it is argued 
that the pattern of variation in wider economic circumstances made the policy outcomes 
that occurred less rather than more likely.  In terms of the tradeoffs associated with 
different licensing schemes, it is argued that all else equal, the Argentinean crisis 
increased rather than reduced the likelihood of F/OSS promotion by increasing the 
financial incentives for adopting F/OSS.   
1.1.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Interviews formed a principle source of primary data.  In order to provide scope for 
cross examination and attain greater objectivity, in each country, around sixty 
interviews were conducted with key informants from government, industry, the F/OSS 
community and wider society, representing a range of contrasting positions on software 
licensing.  Whilst inadequate as a source of reliable data in itself, print and Internet 
journalism were used to corroborate information gained from other sources.  The 
observations gathered through data collection were triangulated with one another for 
substantiation.  Process tracing was utilised to establish connections between variables. 
 
Observation of legislative activity relating to software licensing was facilitated by the 
fact that the legislative process generates a paper trail.  Information on legislative 
proposals as well as laws was accessed via the Internet although additional information 
was obtained by visiting and speaking to actors in various areas of legislatures as well 
as the executive branch.  In addition to interviews, activity in committees was observed 
by gathering meeting minutes and committee reports.  Policy implementation was 
observed through interviews and documentary sources such as government literature, 
implementation guides and reports, public expenditure figures and media commentary. 
 
Government statistics bureaus and business associations were contacted to obtain data 
on production and trade, allowing assessment of the economics surrounding software in 
each country.  The costs of using and switching software within the public sector were 
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informed through interviews with those responsible for administering IT infrastructure 
within the state, along with figures on public expenditure.   
 
Understanding of actors’ material interests, resources and the general dynamics of 
collective action were informed by speaking with actors from the private and third 
sectors.  Private sector actors included firms operating in different segments of the 
software and wider technology sectors and also business associations.  Actors in wider 
society included NGOs and activists connected with F/OSS and consumer interests.  
Interviews with technical and legal experts were used to decipher technological and 
legal issues affecting actors’ interests, capacities and strategies.  Interviews were 
supplemented with economic data, journalism and documents such as reports published 
by private and third sector actors. 
 
The affect of ideological disposition upon software politics may be investigated through 
interviews and triangulated with press reporting and academic literature. 
 
Understanding of the state, its institutions and the policymaking process was informed 
through interviews with current or former high level officials who play, or have played, 
a key role in shaping policy in the areas of industry and trade, science and technology, 
intellectual property, education and social policy.  Senior public sector IT administrators 
were interviewed to gain insight into their role in shaping software policy.  A range of 
documents including org-charts, process documents, reports and other publications was 
gathered to corroborate interview sources.  
1.2 Thesis Summary 
 
The thesis is laid out as follows.  Chapter 2 defines in greater detail the explanatory 
factors, sets out the mechanisms by which they might affect software licensing policy, 
discusses how factors might be observed and finishes up by considering alternative 
explanations.   
 
After summarizing explanatory factors and the mechanisms by which they might 
operate, I explain the incentive structures surrounding collective action around software 
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licensing and how these interact with economics.  Understanding of these incentives is 
important because they condition the capacities of F/OSS advocates and PS advocates 
to organise and mobilise resources and thus the ability of these actors to translate their 
preferences into policy.  I argue that in combination with economic factors, the structure 
of incentives surrounding software licensing mean that ordinarily, the capacity of 
F/OSS advocates to influence policy will be low whilst that of PS advocates will be 
high. 
 
I continue by explaining how the power of F/OSS advocates might be enhanced through 
institutions whilst that of PS advocates might be attenuated by the organisation of 
interests in the software sector, thus affecting the capacities of these two sets of actor to 
influence policy.  Institutions might enhance the capacity of F/OSS advocates to 
translate their preferences into policy by providing resources and ties to government 
actors.  The organisation of interests in the software sector might attenuate the capacity 
of PS advocates to translate their preferences into policy by reducing the ability of these 
actors to mobilise and coordinate sectoral interests. 
 
The empirical chapters examine the politics of software licensing in the two country 
case studies through the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 
conducts an analysis of mobilisation around F/OSS and the organisation of the software 
sector in both countries in the T1 period.  Chapter 4 pursues a similar analysis of 
mobilisation in favour of as well as in opposition to F/OSS promotion in T2 Argentina.  
Chapter 5 replicates the analysis carried out in the previous chapter in T2 Brazil.   
 
Chapter 3 explains the absence of F/OSS promotion in Argentina and Brazil between 
1999 and the end of 2002, arguing that this outcome resulted mainly from F/OSS 
advocates’ inability to persuade executives to adopt F/OSS promotion rather than the 
efforts of opponents seeking to prevent it.  In this period, there was little to suggest 
F/OSS promotion would imminently emerge and mobilisation against such a policy was 
subsequently low.  At the same time, PS advocates’ capacity to mobilise the interests of 
the software sector against F/OSS would have been attenuated by weak sectoral 
cohesion.  Although cohesion was weak in both countries, it appeared stronger in Brazil 
than in Argentina, making F/OSS promotion seem less likely in Brazil.  F/OSS 
advocates’ institutional embeddedness in this period was weak, limiting their capacity 
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to mobilise political support and forge ties with government actors.  Remote from the 
government, F/OSS advocates lacked influence with political leaders and their demands 
either went unheard or were ignored by those with the power to promote F/OSS. 
 
Chapter 4 explains why software licensing policy under the Kirchner governments 
favoured PS.  It is argued that this outcome stemmed from a strengthening in the 
concentration of interests in the software sector whilst F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness remained weak.  Stronger sectoral cohesion enhanced the capacity of the 
software sector to lobby the government by increasing organisational capacity, 
coordination and the legitimacy of sectoral demands.  Moreover, stronger sectoral 
cohesion bolstered PS advocates’ capacity to mobilise the software sector and present 
their narrow interests as coherent with those of the wider sector as a whole.  At the same 
time, F/OSS advocates’ remained remote from incumbent political forces and the 
government in general, reducing their ability to mobilise resources and forge 
relationships with political leaders.  With the lobbying capacity of PS advocates 
enhanced whilst that of F/OSS advocates remained weak, the former were able to 
persuade the government to resist promoting F/OSS whilst politicians effectively 
ignored the demands of the latter. 
 
Chapter 5 explains why software policy under the Lula governments favoured F/OSS.  
It is argued that this outcome stemmed from a strengthening in F/OSS advocates’ 
institutional embeddedness whilst cohesion in the organisation of the software sector 
remained weak.  Stronger institutional embeddedness offered F/OSS advocates access 
to political leaders through ties, facilitating these actors’ capacity to persuade political 
leaders to promote F/OSS.  Stronger institutional embeddedness also offered F/OSS 
advocates access to resources which enabled them to overcome the costs of collective 
action and mobilise wider political support.  At the same time, weak cohesion in the 
software sector reduced the capacity of the sector to organise and pressure the 
government.  Weak cohesion also attenuated the capacity of PS advocates to mobilise 
sectoral interests and present their narrow interests as coherent with the wider interests 
of the sector overall.  As the lobbying capacity of F/OSS advocates increased whilst that 
of PS advocates was limited, the former were able to translate their preferences into 
F/OSS despite vehement opposition from the latter.  
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The conclusion discusses the research findings and contributions.  The research makes 
two principle contributions to academic knowledge.  The first is to show the importance 
of interests and institutions as drivers of software licensing policy where existing 
explanations have tended to emphasise agency and ideas.  The second is to demonstrate 
how both interests and institutions may affect policy simultaneously by explicating the 
mechanisms by which these factors do so.  By providing insights into the workings of 
causal mechanisms, the research also contributes to the comparative political economy 
literature.  Within this literature, the characteristics of the state are recognised as playing 
an important role in shaping patterns of association and thereby affecting the capacity of 
collective actors to influence policy.  However, discussion tends to focus upon how the 
state affects patterns of collective action outside of the state.  I provide new perspective 
on this discussion by showing that the state also affects possibilities for actors situated 
inside it to instigate collective action and influence policy autonomously.
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2 Explaining Variation in Software Licensing Policy 
 
By affecting the appropriability of software source code, policy influences the interests 
of the actors arrayed around software by determining who benefits from software and 
how much.  As a consequence, policy lies at the heart of a struggle amongst these 
actors.  However, this struggle is about more than the financial interests of producers 
versus consumers.  By affecting control over the rules that software embodies – rules 
that in turn regulate, govern and control social activity – it is also a struggle over rights, 
freedom and democracy.  On the one side of this struggle are PS advocates, comprising 
business associations and firms including amongst the largest corporations in the world.  
On the other, are F/OSS advocates, typically technology enthusiasts who seek autonomy 
through the medium of software? 
 
This chapter delineates the ways in which PS advocates’ and F/OSS advocates’ capacity 
to influence policy is shaped by institutions and the way in which interests are 
organised.  The first section defines in greater detail the key independent variables – 
F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness and software sector cohesion – and the 
ways in which they may affect policy.  In the second section, closer attention is paid to 
how economics and the structure of incentives surrounding software licensing interact 
to shape the dynamics in which software licensing politics are played out.  The insights 
developed in the second section inform the third section, which sets out and explicates 
the mechanisms by which institutions and the organisation of interests might mediate 
PS and F/OSS advocates’ capacities.  The last section of the chapter considers 
alternative explanations, presenting arguments as to why these alternatives bear less 
relevance for explaining policy choices in the cases under study. 
2.1 Interests and Institutions 
 
I argue that two factors explain most of the variation in software licensing policy across 
Argentina and Brazil between 2003 and 2010: the degree to which F/OSS advocates 
were embedded within institutions and the level of concentration in the organisation of 
the software sector.  F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness’ relates to F/OSS 
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advocates’ level of participation within or affiliation to institutions such as political 
parties, unions and social movements as well as the state.  F/OSS advocates might 
participate in political parties, unions or social movements as members, affiliates or 
volunteers.  F/OSS advocates might participate in the running of the state as 
professional bureaucrats or political appointees.  Software sector cohesion refers to the 
level of concentration in the organisation of the software sector.  The way these two 
factors matter to policy outcomes has to do with the way interests and institutions affect 
actors’ capacities. 
 
Interests influence actors’ capacities to translate their preferences into policy by 
affecting their ability to mobilise support and pressure government (Gourevitch, 1986; 
Hall, 1997).  Theorisation of political mobilisation, from resource mobilisation theory  
(McAdam et al., 2001; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 2011) to the organisation of 
business interests (Durand and Silva, 1997; Schneider, 2004), draw heavily upon 
Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action.  Collective action theory suggests that 
political mobilisation will be easier where interests are concentrated and homogenous 
(McAdam et al., 2001; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 2011).  Concentration and 
homogeneity foster coherence which facilitates organisation and coordination, and thus 
the capacity of corporate actors to direct and engage in political action.   
 
Institutions affect actors’ capacities to translate their preferences into policy by 
mediating the aggregation of interests (Gourevitch, 1986; Hall, 1997; Skocpol, 1985).  
Institutions may facilitate collective action by aggregating interests where such 
aggregation would not occur in their absence (Peters, 1999).  As a source of resources, 
institutions offer opportunities to overcome the free-rider costs of collective action.  
Resources enable actors to foster coherence amongst heterogeneous interests and thus 
boost actors’ capacity to organise and coordinate interests.  Institutions may also bolster 
actors’ capacities to influence policy by providing  ties to actors or areas within the state 
that hold authority over policymaking (Fairfield, 2011).7   
 
Figure 2-1 below, outlines a model to illustrate the relationship between the two 
explanatory factors, F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness and sectoral 
                                                 
7
 Here, the meaning of the word ‘tie’ is understood to encompass direct occupation of a position within 
the state that offers influence over the levers of policy as well as links to the holders of such positions. 
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cohesion, with the outcome, software licensing policy.  Causal chain A reflects the 
pathway between F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness (A1) and software 
licensing policy (DV) and causal chain B reflects the pathway between sectoral 
cohesion (B1) and policy.  Below, the hypotheses as to how the two explanatory factors 
matter to policy outcomes are stated, together with a summary of the mechanisms by 
which they might do so. 
 
Figure 2-1 – Explanation of Software Licensing Policy 
 
Independent variable
(institution related)
Independent variable
(interest related)
KEY
Lobbying power
A1
B1
A2
B2
Dependent Variable
(Outcome)
DV
 
 
A1. Social conditions – F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness 
A2. F/OSS advocates’ lobbying power 
B1. Social conditions – software sector cohesion 
B2. PS advocates’ lobbying power 
DV. Outcome of policy 
 
F/OSS Advocates’ Institutional Embeddedness 
 
Hypothesis 1: F/OSS advocates that are embedded within institutional structures such 
as political parties and the state are likely to possess greater lobbying power and are 
consequently more likely to be able to translate their preferences into software licensing 
policy (adoption of F/OSS promotion).  F/OSS advocates that are weakly embedded 
within or aloof from these institutional structures are likely to possess weak lobbying 
power and are consequently less likely to be able to translate their preferences into 
policy. 
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Causal chain A shows the pathway between F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness (A1) and software licensing policy (DV).  A1 pertains to F/OSS 
advocates’ institutional embeddedness, understood as their affiliation to or participation 
within institutions such as political parties and the state.  The stronger F/OSS advocates’ 
institutional embeddedness, the stronger will be their capacity to overcome the costs of 
collective action through the aggregation of interests and access to resources.  Access to 
resources will facilitate F/OSS advocates’ capacity to mobilise support in the F/OSS 
community and wider society, forge unity amongst these heterogeneous interests and 
coordinate them.  Stronger institutional embeddedness is also expected to provide 
F/OSS advocates’ with ties to actors or areas within the state holding authority over 
policymaking, offering opportunities to influence policy through these ties.  The greater 
the resources and ties to political-decision makers that F/OSS advocates are able to 
procure, the stronger will be their lobbying power (A2).  The stronger F/OSS advocates’ 
lobbying power, the greater their capacity to influence policy (DV).  
Software Sector Cohesion 
 
Hypothesis 2: Where the organisation of the software sector is concentrated, PS 
advocates are likely to possess greater lobbying power and are consequently more 
likely to be able to translate their preferences into software licensing policy 
(proscription of F/OSS promotion).  Where the organisation of the software sector is 
fragmented, PS advocates are likely to possess weaker lobbying power and are 
consequently less likely to be able to translate their preferences into policy. 
 
Whilst institutions might facilitate F/OSS advocates’ capacity to influence policy by 
strengthening these actors, the organisation of interests might also affect policy by 
mediating PS advocates’ lobbying power.  Whilst PS advocates are likely to be strong 
actors, their strength is mediated by the organisation of the software sector of which 
they form a part.  Causal chain B shows the pathway between the organisation of the 
software sector (B1) and software licensing policy (DV).  B1 pertains to the level of 
concentration in the organisation of the software sector.  The stronger the concentration 
in the organisation of the software sector, the greater the sector’s capacity to mobilise 
and coordinate sectoral interests is likely to be, enhancing its capacity to pressure 
government.  Stronger concentration in sectoral interests is also likely to facilitate the 
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ability of PS advocates to mobilise and coordinate sectoral interests because the most 
powerful PS advocates – multinational corporations – will dominate those sectoral 
associations in which they participate.  Stronger concentration will thus strengthen PS 
advocates’ lobbying power (B2) by strengthening the lobbying power of the sector 
overall, but also, by facilitating PS advocates’ ability to present their narrow interests as 
coherent with those of the wider sector as a whole.  The stronger PS advocates’ 
lobbying power, the greater their capacity to influence policy is likely to be. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, to observe F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness, I 
focus upon whether or not F/OSS advocates participate within or are affiliated within 
institutions (including ‘institutions’ often more readily understood as organisations or 
movements).  As well as the forms of participation already discussed above, I am also 
concerned with F/OSS advocates’ positions and locations within institutions.  To 
observe sectoral cohesion, I focus on how the software sector is organised, i.e. whether 
it is represented by a small number of organisations or by many.  
 
The relationship between F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness and software 
sector cohesiveness and policy choice is not deterministic.  Rather, stronger 
embeddedness of F/OSS advocates within institutions and higher levels of software 
sector cohesion increase the likelihood that F/OSS advocates – in the case of the former 
– and PS advocates – in the case of the latter, will be able to exert influence over policy.   
2.2 Incentives Surrounding Collective Action and Policy 
Choice in Relation to Software Licensing 
 
The following section lays out in more detail how the incentives surrounding different 
software licensing models together with the economics of information goods influence 
politicians’ policy preferences by affecting the capacity of PS advocates and F/OSS 
advocates to mobilise support.  As noted above, incentives for collective action tend to 
strengthen interests in PS whilst weakening those in F/OSS, shaping the dynamics in 
which software licensing politics are played out.  Understanding how incentives and 
economics shape actors’ capacities is important because F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness and software sector cohesion interact with these factors, mediating their 
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effects such that the strength of PS advocates may be attenuated whilst that of F/OSS 
advocates may be enhanced.   
Collective Action around PS: Incentives and Characteristics 
 
The acute and exclusive benefits from PS offer incentives for business interests 
surrounding PS to organise.  Business interests possess advantages over non-business 
interests as they often have access to resources over and above those involved in 
business activity (Hart, 2004; Smith, 2000).  In the case of those business interests 
associated with PS, resources are likely to be great as these interests encompass 
amongst the largest corporations in the world.  Such corporations encompass an interest 
group that is unrivalled by others in terms of resources (Sell, 2003). 
 
Apart from representing powerful actors in their own right, corporations are likely to be 
able to mobilise strong coalitions.  Business coalitions have long been assumed to be 
stronger than non-business coalitions because they represent relatively homogenous, 
mutual commercial interests (Hart, 2004: 49).  Firms also share ideological standpoints 
that align preferences (Sell & Prakash, 2002).  Firms with interests in PS are also likely 
to be able to mobilise support from other knowledge based sectors where firms support 
strong IP protection (Sell & Prakash, 2002; Sum, 2003).   
 
Mobilisation around PS in developing countries is likely to be facilitated by the balance 
of interests in local software sectors.  As developing countries are generally net 
importers of software products (Correa, 1996), interests in the distribution and resale of 
imported PS are likely to be dominate the local software sector.   
 
Collective action around PS is also likely to be assisted by the tendency for high levels 
of concentration in markets for informational goods.  The importance of economies of 
scale, network effects and first-mover advantages in markets for informational goods 
only serves to strengthen the multinational PS firms most likely to oppose F/OSS 
promotion.  Sectoral concentration is likely to be even more pronounced in software 
sectors in developing countries, enhancing multinational firms’ abilities to organise and 
play a leading role in the representation of the software sector. 
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Organisation is likely to be easier amongst smaller groups because the costs of 
collective action will be lower (Olson, 1982; Schneider, 2004).  Where the distribution 
of resources is unequal, organisation is likely to be easier because some actors will 
likely receive sufficient benefit from public goods that they will assume the costs of 
collective action despite the free-riding of others (Geddes, 1995: 95; Schmitter and 
Streeck, 1999: 25).  Because larger firms tend to shoulder collective action costs whilst 
smaller firms tend to free-ride, large firms will possess greater influence in shaping 
group preferences (Atkinson and Coleman, 1985; Hart, 2004; Schmitter and Streeck, 
1999; Shadlen, 2002: 46; 2004: 13).  The small number of corporations that lead the 
software sector, together with the highly unequal distribution of sectoral resources, 
suggest US PS corporations will dominate sectoral organisation.   
 
Figure 2-2 – The Ten Largest Software Firms in the World in 2011 
 
     Ranking Firm Software 
revenues 
(Million US$) 
Total revenues 
(Million US$) 
Software 
revenue share 
     1 Microsoft 54,270 67,383 80.5% 
     2 IBM 22,485 99,870 22.5% 
     3 Oracle 20,958 30,180 69.4% 
     4 SAP 12,558 16,654 75.4% 
     5 Ericsson 7,274 30,307 24.0% 
     6 HP 6,669 126,562 5.3% 
     7 Symantec 5,636 6,013 93.7% 
     8 Nintendo 5,456 13,766 39.6% 
     9 Activision Blizzard 4,447 4,447 100% 
     10 EMC 4,356 17,015 25.6% 
Source: Software Top 100 (2011). 
 
The predominance of Microsoft amongst these firms – the firm representing the world 
leader in software sales, selling more than double the next highest selling firm and the 
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same as the next three put together (Software Top 100, 2011) – suggest sectoral 
interests will tend to oppose F/OSS promotion.  Whilst the threat that F/OSS posed to 
software corporations through the 2000s varied, it was a major threat to Microsoft.  
Deriving its core revenue from systems software and packages in horizontal market 
segments, Microsoft’s products were particularly threatened by F/OSS as they lay in 
areas of the market characterised by low specificity and high appropriability.  As well as 
likely dominating sectoral business associations, Microsoft was also able to mobilise 
support through its market position and the market segments in which it operated.   
 
IT embodies systems and because these systems often comprise the products of more 
than one firm, it is important that different firms’ products interact effectively with 
those of other firms within a system (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  In this context, firms’ 
products complement one-another such that increased demand for a product raises 
demand for another product it complements (ibid).  Because Microsoft dominates the 
market in systems software – the firm accounted for over ninety percent of the PC 
systems software market at the end of the 2000s (NetMarketShare, 2010) – on which 
both hardware and applications software depend, hardware and other software firms 
face strong incentives to collaborate with Microsoft with a view to increasing the 
market share of their own products.  With its own interests in collaboration, Microsoft 
fosters relationships with other firms through its Independent Software Vendor (ISV) 
and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) schemes (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  
The importance of complementary goods in IT and Microsoft’s dominance of a strategic 
market segment places the firm in a strong position to mobilise support through 
partnership agreements. 
 
Microsoft’s position as a supplier also facilitates its capacity to mobilise support 
through linkages.  Linkages relate to where one firm’s or industry’s output forms an 
input for another firm or industry (Hirschman, 1958) and may allow suppliers to exert 
influence over client firms that distribute or utilise a supplier’s products as inputs 
(Shadlen, 2014).  Together with its market dominance, linkages offer Microsoft a means 
of mobilising local SMEs that develop their own software using Microsoft technologies 
as well as firms involved in resale and distribution. 
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Interacting with partnerships and linkages to maintain and strengthen the relationships 
between Microsoft and smaller firms are the factors of lock-in and switching costs.  
Lock-in occurs when investments are made in “durable complementary assets” whose 
compatibility is limited to particular systems (brands, machines, software, etc.)(Shapiro 
and Varian, 1999: 11).  Because these assets are incompatible with alternative systems, 
consumers face switching costs if they wish to move to another system.  Proprietary 
standards bolster lock-in and such standards may be used to retain partners as well as 
consumers because of the costs associated with switching (ibid.).  With Microsoft’s 
products based on its own proprietary formats, lock-in helps cement relationships 
between local firms and Microsoft that facilitates’ the corporation’s capacity to mobilise 
support.   
Public Awareness 
 
For actors seeking to influence software licensing policy, it is not only important to be 
able to mobilise interests but also public opinion.  Apart from directly affecting the 
prevalence of software licensing models, public awareness also affects the knowledge 
on which policy decisions are based by affecting policymakers’ awareness of these 
models and politicians’ incentives for intervening in software licensing by shaping the 
political tradeoffs of favouring one model over another. 
 
Whilst supply-side economies of scale may be important to competition in information 
goods, the ability for a single firm to capture markets in information goods is also based 
on the importance of network effects on the demand-side (Shapiro and Varian, 1999: 
179).  Demand for Microsoft’s products is high precisely because they are popular.  
This facet of the economics of information goods makes marketing especially important 
in software and helps to explain why vendors of package software invest more in 
marketing than in R&D and production (Correa, 1996).  In 2005, Microsoft spent 21.8% 
of revenues on sales and marketing to 15.5% on R&D (Microsoft, 2005).  Microsoft’s 
interest in influencing public awareness is important not just because it possesses strong 
incentives to do so, but also because this interest concerns the public at large by virtue 
of the fact that its core revenue stems from mass and horizontal market segments.  Due 
to network effects, the fact that Microsoft already dominates these market segments 
means its market presence alone facilitates public awareness of its products. 
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With the resources at its disposal, Microsoft is in an unrivalled position to shape public 
opinion through media coverage as well as advertising.  Fuchs (2007: 151) observes that 
“the dependence of the private media on the sale of advertising … means that news and 
reports to some extent are framed by commercial needs.”  Microsoft is well placed to 
gain media coverage that is not only widespread but also favourable due to its 
significance as a source of advertising revenue for media firms.   
 
Microsoft is also able to influence public awareness by giving its products away.  
Another facet of information goods is that they are “experience goods”, which means 
consumers only attach value to them after they have used them (Shapiro and Varian, 
1999: 5).  This characteristic of information goods means the public are unlikely to 
recognise interests in software until they have used it, such that strategies that allow 
consumers to use software products are important for marketing.  An additional benefit 
from such strategies in the case of software is that use of the product raises the 
likelihood of lock-in.  Because use of software often requires learning, costs are 
associated with switching software (ibid.).  The benefits of giving products away 
explain Microsoft’s behaviour in offering its products as well as training at reduced 
rates or through donations in education and charitable initiatives (see Waters, 2008).   
 
Because of the importance of public awareness to Microsoft’s maintenance of its market 
share, the firm even stands to gain benefits from piracy of its products as its co-founder, 
Bill Gates has admitted (CNN, 2000; see also Sum, 2003; Vance, 2010).  Apart from 
acting to increase visibility of Microsoft’s products and lock-in users due to the 
switching costs associated with learning how to use software, the network externalities 
of pirated use of software only serve to increase its value.  
 
Microsoft’s ability to give away or discount its products hinges upon is its profit 
margins.  The economies of scale that Microsoft enjoys together with low marginal 
costs of reproduction mean its profit margins are large – in the 1990s, the firm’s gross 
profit margins were 92% (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  These profit margins allow the 
firm to influence policy and public procurement decisions where governments are 
considering migrating to F/OSS by eliminating cost advantages associated with 
migrating to F/OSS.  Because network effects and switching costs are important to 
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maintaining demand-side economies of scale and the marginal costs of reproduction are 
low, it is in Microsoft’s interests to win or retain big customers even if these customers 
pay little or nothing in return.  An example of Microsoft offering discounts to influence 
policy concerns its offer to donate US$550,000 in software and material support 
towards a Peruvian government education project, following a 2001 Peruvian legislative 
project to promote F/OSS (Chan, 2004; D’Empaire, 2002; Lettice, 2002). 
Collective Action around F/OSS Promotion: Incentives and Characteristics 
 
Although the seeming popular appeal of F/OSS’ benefits might lead to the expectation 
that interests in F/OSS would be strong, such interests are relatively weak by virtue of 
F/OSS’ intrinsic character.  If incentives and economic factors act to strengthen interests 
in PS – interests likely to oppose F/OSS promotion – they serve to weaken actors with 
interests in promoting F/OSS.  As observed above, F/OSS’ non-excludable and non-
rivalrous characteristics mean the incentives for collective action are low.  Even where 
firms form around F/OSS, as monetisation strategies tend to relate to services or 
software as a complementary product, these firms are unlikely to carry either the 
economic clout or intensity of interest in software per se that characterises PS firms 
because profits from F/OSS itself will be lower (Söderberg, 2008).8  Mobilisation of the 
interests surrounding F/OSS in pursuit of F/OSS promotion is likely to be weak not 
least because of the heterogeneity these interests reflect.  Differences in ideology as well 
as material interests differentiate interests surrounding F/OSS.  Just one example of 
these ideological differences are those that distinguish the Free Software Foundation 
(FSF) – which views sharing software as an ethical concern – and the Open Source 
Initiative (OSI) – which is more concerned with sharing for practical reasons (GNU.org, 
2014).  The F/OSS community also embodies differences in political views, ranging 
from anarchist and anti-capitalist perspectives through to libertarian standpoints 
(Coleman, 2004; Coleman and Golub, 2008; McInerney, 2009; Söderberg, 2008). 
 
The salience within the F/OSS community of political standpoints antithetical to 
business interests tends to alienate firms with interests in F/OSS (Perkins, 1999).  
                                                 
8
 IBM (and Sun Microsystems before it was acquired by Oracle in 2010) derives revenue from F/OSS but 
indirectly as a complementary good to increase the value of its hardware.  The intensity of IBM’s interest 
in F/OSS is thus low as it does not depend on F/OSS for revenue. 
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Notwithstanding this antagonism, the pragmatic interests of firms suggest that unless 
they are to benefit directly from such a policy, they are likely to be indifferent if not 
opposed to the idea of promoting F/OSS.  As many firms with interests in F/OSS also 
possess interests in PS (Lerner and Schankerman, 2010), government intervention in 
software licensing is likely to be unwanted.  Firms may also oppose F/OSS promotion 
on the basis that state intervention is inappropriate; such a policy may be viewed as 
political meddling in an issue best left to the market (Bessen, 2002).  As firms, with 
their resources, represent valuable allies, the indifference not to mention alienation of 
business interests by ideologically driven groups within the F/OSS community limits 
prospects for strong mobilisation around F/OSS promotion. 
 
A factor which is likely to further weaken mobilisation around F/OSS promotion is 
indifference towards mainstream politics and the state as well as the notion of 
promoting F/OSS through policy.  The interests of those more technically focused areas 
of the F/OSS community lie away from promoting F/OSS through political means and 
the idea may be viewed as undesirable for politicising what is deemed a technical issue 
(Chan, 2004).  Indeed, sections of the F/OSS community have even argued against state 
promotion of F/OSS on the basis that F/OSS should compete on its own merits in the 
free market, an argument that paralleled that of PS advocates (ibid: 534).  Such an 
argument is likely to be shared by those sections of the F/OSS community closer to 
business interests – sections likely to overlap with those more focussed on the technical 
dimensions of F/OSS.  As a group, software developers generally express indifference 
to politics (Coleman, 2004; 2013) reducing the likelihood that they will engage with 
mobilisation around promoting F/OSS.  F/OSS promotion might also be rejected by 
politicised sections of the community that are hostile towards the state on both the left – 
anarchists and communists – and the right – libertarians. 
 
Together with the challenges that F/OSS advocates are likely to face in mobilising 
actors with interests in F/OSS, the economics surrounding information goods look to 
make it difficult for these actors to mobilise support amongst the wider public.  F/OSS’ 
diffuse benefits mean incentives and investment in publicising F/OSS are low and as a 
consequence, public awareness of F/OSS is also likely to be low.  As discussed with 
regard to Microsoft, as an experience good, software first needs to be used for users to 
recognise interests in it.  Low public awareness of F/OSS – together with the fact that 
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the public are unlikely to recognise an interest in F/OSS unless they have experienced it 
– suggest F/OSS advocates’ ability to mobilise wider public support will be limited. 
 
Another aspect of the economics of information goods that will weaken F/OSS 
advocates are network effects.  Whilst positive feedback may increase the popularity of 
popular goods and in the case of PS, strengthen firms that produce them, it may reduce 
the popularity of unpopular goods and in the case of F/OSS, weaken the actors 
associated with these goods.  Linux, the most popular F/OSS systems software 
accounted for just over 1% of the market for PC systems software in 2009 
(NetMarketShare.com, 2014).  Precisely because usage of F/OSS is comparatively low, 
users are likely to be deterred from using F/OSS, checking greater uptake of this type of 
software.  Whilst low usage of F/OSS does not directly affect the resources available to 
F/OSS advocates, it reinforces the scarcity of public awareness of F/OSS, reducing 
opportunities to mobilise public support. 
 
These dynamics are reinforced by software piracy.  By lowering the cost of PS and 
thereby increasing social access to this good, piracy drives its widespread use (Sum, 
2003: 385; Weerawarana and Weeratunga, 2004: 35), maintaining incentive structures 
that disadvantage F/OSS.9  Piracy is likely to undermine the popularity of F/OSS in 
developing countries in particular.  By effectively democratising PS, piracy represents a 
form of social inclusion.  In developing countries, where large sections of the 
population are excluded from obtaining certain goods through prices and ownership of 
such goods is associated with social status, pirated PS becomes desirable to poorer 
constituencies on the basis of its inclusionary character as well as considerations 
stemming from network externalities and switching costs.  The inclusionary benefits 
offered by pirated PS only act to accentuate incentive structures that disadvantage 
F/OSS within poorer sections of the population.  As poorer sections of society represent 
an important constituency in developing countries, where they are likely to constitute 
the majority of the population, the effect of piracy on poorer users’ incentives presents 
challenges for F/OSS advocates seeking to mobilise support in developing countries. 
                                                 
9
 Whilst PS vendors rail against software piracy in public, they appreciate that piracy ultimately serves 
their interests.  As Bill Gates himself acknowledged during a 1998 conference at the University of 
Washington, “[a]lthough about three million computers get sold every year in China, people don't pay for 
the software …[s]omeday they will, though. And as long as they're going to steal it, we want them to steal 
ours. They'll get sort of addicted, and then we'll somehow figure out how to collect sometime in the next 
decade.” (CNN.com, 2000). 
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Finally, the importance of complementary goods in markets for IT goods weakens 
interests in F/OSS.  As a result of Microsoft’s dominance of the strategic systems 
software market, Microsoft’s PS is generally bundled with new computers and other 
software, hardware and peripherals are often optimised to run or interoperate with 
Microsoft’s software, sometimes exclusively.  Bundling software with hardware, 
interoperability and compatibility further reinforce the market dominance of PS, by 
imposing costs or effectively preventing switching to F/OSS.  Microsoft’s well 
documented attempts at restricting or preventing interoperability and compatibility with 
F/OSS and open standards (BBC News, 2007; Ghosh, 2011; Jackson, 2010; Peritz, 
2010; Rens, 2011) only compound the dynamics that disadvantage F/OSS and its 
advocates. 
Incentives Surrounding Policy Choice in Software Licensing 
 
The incentive structures and economic factors that help strengthen PS advocates whilst 
weakening F/OSS advocates suggest that the state may have to act on its own initiative 
for F/OSS promotion to come about.  Moreover, due to the power of those actors likely 
to oppose F/OSS promotion, it appears this initiative has to come from the highest 
levels of government if such a policy is to withstand the opposition it will presumably 
encounter.  However, the very conditions that lead to a disproportionate balance of 
power between PS advocates and F/OSS advocates suggest the likelihood of political 
decision makers independently pursuing F/OSS promotion appears low.  
 
Public choice theory suggests that politicians’ will choose policies that favour PS 
precisely because of the configuration of interests that surround software licensing.   
Grossman and Helpman (1994: 833) argue, that “politicians respond to the incentives 
they face, trading off the financial and other support that comes from heeding … 
interest groups’ demands against the alienation of voters that may result from the policy 
implementation of socially costly policies”.  If this is the case, the political incentives 
are highly skewed in favour of backing PS advocates’ policy preferences.  Because 
public awareness of F/OSS is low, public pressure for government to promote F/OSS is 
likely to be low and politicians will thus face few incentives to promote F/OSS.  
Moreover, the opportunity costs of choosing policies that favour PS are likely to be 
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minimal.  By contrast, pressure for government to pursue policies that favour the 
interests of PS advocates will be strong.  Sectors reflecting high concentration  often 
enjoy government protection due to the relative ease with which they will be capable of 
organising (Geddes, 1995; Olson, 1982).  The software industry represents a prime 
example of this trend with the state providing protection by upholding IP rights.  
Because PS advocates’ are likely to be capable of mobilising strong coalitions, 
politicians will face strong incentives to follow their policy preferences. 
 
Over and above their ability to mobilise interests, the corporations likely to lead 
opposition to F/OSS promotion – principally Microsoft – are in a strong position to 
influence policy on the basis of structural power and through ties with the state.  High-
tech industries represent amongst the highest added value economic activities and a 
source of power in themselves due to their focus on knowledge (Strange, 1994).  With 
their market leadership of such an industry, PS corporations possess structural power in 
terms of their command of knowledge as well as expertise in a valuable productive 
activity.  Politicians may court software corporations with a view to garnering the 
benefits of knowledge transfer or investment that these firms provide.  Such 
corporations may also be called upon by political decision-makers as a source of 
authority when formulating policy (Sell, 2003).   
 
Use of unlicensed software within governments in developing countries offers PS 
vendors opportunities to exert influence over these governments.  The threat of legal 
action may be used to extract concessions, enabling PS vendors to persuade 
governments to sign-up to licensing agreements.  As observed above, Microsoft also has 
the capacity to influence policy decisions through inducements that eliminate the up-
front financial costs of using its products or reduce the costs associated with 
implementing policy. 
 
The informational asymmetries that surround software licensing add an additional 
dimension to actors’ capacities to shape politicians’ policy preferences.  Such 
informational imperfections produce power asymmetries, placing the knowledgeable in 
a strong position to shape the preferences of the unaware (Hay, 2002: 178).  The high 
levels of public awareness and appreciation of PS versus low levels of public awareness 
and appreciation of F/OSS not only suggest politicians will face political incentives to 
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favour PS advocates’ policy preferences.  Because of the high visibility of PS, 
politicians are also more likely to call upon PS firms which, because of knowledge 
asymmetries, will be in a strong position to shape policy preferences to serve their 
interests.  Within the state, knowledge of F/OSS is likely to be limited to IT 
administrators.  Yet as a group, IT administrators make unlikely proponents of F/OSS 
promotion.  Where such personnel are professional bureaucrats, they will not 
necessarily possess the political influence to persuade politicians to promote F/OSS.  
Moreover, IT administrators’ face incentives to favour PS as vendors of PS provide 
support for their products and thus allow IT administrators to delegate to vendors 
responsibility for the operation of these products.  Whilst the incentives of firms based 
around the sale of PS mean these firms have an interest in offering customer support, 
where F/OSS is developed independently of commercial interests, these incentives are 
absent and support is often dependent upon the F/OSS community.  IT administrators 
may be wary of adopting F/OSS if it means they have to take on greater responsibility.  
If those actors within the government with the technical awareness to recognise the 
potential benefits of F/OSS are isolated from politicians or face incentives to use PS, PS 
advocates will be in a strong position to shape the policy preferences of politicians that 
are ordinarily unlikely to be savvy of IT or software licensing models.  
2.2.1 Institutions and F/OSS Advocates’ Embeddedness within Them 
 
It has long been recognised that the power of ordinarily weak actors might be bolstered 
through institutions (Piven and Cloward, 1978).  Institutions may offer actors 
opportunities to influence policy by affecting the aggregation of interests and access to 
political decision-makers (Gourevitch, 1986; Hall, 1997; March and Olsen, 1984; 
Peters, 1999).  Whilst the state looms large amongst the institutions that might affect 
actors’ abilities to influence policy by virtue of the fact that actors have to work through 
the state to realise policy goals (Gourevitch, 1986; Weir and Skocpol, 1985), other 
organisations that might be conceived as institutions and which might assist actors 
advance their interests encompass political parties, unions and social movements (Hall, 
1997: 180; McAdam et al., 2001; Peters, 1999: 112; Tarrow, 2011; Wilson, 1990).  The 
actors that institutions affect may include those actors that operate within them 
(Foweraker, 1995). 
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Resources  
 
Institutions offer F/OSS advocates opportunities to overcome the low incentives for 
collective action that surround F/OSS and attract allies by aggregating interests and 
providing resources.  Institutions may also enable F/OSS advocates to organise and 
coordinate mobilisation by allowing these actors to reconcile differences within the 
F/OSS community itself and a broader coalition encompassing business actors and 
wider society. 
 
Within the literature on comparative political economy, the state is recognised as 
playing an important role in shaping patterns of association within society (Collier, 
1995; Gourevitch, 1986; Haggard, 1990; Hall, 1997; Offe, 1995; Schmitter, 1974; 1992; 
1995a; 1995b; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; Streeck and Schmitter, 1985).  Olson 
(1965: Chapter 6), in laying out his “logic of collective action”, suggested that where 
interests were heterogeneous and diffuse, high associational costs might be overcome 
through selective incentives provided by the state.  Such incentives might attract support 
and foster unity where interests coalesce.  The literature on corporatism informs 
discussion in comparative political economy of how the state might affect patterns of 
societal association through incentives (see Collier, 1995; Schneider, 2004).10  The state 
may reduce associational costs for certain actors, factions or sectors by offering 
exclusive or privileged rights of representation vis-à-vis the state through rules – 
instituted through statutory codes but also less formal norms and practices (Collier and 
Collier, 1977; Schmitter, 1982: 269; 1995a: 290, 296; Streeck, 1982; Streeck and 
Schmitter, 1985: 25).  Such rules might be construed as providing organisational 
resources by incentivising participation in officially recognised associations.  Another 
way the state might reduce associational costs is by offering subsidies which actors 
(Collier and Collier, 1977; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999), groups or sectors may 
subsequently dispense. 
 
Since the publication of Olson’s original theory, it has been recognised that the 
incentives around which collective action revolves do not necessarily have to be 
                                                 
10
 Corporatism may be defined as “a system of interest … representation … for linking the associationally 
organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state” (Schmitter, 1974: 86). 
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selective (Medina, 2013) and may also be “solidary” or “purposive” (Foweraker, 1995: 
16).  Selective incentives may nonetheless be important to sustain mobilisation 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Lichbach, 1995) and allow its professionalization 
(Foweraker, 1995). 
 
Although the literature on comparative political economy recognises the state as 
important as an influence upon patterns of association, it tends to overlook how actors 
situated within the state might utilise the institutional structures that surround them to 
initiate collective action.  Within this literature it is accepted that societal actors may 
capture or colonise the state (Atkinson and Coleman, 1985; Collier, 1995; O’Donnell, 
1977; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999: 33), implying that the state will act on these actors’ 
behalf.  It is also acknowledged that those actors located inside the state have the 
capacity to mobilise interests themselves (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999: 31).  Yet there 
is little discussion of state actors initiating collective action autonomously, independent 
of wider societal interests. 
 
As Weir and Skocpol (1985: 118) observe, “states may be sites of autonomous official 
action, not reducible to any social-group pressures or preferences”.  The literature on 
social movements elaborates how the state might facilitate the ability of actors within it 
to mobilise wider support.  Actors operating within the state have access to a range of 
resources over and above those of a financial or organisational nature.  Media access is 
important for mobilisation and the state may afford privileged access to this resource 
(Gamson, 2004).  Institutions also offer knowledge and skills, for example with regard 
to leadership and political organisation, that may facilitate mobilisation (Tarrow, 2011).  
Edwards and McCarthy (2004) recognise that technical knowledge of IT may be useful 
for mobilisation over the Internet.   
 
Institutions may also provide “ideological” resources that might facilitate collective 
action (Tarrow, 1988).  Ideas may play an important role in mobilisation through 
framing possesses (McAdam et al., 2001; Snow, 2004; Tarrow, 2011) and the ideas 
embedded within institutions may be utilised in these processes (Tarrow, 2011: 31).  
Existing ideas embedded within the state may influence actors’ ability to mobilise 
support for new policies by determining which policy ideas appear attractive (Hall, 
1993; Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985; Sikkink, 1991; Weir and Skocpol, 1985). 
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The resources at the disposal of state actors allow the dispensation of benefits that may 
attract support and foster group cohesion.  Benefits that might attract support in the case 
of F/OSS include a lowering of the costs involved in attaining information about F/OSS, 
i.e. learning how to use it, solve problems or adapt it to individual needs and the 
contribution of resources in the form of code, where the state develops F/OSS that 
others might utilise.  Although F/OSS’ openness means information is freely available 
and the F/OSS community may offer support, the opportunity costs of searching for 
information and learning may lower incentives to use F/OSS.  State investment might 
lower these costs through activities which facilitate cooperation and knowledge sharing 
between users and actors that develop F/OSS.   
 
Capacity to mobilise support in wider society is likely to improve F/OSS advocates’ 
ability to garner political backing from politicians.  Politicians’ policy decisions take 
into account the tradeoffs between the support they receive from narrow interests and 
wider electoral support (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Landes and Posner, 2004).  The 
greater wider public support for F/OSS promotion, the more likely are politicians to 
back F/OSS promotion as the interests of the population at large counter the narrow 
interests of PS advocates.   
Ties 
 
As well as facilitating organisation, institutions also represent a source of ties to those 
areas of the state holding authority for over policy.  Employment within the state may 
offer opportunities to influence policy through direct participation in policymaking or 
through proximity and ties to political decision-makers (Sikkink, 1991; Weir and 
Skocpol, 1985).  Where bureaucrats possess specialist knowledge, for example in IT, 
such knowledge may strengthen these actors’ capacity to influence politicians’ ideas.  
Bureaucrats possess influence over policy choice because, as the actors responsible for 
implementing policy, they may determine whether policy is successful or not (Weir, 
1989).  The ideas and opinions of bureaucrats are important in influencing 
policymakers’ decisions as to whether a policy is administratively viable (Hall, 1997; 
Weir and Skocpol, 1985).  However, notwithstanding the fact that employment within 
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the state may offer opportunities to influence those actors that decide policy, it does not 
guarantee these actors will listen. 
 
Where it comes to influencing political leaders, participation in political parties may 
offer advantages over professional state employment where political parties enter 
power.  As the “main agents of political representation [political parties] provide access 
to government” (Hagopian, 1998: 101; also Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).  Partisan 
ties may allow F/OSS advocates to influence policy through government appointments 
or lobbying of political decision-makers from outside government.  Partisan ties may 
not only offer access to political decision-makers but also increase the likelihood that 
these actors listen due to political trust. 
 
Another source of ties to political decision-makers may be organisations with which 
incumbent political parties are closely affiliated.  Left parties, like those that held power 
in Argentina and Brazil between 2003 and 2010, often possess links with organisations 
such as unions and social movements.  In Argentina, the Kirchner governments 
possessed ties with movements related to human rights (Wagner and Sánchez, 2009), 
the Piqueteros (Escudé, 2007) and the labour movement (Zelaznik, 2011).  In Brazil, 
the PT traditionally enjoyed links with social movements and unions (Baiocchi, 2003; 
2005; Branford et al., 2005; Foweraker, 1995; Hochstetler, 2008; Keck, 1995).   
 
F/OSS advocates’ location within the state may facilitate their capacity to access 
political decision-makers.  Because actors have to work through the state in order to 
obtain policy goals, the structure of the state conditions actors’ opportunities to 
influence policy (Gourevitch, 1986; Hall, 1997; Weir and Skocpol, 1985).  For those 
actors with ties to the state or working within it, the areas of the state to which actors are 
connected or located inside it affects opportunities to influence policy (Foweraker, 
1995; Weir, 1989; Weir and Skocpol, 1985).  For F/OSS advocates with an interest in 
precipitating change in IT use, influence in areas of the state related to IT as well as 
those housing political leaders is likely to be key to their ability to advance their policy 
objectives.  
 
Where F/OSS advocates possess direct control or indirect influence over those areas of 
the state with faculties pertaining to IT, they are more likely to be able to persuade 
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politicians that F/OSS promotion is administratively viable.  The significance of the 
public sector as a principle user of software in developing countries means control or 
influence over the state’s IT infrastructure will hold strategic importance to patterns of 
IT use in the wider population as well as within the state (Weerawarana and 
Weeratunga, 2004).  Holding responsibility for policy implementation, those actors with 
responsibility for administering IT and setting IT standards within the state as well as 
those charged with formulating policy towards IT outside it determine whether F/OSS 
promotion is administratively viable.   
 
Together with the support of bureaucrats and policymakers connected with IT, the 
backing of political leaders is likely to prove crucial to F/OSS advocates’ capacity to 
translate F/OSS promotion into policy due to the power of PS advocates that are likely 
to oppose it.  Backing from the political leadership of the executive increases the 
likelihood that F/OSS promotion might take on government-wide dimensions and resist 
opponents’ attempts to stymie such a policy.  Where presidential systems of government 
are strong, as in Argentina and Brazil, the presidential style of government means the 
president plays an important role in policymaking (Scartascini, 2008; Sikkink, 1991).  
The cabinet is also an important actor in policymaking as it is responsible for policy 
implementation (see Scartascini, 2008).   
 
In Argentina, between 2003 and 2010, the executive was in a strong position to control 
legislative output.  In this period, strong ruling party discipline (Jones, 2002) together 
with the ability of the ruling party to dominate the legislature through majorities or 
alliances with other parties strengthened the ability of the executive to determine the 
legislative agenda and outcome of proposed legislation (Jones and Hwang, 2005: 127; 
Jones and Micozzi, 2011).  The executive is in turn able to exert strong discipline over 
the ruling party through both institutional and party-based mechanisms (Jones, 1997).  
The executive may exert influence over legislative party forces in general by offering 
benefits conferred through the state (ibid.) 
 
The executive was also in a strong position to push through legislation in Brazil as well 
in the 2003 to 2010 period.  In Brazil, the president is in a strong position to push 
through legislation due to their ability to effectively legislate by decree (Alston et al., 
2008; Santos and Vilarouca, 2008; Neto, 2002; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Shugart and 
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Haggard, 2001).  As in Argentina, there existed a number of mechanisms by which the 
chief executive could gain legislators’ acquiescence to have legislation approved in 
congress (Santos and Vilarouca, 2008).  The rules of the congress meant party leaders 
played a key role in determining committee appointments and this, combined with the 
ability of the presidency to offer resources (Alston et al., 2008: 127), allowed the chief 
executive to trade inducements for legislative support.  Although the PT possessed a 
congressional minority between 2003 and 2010, the party was able to build a governing 
majority by offering cabinet positions and benefits (Samuels, 2008). 
 
In addition to the capacity to push through legislation, executives also possess “negative 
agenda setting power” (Calvo, 2007).  This means pursuing F/OSS promotion through 
the legislative branch is likely to be fruitless without executive backing.  The president 
has the capacity to veto laws (Cox and Morgenstern, 2001; Jones, 1997), and through 
influence over parties in the legislative arena, may stymie legislation before it reaches a 
vote (Calvo, 2007). 
 
The support of the political leadership of the executive may offer F/OSS advocates 
greater autonomy vis-à-vis opponents within as well as outside the state.  Where actors 
receive backing from the political leadership of the executive, they are likely to enjoy a 
level of autonomy that may allow them to exceed their official remit whilst tempering 
the capacity of opponents to dislodge them or disrupt their plans.   
2.2.2 The Organisation of Interests and PS Advocates 
 
Although PS advocates, encompassing multinational PS firms, are likely to include 
actors that are powerful in their own right and which dominate the software sector both 
economically and politically, the power of these actors is mediated by the level of 
concentration in the organisation of software sector.  Where business organisation is 
concentrated it enhances business’ capacity to exert pressure upon and negotiate with 
government (Fairfield, 2011: 428).  The greater the level of concentration in the 
organisation of the software sector, the larger sectoral representatives’ ability to 
influence policy is likely to be.   
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As members of the sector, PS advocates will benefit along with other sectoral actors.  
However, greater concentration in sectoral interests is also likely to bestow 
disproportionate benefits upon the largest firms in the sector which encompass 
multinational PS firms.  As multinational PS firms will tend to dominate the business 
associations in which they participate because of their size (Hart, 2004), where sectoral 
interests are concentrated within fewer associations, these firms’ domination of sectoral 
interests will be greater.   
 
Concentration in business’ organisation also increases business’ coordination.  Fairfield 
(2011: 428) observes that “encompassing organisation … enhances business’ ability to 
forge common positions and coordinate political actions” (Fairfield, 2011: 428; also 
Durand and Silva, 1997; Smith, 2000).  In the case of the software sector, greater 
concentration thus also allows multinational PS firms greater capacity to coordinate 
sectoral interests.   
 
Greater influence over the coordination of sectoral interests will allow multinational PS 
advocates greater capacity to present their narrow interests in PS as reflecting those of 
the wider sector.  Where sectoral interests are presented in this way, PS advocates will 
be in a stronger position to persuade policymakers to adopt policies that favour their 
interests as PS is more likely to be identified with the interests of the sector as a whole.   
 
Concentration of sectoral interests will also increase PS advocates’ capacity to benefit 
politically from the economic performance of the sector as a whole.  The economic 
performance of the sector is likely to affect its political influence as a source of revenue 
for the government, stronger economic performance leading to a concomitant increase 
in political influence.  The ability of PS firms to present their interests as those of the 
wider sector through concentration in sectoral organisation will enhance the capacity of 
PS firms to benefit politically from economic activity in which they do not directly 
participate.   
Factors Affecting the Level of Concentration in Sectoral Organisation 
 
The level of concentration in sectoral organisation may be affected by a variety of 
factors.   As already noted above, the state may play a key role in shaping patterns of 
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association by influencing incentives for collective action.  Firms’ participation in 
business associations is motivated by access to selective benefits, yet the state may 
represent the source of these benefits (Schneider, 2004).  The state might enable 
business associations to provide selective benefits by offering political access, 
government appointments or participation in policymaking (ibid.).   
 
If the state affects levels of business associativism through the benefits that it offers, the 
dispensation of such benefits is conditioned by the state’s demeanour toward business 
sectors.  This demeanour may be conditioned by various factors.  Perhaps the most 
salient is the state’s ideological disposition.  Offe (1995: 127) notes that the extent to 
which collective actors emerge is likely to hinge upon the “‘interventionist’ vs. ‘liberal’ 
nature of the state.”   He observes that, where there is “lots to win from the state through 
associative activity, there will be a correspondingly stronger incentive to undertake the 
efforts of group formation and pressure politics … [i]nversely, governments that follow 
extreme market-liberal doctrines … will not only be unresponsive to such groups, but 
beyond that will actively try and disorganize intermediate groups” (ibid: 127).   
 
Political support and policymaking may also affect the state’s demeanour toward 
business sectors.  Politicians might engage business sectors with a view to garnering 
their political support (Schneider, 2004: 27–28).  Policymakers might engage business 
sectors to send them a signal with a view to influencing their behaviour, i.e. to alleviate 
business’ uncertainty (Haggard et al., 1997: 41; Schneider, 1997), or to garner 
information that might facilitate policymaking (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997: 7–9).  
Policymakers’ engagement with business sectors might also stem from interests 
concerning policy implementation, where policy aims and the limited resources at the 
disposal of the state mean cooperation from such sectors raises the likelihood of policy 
success (Cawson, 1985; Fuchs, 2005; 2007; Maxfield and Schneider, 1997; Schneider, 
2004).   
 
The state’s influence upon business association includes the legacies of its historical 
policies (Schneider, 2004: 51).  Up until the 1980s, many Latin American countries 
pursued state-led economic strategies where local firms or sectors may have enjoyed 
protection.  Where protection has historically favoured local firms in the software 
sector, development of local production may mean sectoral representation has grown up 
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around this activity.  Such representation is historically likely to have expressed a 
nationalist bias (Domínguez, 1982), with interests antagonistic to foreign firms.  Moves 
to neoliberal economic models and the removal of protection – a phenomenon that 
occurred in both Argentina and Brazil in the 1990s – mean local software firms’ 
interests would likely have become more dependent upon imported PS by the turn of the 
2000s.  Yet it is possible that sectoral representatives that emerged during the 
protectionist period survived subsequent market opening and if so, their continued 
presence may increase the likelihood of fragmented sectoral representation.  Business 
associations founded under protection may cling to nationalist interests, prompting the 
emergence of additional associations to cater for new interests arising from the opening 
of the market.  Under such circumstances, sectoral cooperation may be reduced, 
attenuating the capacity of the sector as a whole to coordinate political action and the 
ability of actors within it to bargain with the government.  Moreover, fragmented 
sectoral organisation is likely to inhibit PS advocates’ capacity to mobilise and 
coordinate sectoral interests. 
 
The neoliberal policies of the 1990s may also have affected patterns of business 
association by reducing levels of associativism.  In addition to diminishing the 
availability of state derived benefits that might encourage association, neoliberal 
policies are likely to have reduced associativism by increasing private sector 
competition, attenuating incentives for inter-firm cooperation and resources for 
collective action (Schneider, 2004).  
 
Business organisation and cooperation is likely to increase when common business 
interests come under threat (Durand, 1997; Durand and Silva, 1997; Plotke, 1992; 
Schneider, 2004).  Such threats include economic crises which increase incentives for 
associativism and business unity.  A factor which may in combination with common 
threats to business interests encourage business associativism concerns exclusion from 
policymaking (Durand and Silva, 1997), which increases business’ uncertainty over the 
actions government might take (Durand, 1997). 
 
Plotke (1992: 190) claims that business cooperation may be affected by changes in the 
relations between firms.  Where social ties between firms are extensive and strong, they 
are likely to facilitate inter-firm discussion.  In combination with changes in the wider 
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socio-economic environment that threaten common business interests, such ties may 
facilitate inter-firm cooperation and organisation. 
 
Geography may affect the concentration of sectoral interests, the size of a country and 
the distribution of industry within it conditioning patterns of association (Schneider, 
2004). 
Overview of Theoretical Framework: Interests, Institutions and Lobbying Power 
 
To summarize, the theoretical framework laid out in the preceding sections of this 
chapter is based upon the configurations of interests and institutions that surround 
F/OSS and PS advocates, configurations which influence outcomes in software 
licensing policy by mediating the lobbying power of these actors.  This framework 
explains variation in software licensing policy across Argentina and Brazil between 
2003 and 2010.  In Argentina, strong cohesion in the software sector strengthened PS 
advocates’ lobbying power by enabling these actors to mobilise and coordinate sectoral 
interests.  At the same time, weak institutional embeddedness weakened F/OSS 
advocates’ lobbying power by limiting resources which might lower the costs of 
collective action and coordination and ties with political decision-makers that might 
provide high level political access.  In Brazil, the situation was reversed.  There, weak 
cohesion in the software sector weakened PS advocates’ lobbying power by attenuating 
their capacity to mobilise and coordinate sectoral interests.  By comparison, F/OSS 
advocates’ lobbying power was strengthened by these actors’ strong institutional 
embeddedness which furnished resources which lowered the costs of collective action 
and coordination and provided ties with political decision-makers that offered high level 
political access. 
2.3 Alternative Explanations 
 
This section considers alternative factors that might explain software licensing policy, 
advancing arguments as to why these alternatives offer less leverage in explaining 
policy outcomes in Argentina and Brazil.  
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2.3.1 Economics  
 
Broad similarities between the software sectors in Argentina and Brazil mean the costs 
and benefits associated with different software licensing models are generally similar 
across these two countries.  In terms of software products, both countries are net 
importers of PS and face incentives to reduce expenditure on these imports.  With 
locally produced software products less likely to be dependent upon appropriation, 
increased use of F/OSS offers a plausible means of reducing imports of PS.  If anything, 
as argued in the previous chapter, the Argentine crisis suggests that on balance, F/OSS 
promotion was more likely in Argentina in the 2000s than in Brazil if only because of 
the acute resource shortages in the state and the effects that the devaluation would have 
made to the price of royalties for foreign produced PS.  Despite economic causes of 
variation having been controlled for through case selection, it is important to point out 
that economics provide limited value in explaining variation in software licensing 
policy. 
 
Whilst such policy choices might be expected to take into consideration the material 
costs and incentives associated with different software licensing models, because 
policies may be motivated by political concerns that go beyond economics – concerns 
for which policies may be adopted in spite of rather than because of financial costs – 
explanations of policy choice are not necessarily reducible to an economic calculus.  
The political reasons for promoting F/OSS may mean financial costs are secondary or of 
little concern in policy decisions.  Indeed, there is reason to suggest that economics per 
se provide limited grounds for promoting F/OSS.  
 
So far as use of software is concerned, unless politicians are concerned with enforcing 
IP, they are unlikely to recognise significant financial benefits in promoting F/OSS or 
switching to it from PS.  By making PS financially accessible to all sections of the 
general population through the medium of pirate software, weak enforcement of IP 
offers an effective means of enabling social access to software.  Even if politicians care 
about reducing piracy where software is used within the state, PS firms’ capacity to 
lower their prices to win and maintain business may make it financially advantageous 
for government to adopt PS over F/OSS in the short term, cancelling any apparent 
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pecuniary benefit in switching to F/OSS.  So far as producing software is concerned, it 
would appear politicians have to appreciate the wider implications that F/OSS raises in 
terms of facilitating knowledge transfer, learning and education as well as opportunities 
to capture the benefits of peer production if they are to recognise tangible economic 
benefits in promoting F/OSS. 
 
The way in which different interpretations of F/OSS affect the value associated with its 
promotion speaks to the significance of cognitive factors in influencing choice in 
software licensing policy.  If the value of promoting F/OSS hinges largely upon 
interpretations of F/OSS’ significance, variation in policy outcomes cannot be attributed 
solely to straight forward pecuniary costs and benefits.  
2.3.2 Ideas 
 
Ideas have long been identified as an important factor in explaining policy choice 
(Adler, 1987; Gourevitch, 1986; Hall, 1989; 1997; Hart, 2004; Sell and Prakash, 2002; 
Sikkink, 1991).  Ideas are likely to be particularly important to choice in software 
licensing policy because they determine the potential for value to be recognised in 
promoting F/OSS by conditioning cognisance of the political dimensions and 
ramifications of software licensing.  Although where software is used, the financial 
incentives for switching to F/OSS may appear limited, if politicians care about the 
implications software licensing raises for autonomy and democracy, the benefits of 
using F/OSS may be viewed as substantial.  Because interpretation of the meaning of 
software affects the goals and interests that policy serves, gaining consensus over this 
meaning lies at the heart of the politics of software licensing. 
 
The importance of interpretation to choices in policy over software licensing mean 
politics are played out within ideas themselves as actors seek to persuade policymakers 
to accept interpretations coherent with actors’ interests.  Discursive power and framing 
are two concepts that help explain how ideas might shape policy outcomes.   
 
Fuchs (2007: 139) describes discursive power as the capacity to wield influence by 
“shaping norms and ideas”.  Discursive power evokes Lukes’ (2005) “third dimension” 
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of power, where actors might shape the preferences of others and consequently lead 
them to act in ways in which they otherwise would not.   
 
Framing may be understood as an interpretive process through which identities and 
interests are defined and understood (McAdam et al., 2001: 48; Snow, 2004; Tarrow, 
2011).  Through framing, actors construct collective identities, legitimate objectives and 
demands and connect their interests to those of potential allies that might offer support. 
 
Schoonmaker (2002: 7) notes that within discourse, “certain relations of power and 
domination are represented as normal through language, while others are subjugated by 
not being acknowledged”.  Through discourse, norms and values become reified within 
social structures, coming to be interpreted as objective reality whilst their character as 
norms and values is obscured (ibid.).  This insight echoes the Gramscian notion of 
“cultural hegemony” (Harvey, 2007) where the beliefs held within society comprise a 
socially constructed reality which is taken to represent the natural order of things.  
Through the modern period, rationality and neoclassical interpretations of economics 
have come to represent the dominant worldview (Schoonmaker, 2002) and may be 
regarded as culturally hegemonic.  The cultural hegemony of rationality and economics 
privileges actors that employ arguments based upon these values by facilitating such 
actors’ ability to present themselves as representatives of objectivity, allowing them to 
frame arguments based upon alternative values as irrational or inefficient and thus 
counter to common sense.  Furthermore, it enables them to undermine arguments based 
on alternative values by drawing attention to their foundation within ideas.  Whilst the 
arguments of those aligned with hegemonic values benefit from the notion that these 
arguments reflect objectivity – a notion that obscures their ideological underpinnings – 
the labelling of alternative arguments as ideological contributes to their framing as 
counter to objectivity.   
 
As noted above, the informational asymmetries that surround software licensing place 
PS advocates in a strong position to shape the preferences of politicians who are 
ordinarily unlikely to be savvy of IT or software licensing.  The cultural hegemony of 
rationality and economics affords PS advocates an additional advantage in their ability 
to shape politicians’ preferences.   
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The struggle to gain consensus over software licensing evokes free software proponent 
Richard Stallman’s oft quoted dictum about the ‘free’ in free software meaning “‘free’ 
as in ‘free speech,’ not as in ‘free beer’” (Stallman, 2002: 43).  PS advocates tend to 
concentrate on the financial costs associated with using software when engaging with 
the debate on software licensing (see Katopis and Galan, 2009; Bradford L. Smith, 
2002), leaving unmentioned political concerns, hence framing F/OSS in ‘free beer’ 
terms.  Rooted in hegemonic values of rationality and economics, this frame is socially 
intuitive and unless bystanders are otherwise aware, suggests software licensing is 
principally a financial issue.  Whilst F/OSS is understood in ‘free beer’ terms, it 
presents little threat to the interests of PS advocates because PS firms may undercut 
prices for F/OSS solutions and F/OSS presents little if any value over PS.  Furthermore, 
the very rationale for promoting F/OSS on the basis of putative financial or technical 
benefits may be called into question by PS advocates (and even sections of the F/OSS 
community, as noted above) on the strength of free market arguments: if F/OSS is 
indeed cheaper or technically superior to PS, then it may compete with PS without the 
need for state intervention.  F/OSS advocates make explicit the political dimensions of 
software when engaging in the debate over software licensing, framing F/OSS in ‘free 
speech’ terms.  Where, F/OSS is understood as ‘free speech’ and politicians care about 
autonomy and democracy, F/OSS represents the only option if autonomy and 
democracy are to be guaranteed.    
 
If there is an association between political bias and software licensing policy, it perhaps 
relates to whether politicians care about the political dimensions of software licensing.  
If more conservative political forces view democracy through a narrow, institutional 
lens or see limited threat to the sovereignty of the state, perhaps because of close 
alignment with the US, then the attractiveness of F/OSS’ political dimensions  are likely 
to be limited. 
Ideas as Roadmaps 
 
Ideas may matter to policy as “road maps”, where ideas related to principles and values 
guide choices in policy by “providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for 
action” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 16).  Under this mechanism, policy choices will 
be influenced by the ideas that already exist in surrounding social structures and 
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institutions.  Hall (1989: 10) observes that “[t]he persuasiveness of a new set of … ideas 
is always relational, that is to say, it depends not simply on the ideas themselves but on 
the way in which they fit with other existing ideas” (see also Sikkink, 1991: 26).  The 
attractiveness of licensing models will be a function of the degree to which frames and 
philosophies surrounding these models connect to and cohere with existing goals or 
ideas. 
 
Ideas may matter to policy by shaping opportunities for mobilisation and hence actors’ 
political influence vis-à-vis political decision makers.  Ideas may allow possibilities for 
collective action in the absence of clear interests by acting as “focal points and glue” 
(Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 17).  In this way, ideas are likely to be especially 
important for F/OSS advocates’ ability to mobilise support.  Over and above the issues 
that F/OSS’ non-excludable character poses to collective action, low public awareness 
of F/OSS and F/OSS’ character as an experience good (such that value only arises with 
use), mean F/OSS advocates face a lack of understanding and appreciation of F/OSS in 
the wider population upon which interests might be activated.  In the absence of 
interests in F/OSS in the wider population, ideas offer F/OSS advocates’ opportunities 
for mobilising support through framing. 
 
The degree to which actors will be successful in mobilising wider support through ideas 
depends on their ability to frame their interests and objectives in ways that resonate with 
the norms and values of constituencies from which they seek support (Kapczynski, 
2008: 814; Tarrow, 2011). 
 
In poorer countries, constituencies at the base of society offer important opportunities 
for mobilising support for F/OSS because they likely represent the better half of the 
population and their use of F/OSS may thus serve to harness the benefits of network 
effects in generating wider popularity of F/OSS.  Because the abundance of pirate PS 
and switching costs effectively make F/OSS more expensive than PS for ordinary users, 
attracting the support of poorer sections of the population is likely to rest on framing 
F/OSS in ways that transcend its potential financial benefits.  Drawing attention to the 
ways in which F/OSS might foster democracy and self-reliance might offer 
opportunities to mobilise support for F/OSS amongst marginalised sections of the 
population by connecting F/OSS to issues of social inclusion and empowerment.    
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Ideas may matter to policy choice by becoming embedded within institutions (Goldstein 
and Keohane, 1993; Sikkink, 1991).  The very fact that the ideas that exist within 
institutions such as the state and political parties shape policy choices through 
awareness of the options that are available and by informing which options are 
appropriate means that where ideas gain purchase within institutions, they tend to 
influence future policy decisions.    
 
Whilst ideas matter to policy choice, focus on ideas in themselves does not necessarily 
explain how or why one set of ideas comes to motivate policy over another.  Ideas have 
to be “available” to those actors that formulate policy if they are to influence policy 
(Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 13; Weir, 1989) and availability is contingent upon the 
interests and institutions that surround ideas.  As Weir (1989: 54–55) observes, if ideas 
are “only advocated by those without access to centres of national power, there is little 
chance that [such ideas] can emerge as the basis for redesigning policy”.   
 
The configuration of interests that surround ideas may affect opportunities for ideas to 
be taken up in policy (Weir, 1989).  Political incentives to act on ideas through policy 
may hinge around the strength of coalitions that support and oppose ideas.   
 
The institutional structure of the state affects the propensity of ideas to influence policy 
by influencing the transmission of ideas between sources in wider society and other 
areas of the state and political decision-makers (Hall, 1989).  As already observed 
above, actors’ location within the state affects their ability to influence policy by 
conditioning access to the levers of policymaking and location thus also conditions the 
possibility for actors’ ideas to shape policy choice.  As social structures within which 
ideas are embedded, institutions also condition opportunities for the actors located 
within them to mobilise support (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985; Sikkink, 1991; 
Tarrow, 2011: 31; Weir and Skocpol, 1985).  
 
The availability of ideas and their capacity to be assimilated and appreciated is also 
conditioned by the availability of knowledge (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985: 50).   
Because politicians are unlikely to possess strong knowledge of IT and software 
licensing, if politicians are to recognise the political dimensions of software licensing on 
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which the value in promoting F/OSS is principally based, actors that might explain 
these dimensions need to be proximate to politicians.  Within the state, those most likely 
to possess knowledge relevant to recognising the benefits of F/OSS are IT 
administrators.  However, as noted above, these actors possess principally financial and 
technical interests and face incentives to use PS, making it unlikely they will ordinarily 
push for F/OSS to be promoted.  The significance of knowledge to the recognition of 
value in promoting F/OSS and the issues that are typically likely to militate against this 
knowledge being imparted, again points to the importance of F/OSS advocates’ 
embeddedness within the state or incumbent political forces if F/OSS promotion is to 
stand a chance of emerging.  Only where knowledge of the political benefits of F/OSS 
is coupled with the desire to realise these benefits is this knowledge likely to be 
imparted. 
 
Whilst ideas matter to choice in software licensing policy, their influence on policy 
varies across time and national boundaries in relation to conditions shaped by the 
character of interests and institutions.  It is argued that whilst ideas may play an 
important role in shaping policy decisions and mobilisation, the influence that ideas 
have rests upon the location, resources and ties of the actors that espouse them such that 
they may be regarded as secondary to interests and institutions in explaining policy 
choice. 
2.3.3 Other Institutional Factors 
 
A number of other institutional variables might affect software licensing policy.  
State Capacity 
 
The capacity of the state affects policy choice by determining which policy options are 
administratively viable (Hall, 1989; Weir and Skocpol, 1985; Evans, 1995).  Although 
the organisation and resources at the disposal of IT administrators will affect the 
capacity of these actors to adopt F/OSS independently – i.e. without buying in 
knowledge, personnel or solutions from the private sector – outside the issues raised by 
switching costs, the ability of the state to purchase PS solutions suggests that it might 
equally purchase F/OSS solutions if they are competitively priced.  In-house knowledge 
 84 
will be important if public sector IT administrators are to deploy F/OSS themselves.  
Manpower with the relevant skills will be crucial if the state wishes to develop F/OSS 
independently.  However, notwithstanding these issues, the adoption of F/OSS is 
arguably more about responsibility and organisation than resources.  Where F/OSS is 
adopted, if the state adopts F/OSS independently, IT administrators take on more 
responsibility for the systems they manage than when they buy-in solutions and support 
from the private sector.  In terms of organisation, greater pooling and sharing of 
knowledge across the state as well as engagement with the wider F/OSS community 
offers IT administrators opportunities to overcome the search and learning costs 
associated with adopting F/OSS and harness the benefits of peer production.  In view of 
the amount the state may spend on licensing PS, it is reasonable to assume that 
governments generally posses the financial resources to manage their IT needs 
relatively independently through F/OSS. 
State-Sector Relations 
 
As implicit in the discussion above as to how state demeanour toward the private sector 
might affect business organisation, the relations between the state and the private sector 
affect business actors’ influence over policy (Durand and Silva, 1997; Maxfield and 
Schneider, 1997; Schneider, 2004).   
 
As for any actor, the structure of the state will affect the influence that business is able 
to wield over policy (Gourevitch, 1986; Hall, 1997).  The way in which policymaking 
towards software is organised within the state is likely to be key to sectoral actors’ 
ability to influence policy.  The very fact that software is ever more integral to daily life 
means policy in virtually any policy area might involve software.  As a consequence, all 
areas of the state may connect to software and unless these areas are coordinated, the 
software sector will find it costly to influence policies that affect its interests.  The more 
centralised policymaking toward software, the easier it is likely to be for sectoral actors 
to influence policy.  Awareness and understanding of IT within the government is likely 
to affect the degree to which the interests of the software sector are catered for as formal 
liaison with the sector rests upon recognition of software as a policy issue.  The 
character of formal state-sector relations and the areas of the state with which the sector 
formally liaises will affect sectoral influence over policy.  
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As well as the wider institutional structure of government, business actors’ ties with 
those in the state more generally will affect influence over policy (Fairfield, 2011; 
Plotke, 1992).  Apart from more formalised consultation of business, business actors 
might garner ties with government through appointments, informal or partisan links 
(Fairfield, 2011).  Although business did not represent a core constituency of 
government in either Argentina (Corrales, 2008) or Brazil between 2003 and 2010, 
governments in both countries counted on support from business.  Business support is 
necessary for governments to effectively govern (Lindblom, 1980).  The Lula 
government’s dependence upon business was signalled by the appointment of pro-
business figures to ministries related to business interests (Branford, 2005: 98–99).  The 
Kirchner governments counted on sections of the business community for support, 
especially those with an orientation toward local production (see Lewis, 2009: 163; 
Wylde, 2012: 126). 
 
Although state-sector relations will affect PS advocates’ ability to access political 
decision-makers and participate in policymaking, it is argued that this factor is 
secondary to the organisation of sectoral interests in explaining software licensing 
policy choice.  Although strong ties with policymakers and politicians are likely to 
increase PS advocates’ lobbying capacity, the organisation of the sector will affect 
government actors’ responses.  Where cohesion in sectoral interests is lower, PS 
advocates’ reduced capacity to mobilise the sector and present their interests as those of 
the sector overall will reduce these actors’ ability to persuade policymakers to choose 
policies that favour PS.
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3 The Politics of Software Licensing Policy in 
Argentina and Brazil at the Turn of the 21st Century 
(1999 – 2002)  
 
Around the turn of the millennium, calls for policy promotion of F/OSS emerged in 
both Argentina and Brazil in the guise of activism and legislative initiatives.  
Notwithstanding the appearance of these efforts, the prospects of F/OSS promotion 
taking hold looked to vary widely across the two countries, appearing high in Argentina 
whilst low in Brazil.  There were a number of reasons why prospects appeared to vary 
this way.  First were the underlying financial incentives for using F/OSS.  In Argentina 
in the wake of the 2001 economic crisis, the pecuniary incentives for government to 
turn to F/OSS were arguably greater than anywhere else in the region.  As the state 
faced fiscal collapse and the cost of imported PS skyrocketed with the 2002 devaluation 
of the peso, F/OSS effectively represented the only feasible means of using software 
legally.  Although financial drivers for the Brazilian government to turn to F/OSS may 
seemingly have been elevated in Brazil too following its own crisis in 1998, subsequent 
increases in fiscal revenues and public sector spending (Amann, 2003; Giambiagi and 
Ronci, 2004) suggest that – in spite of the fact that the Brazilian government sought to 
reign in public sector spending in a political climate of austerity (ibid.) – such drivers 
were unlikely to have been significantly more compelling than elsewhere in Latin 
America.  
 
Second were trends in wider IP regimes.  In the 1990s, as it acceded to the TRIPS 
agreement and sought preferential access to US markets, Brazil increased patent 
protection to levels higher than those called for either under the TRIPS agreement or by 
the US (Guise et al., 2008; Shadlen, 2012; 2014).  This hike in protection, showing a 
bias in favour of knowledge owners in Brazil’s wider IP regime, made F/OSS 
promotion appear less likely.  Argentina also increased levels of patent protection in this 
period, yet it sought to minimise these increases, utilising flexibilities under the TRIPS 
agreement and failing to meet the levels of protection called for by the US (Shadlen, 
2014).  These attempts to minimise increases in protection, showing an inclination to 
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favour knowledge users in Argentina’s wider IP regime, suggested F/OSS promotion 
was more likely. 
 
Third was the character of foreign policy.  Brazil’s foreign policy was characterised by 
cooperation as it sought a global order based on collaboration and multilateralism, and it 
generally conformed with international norms as a result (Vigevani and Oliveira, 2007).  
The liberal character of the international environment and US’ backing of US PS firms 
meant promotion of F/OSS – a phenomenon its US detractors described as ‘un-
American’ (Festa, 2001) – appeared incongruent with Brazil’s behaviour in the 
international arena.  Although Argentina had pursued strong alignment with the US in 
the 1990s, its image on the international stage had historically been characterised by 
recalcitrance.  As Argentina defaulted on its international debt at the end of 2001, 
reinforcing its reputation for indifference to international norms, US disapproval 
appeared unlikely to present a serious obstacle to F/OSS promotion. 
 
Fourth was the likely strength of would-be opponents of F/OSS promotion, the legacy 
of previous industrial policies suggesting such actors would be stronger in Brazil than in 
Argentina.  Protection of informatics was stronger in Brazil than in Argentina during the 
1980s (see Evans, 1995; Nochteff, 1995).  By 1990, where the Brazilian software sector 
represented a notable political player, such an actor barely existed in Argentina.  
Although Brazil’s informatics protection was rolled back in the 1990s, reducing the 
significance of the software sector as an actor, there remained a legacy of institutional 
structures which represented the sector and connected it with government which were 
virtually absent in Argentina.   
 
Last and perhaps most important was the character of governments in Brazil and 
Argentina around the millennium.  The Cardoso government looked unlikely to promote 
FOSS not only because it sought strong ties with the US but also because its liberal bent 
was apparently at odds with ‘picking winners’, especially in relation to a software 
licensing scheme popularly viewed as antithetical to capitalism and the spirit of IP.  
Although the Argentinean governments of the period were hardly radical, the Duhalde 
administration’s break with neoliberalism as it adopted interventionist measures 
suggested it would be open to promoting F/OSS. 
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Despite prospects of F/OSS promotion appearing to vary in this way across Argentina 
and Brazil in T1, both countries maintained policies that favoured PS.  The absence of 
policy variation in T1 is noteworthy in view of cross-national patterns in underlying 
conditions.  Yet it is all the more so at the end of this period, when conditions appeared 
to become increasingly propitious to F/OSS promotion in Argentina following the 
crisis, whilst seeming to remain as unfavourable as ever to such a policy in Brazil.  
Considering the increasingly leftist orientation of the subsequent Kirchner 
administrations, at the end of 2002, F/OSS promotion looked imminent in Argentina.  
By contrast, Lula’s pledge to maintain the market orientated stance of the Cardoso 
administration suggested policy would continue to favour PS in Brazil.  
 
This chapter explains the absence of F/OSS promotion in Brazil and Argentina between 
1999 and 2002, arguing that this outcome resulted mainly from F/OSS advocates’ 
inability to persuade executives to adopt F/OSS promotion rather than the efforts of 
opponents seeking to prevent it.  With little to suggest F/OSS promotion would 
imminently emerge in T1, mobilisation against such a policy was low.   
 
F/OSS advocates were unable to translate their preferences into policy because they 
possessed weak institutional embeddedness, attenuating their lobbying power by 
reducing their capacity to mobilise resources and forge ties with political decision-
makers.  Without ties to political leaders, F/OSS advocates lacked influence within the 
leadership of the executive and as a consequence, their demands either went unheard or 
were ignored by those with the power to promote F/OSS.  In Argentina, F/OSS 
advocates were remote from the state in general and could mobilise only limited support 
and possessed little if any influence within the executive.  Brazilian F/OSS advocates 
presented a contrast to their Argentinean counterparts in that they possessed strong 
embeddedness within both an incumbent political party and the state albeit at the 
subnational level.  By offering access to resources, embeddedness within a state 
government facilitated these actors’ capacity to mobilise and organise a national 
movement around F/OSS.  However, affiliated to a party that at the national level sat in 
opposition, Brazilian F/OSS advocates lacked ties with the leadership of the national 
executive.  Notwithstanding the support Brazilian F/OSS advocates were able to 
mobilise in wider society, in the absence of influence amongst national political leaders, 
these actors were unable to persuade these leaders to promote F/OSS. 
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The cases of Brazil and Argentina at the turn of the millennium demonstrate the limits 
of agency where actors are relatively weak and act outside institutional structures such 
as the state and political parties.  Whilst F/OSS advocacy emerged in both these 
countries during this period, F/OSS advocates worked from outside the national 
government and political forces holding power at the national level.  With 
embeddedness within the government and incumbent political forces weak or absent, 
F/OSS advocates lacked the capacity to translate their preferences into policy.   
 
This chapter first examines the characteristics of the software sector and mobilisation 
around F/OSS promotion in Argentina before carrying out an equivalent analysis for 
Brazil.  In both countries, greater space is given to analysing mobilisation around F/OSS 
promotion in accordance with the argument that between 1999 and 2002, mobilisation 
of opposition to F/OSS promotion was low.  Greater space is devoted to analysing 
F/OSS mobilisation in Brazil than in Argentina on account of the fact that in the former 
country, F/OSS advocates were able to achieve their goals at a subnational level and 
mobilise greater support than their counterparts in Argentina, even if they were 
ultimately unsuccessful in succeeding in precipitating F/OSS promotion at the national 
level. 
3.1 F/OSS Advocacy in T1 Argentina 
 
At the turn of the 2000s, Argentina possessed what was likely the most well developed 
F/OSS community in Spanish speaking Latin America, with probably the most Linux 
users (Busaniche, 2006) and numerous F/OSS related groups, the largest of which 
attracted around 1,000 active participants.  However, if the existence of a developed 
local F/OSS community made the existence of social pressure for government to 
promote F/OSS seem likely, where it existed, such pressure was ineffectual.  
Differences between groups calling for F/OSS to be promoted prevented these groups 
from working together effectively and no one group was strong enough in itself to 
persuade the government to adopt such a policy.   
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Although F/OSS related groups were numerous, most were narrowly focused on the 
technical dimensions of F/OSS and generally disinterested in F/OSS as a political issue 
or an object of government promotion.  Those groups that were interested in F/OSS 
promotion were significantly smaller than their technically focused counterparts, 
attracting relatively few participants and able to mobilise limited resources, reflecting 
the collective action issues surrounding mobilisation around F/OSS promotion.  The 
main groups were Hipatia, the Free Path Foundation (FVL) which both emerged at the 
end of the 1990s and Free Software Argentina (SoLAr) which emerged in 2003 (SoLAr 
A, 2011; SoLAr B, 2011; SoLAr C, 2010).  SoLAr was estimated to involve around 
two-hundred active participants and FVL around only ten (Saravia, 2011).  Outside the 
voluntary labour of their participants, FVL’s resources were generated through 
partnering with international donor organisations whilst SoLAr’s were effectively 
limited to membership dues.  
 
Capable of mobilising limited resources, groups advocating F/OSS also experienced 
difficulties in working effectively together on account of differences that characterised 
the F/OSS community more widely together with competition for leadership and 
political space.  Based upon ideological positions in terms of political bias and 
democratic principle, differences were reflected both within as well as across groups.  In 
terms of political bias, Hipatia was associated with the far-left whilst SoLAr reflected 
views across the political spectrum albeit with a leftwing bias.  Whilst FVL professed 
neutrality with regard to political bias and partisan affiliation, the organisation was 
viewed elsewhere in the F/OSS community as rightwing, in part because it worked with 
Marcelo Dragan, a legislator affiliated with the centre-right party, Action for the 
Republic (APR)(see Torre, 2005: 175), to improve the text of a F/OSS mandate bill 
(FVL A, 2010b; Proposicion.org.ar, 2001).  With regards democracy – a theme of 
import within the F/OSS community where openness and deliberation were prized – 
differences existed between FVL, which was incorporated as a foundation, organised 
hierarchically and conducted decision-making behind closed doors and SoLAr, which 
was incorporated as a civil society and where emphasis was placed upon observing 
democratic norms, participation and transparency in decision making.  Where FVL was 
criticised on ethical grounds, on the basis that its operation flouted the very values it 
purported to uphold (interviews, 2011), SoLAr was criticised for being ineffective, its 
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emphasis on democracy reducing the organisation’s capacity to define objectives and 
strategies to achieve them (interviews, 2010; 2011). 
 
If groups advocating F/OSS faced limitations in mobilising support amongst 
themselves, they also passed up opportunities to attract allies in wider society.  The 
general profile and demeanour of F/OSS advocates served to reduce possibilities for 
mobilising support from wider society.  In Argentina, the F/OSS community 
represented a relatively privileged section of society, embodying a mainly middle class, 
university educated, twenty-something following (FVL A, 2010; Journalist A, 2012; see 
Zúñiga, 2006: 26).  With their origins in this community, where an anti-politics stance 
was also prevalent, F/OSS advocates generally remained disengaged and aloof from 
social mobilisation (Journalist A, 2012), missing opportunities to generate wider social 
awareness of F/OSS and associate it with a broader constituency.  Around the turn of 
the century, the costs of this aloofness were high, as mobilisation in response to the 
conditions wrought by the crisis was widespread amongst sections of the middle classes 
and sectors at the base of society (Di Marco, 2003; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007: 94; 
Levitsky, 2008: 107; Panizza, 2014).  In some cases, F/OSS advocates’ demeanour or 
actions served to alienate potential allies.  Leftist sections of the F/OSS community 
reduced possibilities to mobilise resources by alienating business actors, as much 
through the disdain their political bias generated within the business community as 
through their own rejection of capitalism (interviews, 2011).  FVL’s involvement with 
APR looked to negatively affect chances of mobilising support by associating F/OSS 
with conservative political forces at a time when such forces were particularly 
unpopular. 
 
APR was headed by the principle architect of Argentina’s economic policies through the 
1990s, Domingo Cavallo (Grugel, 2009), a man many Argentineans regarded as the 
primary culprit for the crisis (see Lewis, 2009; Panizza, 2014; Smith, 2002: 4).  
Engaging with Cavallo’s party at the height of the crisis in 2001 – a moment at which 
its leader could not have been more unpopular – FVL, and by extension F/OSS, not only 
came to be associated with political forces facing the groundswell of public opinion but 
also, effectively framed F/OSS in a way likely to deter rather than garner support from 
important constituencies.  Framing represents a mechanism for mobilising support 
(McAdam et al., 2001; Tarrow, 2011) and in Argentina, where sectors at the base of 
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society represent the majority of the population, framing F/OSS in ways that connect to 
the interests of these sectors may offer valuable opportunities to mobilise support.  With 
the availability of low cost, unlicensed PS representing a form of social inclusion, if 
such sectors were to come to support F/OSS, it was important to frame F/OSS in ways 
that drew attention to its political dimensions, such as social inclusion.  Dragan’s project 
– the motivations of which were couched primarily in economic and technical 
arguments relating to reducing fiscal expenditure, stimulating local commercial 
enterprise and improving the efficacy of the state (Dragan, 2000) – presented F/OSS in 
a way that overlooked its political benefits.  Moreover, being presented by political 
forces viewed by many as responsible for increased social exclusion, the project was 
likely to do little to endear F/OSS to poorer sections of the population (Carllinni, 2012; 
Journalist A, 2012). 
 
Aloof from actors in wider society, F/OSS advocates were also isolated from state and 
political institutions, passing up further possibilities to mobilise resources as well as 
opportunities to garner influence within the government.  With their anti-politics stance 
and at a time marked by acute wider public dissatisfaction with Argentina’s political 
class as a result of the crisis (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007: 94; Riggirozzi, 2009: 109; 
Torre, 2005), F/OSS advocates were generally averse to working with the state and 
mainstream political parties.  Isolated from incumbent political forces, F/OSS 
advocates’ reduced possibilities to participate in policymaking and transmit their ideas 
to politicians, not least political leaders, the support of which was crucial for F/OSS 
promotion to be adopted as a government wide policy.  Unless ideas are pushed by 
actors with access to the bases of power within the state, the likelihood of ideas 
influencing policy is slim (Weir, 1989: 54–55).   
 
Generally avoiding incumbent political forces and professional bureaucrats, F/OSS 
advocates’ contact with government was effectively limited to their engagement with 
Dragan’s legislative project.  As a strategy to precipitate policy promotion of F/OSS, 
legislative proposals possessed a number of drawbacks.  In the case of Dragan’s project 
in particular, a principle issue concerned the fact that APR was a minority party holding 
just 4.3% of the seats in the chamber of deputies in the legislature (Calvo and Murillo, 
2013: 141), reducing the likelihood of approval.  Dragan’s assistant believed there had 
existed support sufficient for the bill to be approval within the chamber of deputies in 
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2001 (Ares, 2011) yet the crisis eclipsed the bill’s discussion and before a vote could be 
taken, APR’s presence within congress was practically wiped out in the 2001 election 
(Calvo and Murillo, 2013: 141; Torre, 2005).  Another issue with Dragan’s project was 
that it reflected neither a societal demand nor garnered significant public support that 
might have added to the political incentives for approval.  Dragan had submitted his 
project on individual initiative after hearing about F/OSS from a mutual friend (Ares, 
2011), his first contact with the F/OSS community only arising after his bill’s 
submission when FVL approached him (FVL A, 2010b).   
 
More generally, as a strategy to prompt policy adoption of F/OSS promotion, legislative 
projects were susceptible to being blocked in the absence of support from the executive 
or majority party in the legislature.  Ruling party control of committees allows the 
executive or ruling party to stymie proposed legislation it opposes at the committee 
stage, preventing it from ever reaching the floor to be voted on (Calvo, 2007; 
Scartascini, 2008).  In Latin America, much of the activity that takes place in the 
legislature takes place behind the scenes (Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002) and lobbying of 
legislators or parties that control committees offers one way in which legislative activity 
may be stymied (Guides, 2011; HCDN A, 2011; Legislative assistant B, 2011).  
Following the crisis which eclipsed discussion of Dragan’s bill, the Justicialist Party 
(PJ) was the ruling party, such that the bill required the support of the PJ if it was to 
stand a hope of being revived.  Even if projects enjoy political support and are not 
blocked, to stand a chance of being implemented successfully they also require the 
support of bureaucrats (Weir and Skocpol, 1985).   
 
Bureaucrats may play a key role in determining policy adoption as participants in the 
policymaking process, thereby possessing capacity to influence politicians, and by 
affecting the administrative viability of policy proposals due to their role in policy 
implementation (Weir, 1989: 373; Weir and Skocpol, 1985).  Within the Argentinean 
government, the Oficina Nacional de Tecnologías de Información (ONTI) was 
responsible for determining standards for technology adoption (Fontdevila et al., 2008).  
It was crucial that ONTI bought-in to the idea of promoting F/OSS if such a policy was 
to be viable because the entity was not only in a position to influence policymakers but 
also exerted influence over policy implementation throughout the state.  However, 
F/OSS advocates failed to engage with ONTI.  In the case of Dragan’s project, ONTI 
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was not invited to committee meetings to discuss the project despite its importance to 
the viability of this proposal (Carllinni, 2010). 
 
In the absence of engagement from the wider F/OSS community, government IT 
administrators pursued their own, autonomous F/OSS related initiative through a 
workgroup within the Foro de Responsables Informáticos (FRI)(Kaufman, 2003: 16; 
2005; Poggiese et al., 2005).  The FRI was part of a wider initiative involving 
cooperation and knowledge sharing between bureaucrats through forums across a range 
of areas in public administration, conceived with a view to enabling the state to continue 
functioning through the resource shortages of the crisis (Kaufman, 2003; Poggiese et al., 
2005: 4).  The F/OSS workgroup within the FRI was motivated by pragmatic as 
opposed to political or ideological concerns and focused upon tackling technical issues 
in the adoption of F/OSS rather than promoting F/OSS as an end in itself (Carllinni, 
2010).  Coordinated by professional bureaucrats from within the ONTI beneath the 
political tiers of government, the FRI operated independently of political intervention 
(ibid.). 
 
The separation of F/OSS advocates, the political leadership of the executive and 
government IT administrators in Argentina around the millennium reduced the 
likelihood of F/OSS promotion emerging because the motivation to adopt such a policy, 
political authority necessary to avoid stymie and technical capacity for viability were all 
separated from one another.  Awareness and comprehension of IT was generally limited 
in political circles in Argentina (see Kaufman, 2005) and without interchange between 
politicians and actors holding both technical knowledge and an appreciation for the 
political dimensions of technology, politicians generally lacked the awareness to lead 
them to consider adopting F/OSS by themselves. 
 
If F/OSS advocates were unsuccessful in getting the government to promote F/OSS in 
the first years of the century, the prospects of these actors achieving their objectives 
appeared to improve in 2003, shortly before Kirchner came to power.  From within the 
offices of the presidency, it was announced that the F/OSS community was to be invited 
to participate in an initiative to promote the use of F/OSS within the state – the Ámbito 
de Software Libre en el Estado (ASLE)(ASLE, 2003).  Suggesting an opportunity for 
F/OSS advocates to strengthen their government ties, it appeared likely that F/OSS 
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advocates would begin to increase their influence within the government and that 
F/OSS promotion would be incorporated into the government’s agenda.   
3.2 Opposition to F/OSS Promotion in T1 Argentina 
 
Mobilisation in opposition to F/OSS promotion was low in Argentina at the end of the 
1990s and first years of the millennium, not least because there appeared relatively little 
sign the executive would adopt such a policy.  However, likely opponents of F/OSS 
would have been in a relatively weak position to prevent the uptake of F/OSS 
promotion, had the executive decided to do so.  At the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, 
whilst local firms with interests in PS existed and large US software firms were active 
in Argentina, software was not readily identified as a discrete economic activity yet 
alone a sector of political weight with notable representation.  Where business 
associations existed, they tended to aggregate the interests of only the largest, 
multinational firms, raising consequences for their organisational strength.  Identified 
primarily with the interests of multinationals rather than local SMEs, local business 
associations that nominally represented the interests of the software sector as a whole 
attracted little participation from local firms.  Reducing the resources available to these 
associations and their legitimacy as sectoral representatives, low levels of associativism 
also inhibited the ability of the most powerful would-be opponents of F/OSS promotion 
to coordinate the sector.  Would-be opponents of F/OSS promotion were also in a 
relatively weak position to lobby government due to the institutional structure of the 
state, which was not geared to facilitating liaison between the sector and the 
government, there being an absence of relevant government interlocutors and 
institutionalised channels of communication.  Overshadowing the period around the 
millennium, the crisis drew the attention of the government, reducing the likelihood of 
significant change in government-sectoral relations in this period. 
Sectoral Association 
 
In both economic and political terms, the Argentinean software sector was relatively 
insignificant at the end of the 1990s.  Whilst the government had shown some interest in 
developing local production of informatics in the 1980s, policy was weak and 
ineffective (Babini, 2003; Chudnovsky and López, 1996: 17; Fontdevila et al., 2008; 
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Nochteff, 1995).  Generally left to the vagaries of the free market from this period 
onwards, the local software sector was small and dominated by foreign, mainly US 
interests (Chudnovsky et al., 2001; Correa, 1996).  In the mid 1980s, conservative 
estimates put the number of firms involved in software related activities in Argentina at 
around 300 (Chudnovsky et al., 2001: 76).  It appears that this number remained 
relatively static for the next decade, the same figure being reported in a study from the 
mid 1990s (Correa, 1996).  Whilst institutional representation of software related 
activity existed in the 1980s and early 1990s, reportedly aggregating the interests of 
around 80 local SMEs at the beginning of the 1990s, the business associations 
concerned possessed limited political influence (CESSI A, 2011). 
 
Under the neoliberal policies of the Menem governments in the 1990s, there existed no 
policy support for the software sector (Chudnovsky et al., 2001: 42).   The software 
sector was not even able to obtain benefit from horizontal policies aimed at assisting 
industry in general as software was not recognised as a discrete economic activity 
(Chudnovsky et al., 2001).  The Menem governments also generally took little notice of 
business organisations (Birle, 1997: 273–285; Schneider, 2004: 53).  Schneider (2004) 
argues that the state may play a major role in patterns of business organisation, 
intervention and business consultation representing two factors which might stimulate 
associativism.  The absence of sectoral policy toward the software sector and 
government indifference to business organisation through the 1990s reduced incentives 
for sectoral association. 
 
The software firms that did develop in the 1990s grew up around the privatisation of 
state enterprises and informatisation of the state (Fontdevila et al., 2008: 111–112; 
Yoguel et al., 2006).  According to businessmen active in the 1990s, competition 
amongst local firms during the period was strong (CESSI B, 2010; CESSI C, 2012; 
CESSI D, 2012).  Competition may inhibit business organisation by limiting available 
resources (Schneider, 2004: 52).  Together with a lack of state intervention to offer 
incentives for organisation, market conditions in 1990s Argentina led firms to focus on 
individual interests rather than sectoral cooperation.  A sector’s capacity to support 
business organisation may also be associated with its size (Drope and Hansen, 2009: 
309).  With the local software sector in Argentina still at an incipient stage of 
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development in the 1990s, its relatively small size is likely to represent another factor 
that limited business organisation. 
 
With the Argentinean market open to foreign software, Microsoft dominated the 
Argentinean software sector.  Forward linkages, which allow suppliers to mobilise firms 
that use suppliers’ products as inputs (Shadlen, 2014), meant Microsoft was able to 
influence local distributors and resellers.  Whilst sectoral business associations were 
dominated by MNCs, allowing these firms a strong hand in steering associations’ 
agendas, the low participation of national software firms in these associations meant 
MNCs’ ability to coordinate the sector was limited.   
 
At the end of the 1990s, the business associations chiefly associated with the software 
sector reflected primarily the interests of multinational firms.  These organisations were 
the Argentine Chamber of IT and Communications (CICOMRA) and the Chamber of 
Software and IT Services Firms (CESSI).  CICOMRA primarily represented the 
telecommunications sector (Capellán and Ballarino, 2011). Representing many of the 
largest IT and telecommunications firms in the world, CICOMRA possessed significant 
resources.  However, whilst its members included software firms, it was primarily 
focused on telecommunications.  Focussed exclusively upon activity relating to 
software and nominally representing firms across the sector, national as well as 
international, CESSI was nonetheless dominated by MNCs (CESSI D, 2012).  Local 
firms, saw little benefit from participating in the CESSI (CESSI D, 2012) and the 
organisation faced difficulty in extracting contributions from its members around the 
time (CESSI E, 2011).  Participation was so low that there were often insufficient 
numbers to support the various commissions within the association (CESSI B, 2012b; 
CESSI C, 2012).  Under such conditions, CESSI welcomed the involvement of MNCs 
as much as a source of resources as a source of influence (CESSI A, 2011).  MNCs’ 
dominance within the association reinforced itself, as local firms viewed the association 
as representing the interests of MNCs rather than local firms (CESSI D, 2012).  The 
influence of multinational PS firms within the CESSI at the end of the 1990s is reflected 
by the organisation’s focus on combating use of unlicensed software (see Giglio, 2000). 
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Whilst the CESSI petitioned the government it was unsuccessful in gaining government 
support for the sector.  It is unsurprising that the association remained weak through the 
period as it was able to offer few incentives to attract participation.   
State-Sector Relations 
 
The arrangement of the institutions with which societal actors interact with the state 
condition these actors’ influence within it (Evans, 1995; 1997b; Weir and Skocpol, 
1985).  In T1 Argentina, institutional arrangements interacted with the weak cohesion of 
the software sector to limit the effects of its lobbying.  With policy toward the software 
sector absent, there existed no particular institutional arrangements to cater to the sector.  
Due to the nature of software, the purview of many areas of government touching upon 
the issue, responsibility for matters of concern to the sector was distributed across a 
multitude of different government ministries and departments (CESSI A, 2011).  As the 
sector had to coordinate with multiple areas of the government to pursue its interests, 
such conditions increased the costs of government liaison and reduced the sector’s 
chances of lobbying success.  The coordination problem facing the sector was 
compounded around the millennium because the government was controlled by a 
coalition, the entities with which the sector had to liaise being distributed amongst the 
different political forces from which the coalition was comprised (CESSI A, 2011).  
This coalition broke down in 2000 (Lewis, 2009) further complicating the sector’s 
ability to liaise with the government as cooperation between the different areas 
responsible for matters of interest to the sector was obstructed by political differences.  
3.3 F/OSS Advocacy in T1 Brazil 
 
Unlike their counterparts in Argentina, Brazilian F/OSS advocates were from the outset 
embedded firmly within political and state institutions and these institutions enabled 
these actors to mobilise support for F/OSS promotion in multiple ways.  In Brazil 
mobilisation around F/OSS promotion emerged within the state government of Brazil’s 
southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul (RS), during the leftist administration of PT 
governor, Olívio Dutra.  Unlike the mobilisation around F/OSS promotion in Argentina, 
where heterogeneous interests limited F/OSS advocates’ ability to mobilise support, 
Brazilian F/OSS advocates were able to overcome the costs of collective action and 
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harness the support of a broad coalition reflecting heterogeneous interests through the 
resources they were able to mobilise through the state.  Controlling the resources on 
which this coalition was built, these F/OSS advocates were able to lead and coordinate 
this coalition.   
Emergence of F/OSS Policy 
 
In RS, mobilisation around F/OSS promotion emerged in tandem with the adoption of 
F/OSS as a policy by the state government and both were prompted by actors within the 
state.  The state may allow actors within it to act autonomously, the structures that 
surround these actors conditioning opportunities for action (Weir and Skocpol, 1985: 
118).  The mix of state institutions and incumbent political forces that the Dutra 
administration embodied produced conditions in which politicians’ receptiveness to the 
idea of adopting F/OSS promotion was more likely for reasons relating to the goals and 
capacity of the government.     
 
Institutions affect policy choices through the ideas which are embedded within them 
(Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985; Sikkink, 1991; Weir and Skocpol, 1985).  The 
particular ideas of the PT conditioned the policy ideas that would be acceptable within 
the Dutra administration.  The PT’s emergence coincided with the re-democratisation of 
Brazil (Keck, 1995) and one of the party’s goals concerned increasing participation in 
democracy (Abers, 2000; Nylen, 2000; 2003).  Reflecting this goal, the stated objectives 
of the Dutra administration were to offer citizens more control over the state, improve 
public accountability and public participation in the way the state was run and IT was 
viewed as strategic to advancing these objectives (C. Dutra, 2011; O. Dutra, 2012; 
Mazoni, 2011).  The ideas embedded within the Dutra administration meant heed was 
likely to be paid toward policy proposals that might improve the state’s capacity to offer 
public services through IT. 
 
The institutional structure of the state affects the administrative viability of policies and 
thus conditions the policy options the state might realistically entertain (Rueschemeyer 
and Evans, 1985; Weir and Skocpol, 1985).  The institutional structure of the state 
government of RS meant the government possessed the capacity to develop its own IT 
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solutions.  In RS, the IT and telecommunications (ICT)11 infrastructure upon which the 
state bureaucracy of RS depended was publicly owned and administered by a public 
company, the State Data Processing Company of RS (PROCERGS).  Unlike ONTI in 
the Argentinean government – which was focused on formulating standards for IT 
adoption within the state – PROCERGS was responsible for executing as well as 
formulating government IT policy.  Further to controlling government owned ICT 
infrastructure, PROCERGS possessed technical personnel that offered the potential to 
design, develop and deploy IT solutions in-house, including software.  
 
Whilst the goals and capacity of the Dutra administration made receptiveness to F/OSS 
adoption more likely, these conditions in themselves were insufficient for the idea itself 
to gain recognition amongst politicians.  The catalyst was a government actor which 
was itself an outcome of the political forces that comprised the Dutra administration. 
 
Although the Dutra administration was a PT administration, it was dominated by more 
radical sections of the party.  The prevalence of radical factions within the PT party 
organisation of RS was particularly pronounced (Machado, 2004; Sobota, 2011) and as 
a result of internal party struggles during the 1998 gubernatorial elections, these factions 
gained strong representation in the Dutra administration (Goldfrank and Schneider, 
2003).  Emerging out of revolutionary groups, these factions contained experienced 
activists who possessed “know-how” in political organising (Gret and Sintomer, 2005: 
11; see also Abers, 2000: 57).  Unionised public sector workers represented a core 
constituency of the PT (Nylen, 2000) and the Dutra administration also reflected 
participation from this constituency.  
 
As a result of the attributes of the political forces that comprised the Dutra 
administration, PROCERGS came to be headed up by a group of professional public 
sector IT administrators, who were linked to labour unions and a radical PT faction with 
roots in Trotskyism, Socialist Democracy (DS)(see Goldfrank, 2003; Kucinski, 2005).  
Constituting a ‘bureaucracy-party-union nexus’, this group represented a confluence of 
                                                 
11
 The terms ‘ICT’ and ‘IT’ will be used interchangeably here.  Due to technological convergence, both 
the transport of data over networks (encompassing communications/telecommunications) and the 
processing and storage of data (generally referred to as ‘IT’) rested on the same digital foundations by the 
turn of the millennium. 
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state and political institutions as well as a fusion of the cognitive attributes that these 
institutions embodied.   
 
Through professional, partisan and union ties, members of this nexus were connected to 
colleagues and peers in local branches of federal institutions as well as the municipal 
government of the state capital of RS, Porto Alegre, which was also controlled by the 
PT.  It was through these ties that PROCERGS managers were prompted to consider 
F/OSS adoption as a means to reduce government expenditure on PS (Parera et al., 
2000) following a suggestion from a DS activist who worked in SERPRO – the federal 
equivalent of PROCERGS – where F/OSS adoption had been trialled (see Tema, 2002).   
 
On coming to power, the Dutra government found state funds had been exhausted by 
the outgoing administration of Antônio Britto, leaving the state with massive shortfalls 
due to debts owed to the federal government (Goldfrank and Schneider, 2003: 161).  
The Dutra government’s fiscal situation was not was not helped by conditions in the 
wider Brazilian economy as it took power during a period of falling economic growth 
and financial crisis (see Amann, 2003).  In 1999, the state government’s expenditure on 
PS licensing fees reportedly ran to around US$10 million12 (Parera et al., 2000) and 
facing acute financial difficulties, PROCERGS managers welcomed a suggestion that 
might reduce these fees. 
 
Though F/OSS adoption was initially considered for economic reasons, it was also 
quickly identified as consistent with the Dutra administration’s ideals.  Together with 
ideas, the knowledge embedded within institutions affects policy choice through 
awareness of the policy options that are available (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985: 50).  
It was a result of a mix of the knowledge as well as ideas embedded within the nexus 
that F/OSS adoption was recognised as a policy idea and one which was attractive.  
Fusing technical expertise of ICTs, leftist ideas and the political goals of the wider 
Dutra administration, members of this nexus were not only aware of F/OSS but also 
quick to appreciate its political significance and view its adoption as desirable.   
 
                                                 
12
 Converted using 1999 exchange rate (World Development Indicators) from figure quoted in Brazilian 
reales in source. 
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As political appointees, PROCERGS managers were in a strong position to gain 
political leaders’ backing for policy proposals in their area of competence and they 
readily received Dutra’s approval to adopt F/OSS (O. Dutra, 2012; Mazoni, 2011).   
 
The nexus’ control of PROCERGS and the political emphasis placed on advancing the 
administration’s goals meant that in contrast to the situation in the Argentinean 
government, where IT administrators and politicians were relatively isolated from one 
another, the two groups worked together closely in RS such that there was an interaction 
between technical knowledge and political objectives.  With F/OSS being viewed as 
congruent with the government’s goals, this close interaction facilitated the uptake of 
F/OSS adoption, such that the motivation for such a policy, political authority necessary 
for adoption and support of technical personnel for policy viability, all came together. 
 
With Dutra’s support, F/OSS was adopted in a range of initiatives across the state 
government of RS.  PROCERGS developed a clone of Microsoft Outlook, Direto, 
featuring email, calendar and address book functionality which was deployed 
throughout the state government (Teza, 2003; 2004a).  Rede RS, a corporate network 
connecting 60 entities of the state government of RS and attending 300,000 users was 
developed using F/OSS (Cruz, 2002).  The state bank, Banrisul, migrated to the F/OSS 
office suite, StarOffice (Tema, 2002).  In digital inclusion projects, which sought to 
increase social access to ICTs, F/OSS was adopted in the Vía Pública, Escolas Técnicas 
de Informática and Telecentros initiatives (Mori, 2011: 127; Teza, 2002; 2003).  In the 
area of education, initiatives included Web portals (ICAWF, 2003), the Rede escolar 
initiative, which deployed free software in 42 schools (Teza, n.d.) and migrations such 
as that in the State University of RS (UERGS)(Teza, 2002).  The uptake of F/OSS at the 
state level also prompted similar initiatives within the municipal government of Porto 
Alegre (Branco, 2004) which was also controlled by the PT. 
Mobilisation around F/OSS 
 
Although PROCERGS managers recognised benefits in adopting F/OSS, at the end of 
the 1990s, knowledge of F/OSS was scarce outside the F/OSS community.  Within 
PROCERGS itself, there was a lack of technical knowledge of F/OSS technologies as 
well as understanding of the network mode of production by which F/OSS was 
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produced.  To garner greater knowledge of F/OSS and thus facilitate F/OSS adoption, 
PROCERGS mangers initiated the Free Software Project RS (PSL-RS)(ICAWF, 2003; 
Teza, 1999; 2000).  Paralleling the aim of the FRI within the Argentinean government, 
the PSL aimed to harness the benefits of F/OSS and peer production by encouraging 
knowledge sharing and collaboration across the state.  The potential utility of such an 
initiative being likely to increase in relation to its size and breadth, PROCERGS 
managers launched the PSL in conjunction with the data processing company of the 
municipal government of Porto Alegre, PROCEMPA, and the state bank, Banrisul 
(ibid.).  The PSL differed to the FRI however in that it not only sought to encourage 
collaboration within the state but also across wider society.  State actors may mobilise 
civil society to facilitate policy implementation (Rich, 2013) and in the case of the PSL, 
the inclusion of societal actors facilitated F/OSS adoption by offering a larger pool of 
knowledge and labour.  For example, by involving the F/OSS community in state 
software development projects, the PSL harnessed the labour as well as the knowledge 
of the F/OSS community (Mazoni, 2011).   
 
At its inception, the PSL involved over forty actors encompassing areas of the state 
government and municipal government of Porto Alegre, local branches of federal 
government institutions, universities, NGOs, private firms as well as individuals (Teza, 
2004c).  The PSL involved laboratories, courses, publications and events to study and 
share knowledge of F/OSS (Teza, 2000).  Initially coordinated through a mailing list, 
the PSL soon found a home on the Internet in the guise of a website.  The centre-piece 
of the initiative was a F/OSS event, the International Free Software Forum (FISL), 
which ran annually from 2000 (Knebel, 2010). 
 
Whilst the PSL set out to facilitate the adoption of F/OSS within the state on economic 
and technical grounds, the coordinators of the PSL quickly recognised political grounds 
for promoting F/OSS as an end in itself.13  As the PSL’s coordinators came to learn 
more about the philosophy surrounding free software, free software came to be viewed 
as coherent with advancing the wider values and goals of Dutra administration.  The 
                                                 
13
 Those behind the PSL actually sought to promote ‘free’ as opposed to ‘open source’ software.  In 
Portuguese (and Spanish), F/OSS is generally referred to as ‘software livre/libre’ which privileges free 
software over open source.  The ‘libre’ label also avoids the ambiguity that exists in English regarding the 
meaning of ‘free’ in free software, i.e. whether it means “free as in beer” or “free as in speech”.  In 
Portuguese and Spanish, ‘livre’/’libre’ means free as in speech. 
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ideological motivations behind free software – protecting and advancing freedom 
through technology – bore a strong affinity to democracy as it was understood within 
the PT (Aquino, 2011; Murilo, 2011).  Free software was conceived as a mechanism to 
advance the Dutra administration’s drive to deepen democratic participation.  The ideas 
embedded within institutions may offer opportunities for mobilising support through 
framing (Tarrow, 2011: 31), and the currency that the idea of democracy held within the 
Dutra administration enabled the PSL’s coordinators to utilise this idea as another base 
for mobilising support for promoting F/OSS.    
 
The framing of F/OSS in RS contrasted that in Argentina.  By highlighting the political 
dimensions of software licensing, presenting F/OSS as a means to expand democracy 
and empowerment, PROCERGS managers not only connected F/OSS to the interests of 
wider society and thus raised opportunities to garner wider societal support.  They also 
moved debate to territory on which PS, by its very nature, could not compete, by 
offering a rationale for promoting F/OSS that transcended technical or economic 
questions.  Proponents of PS could plausibly argue that promotion of F/OSS on 
technological or economic grounds was unnecessary if not undesirable in a market 
economy.  However, where such grounds concerned political questions such as 
autonomy, transparency and democracy, it was difficult to contest F/OSS promotion on 
the grounds themselves.  The justification of promoting F/OSS on political grounds was 
important because such grounds were not only more difficult for opponents to challenge 
but also appealed to the interests of wider society, making wider societal support more 
likely. 
Resources 
 
PROCERGS managers’ situation within the state facilitated their capacity to mobilise 
support for F/OSS.  Institutions may lower the costs of collective action by aggregating 
interests and offering resources (Olson, 1965; Tarrow, 2011: 136).  The resources 
PROCERGS managers were able to mobilise as a result of their position within the state 
– with their control over PROCERGS and backing from political superiors – contrasted 
the limited resources that Argentinean F/OSS advocates were able to mobilise of their 
own accord.  These resources encompassed financial, human, technological and 
cognitive dimensions, facilitating capacity to mobilise political support.   
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In terms of financial resources, PROCERGS managers had access to departmental and 
organisational budgets.  Control over budgetary resources contributed to the PSL’s 
ability to stage an event to publicise F/OSS, the FISL (Branco, 2011).  The personnel 
that worked for PROCERGS offered a pool of labour which could be deployed in 
pursuit of the PSL’s goals.  Unlike Argentinean F/OSS advocates whose activist related 
activities were confined to free time, the PSL’s coordinators were able to devote time to 
such activities in their day job.  The physical technological resources that PROCERGS 
managed – hardware, networks and software – offered opportunities to communicate, 
network, organise and disseminate knowledge.  PROCERGS’ managed the state Internet 
service provider, Via-RS, and coupled with control over government domain names, 
Web hosting software, storage space on servers and staff with the technical skills to 
develop and administer Web sites, it was possible for the PSL to stage a website at 
minimal cost (see Teza, 2004c).  PROCERGS also represented a concentration of 
technical knowledge which facilitated the PSL’s ability to coordinate and execute its 
activities.  As well as technical knowledge in IT which assisted the PSL’s ability to use 
technology in pursuit of its aims, the management and political organising expertise 
possessed by PROCERGS’ directors helped in developing tactics and strategy for 
mobilisation.  
 
Technology can facilitate organisation without the need for physical organisational 
structures (Castells, 2010b; Tarrow, 2011: 137).  With their technical knowledge, 
PROCERGS managers were not only adept at using the Internet to organise but also 
quick to understand the modus operandi of the wider F/OSS movement.  As a result, 
they were able to harness the network mode of production that F/OSS embodied for 
their political ends. 
 
PROCERGS managers’ were able to leverage the benefits of Internet based mobilisation 
by coupling it with the conventional, offline forms they were able to easily exploit by 
virtue of their position within the state.  In online terms, the PSL represented what 
Castells (2010b: 147) describes as a “network movement”: a social movement organised 
online, where “Internet-based networking, is not just an instrument of organisation … 
[but] a … form of social interaction, mobilization and decision-making” (ibid: 156).  In 
network movements, heterogeneous interests broaden a movement’s base of support 
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without undermining capacity for organisation (Castells, 2010b: 147–148).  However, 
due to the decentralised nature of the Internet, online, no node within a network is 
capable of controlling other nodes (Castells, 2010b; Galloway, 2004), holding 
ramifications for any one actors’ ability to control network movements.  The PSL was 
able to leverage the opportunities that the Internet allows for mobilising heterogeneous 
coalitions online whilst at the same time retain the capacity to steer this movement 
through its control over the resources around which the mobilisation was cantered 
offline.   
 
The PSL coordinators’ position within the state offered privileged access to the media.  
Such access allowed the PSL to publicise F/OSS through two channels.  Where 
mainstream media was used to reach the widest audience, raise awareness in areas 
where media coverage was absent or scant and to challenge criticism, the PSL website 
was used to disseminate news that did not appear in the mainstream media (Teza, 
2004c).  Such use of technology allows audiences to be engaged outside the mainstream 
media, thus avoiding mainstream editorial constraints (Castells, 2002: 141; 2010b: 157). 
 
Ties 
 
Besides providing access to the political leadership of the Dutra administration, 
PROCERGS managers’ partisan ties also facilitated their ability to instigate legislative 
initiatives at the federal as well as state and municipal level of government.   
 
The most important of these initiatives was PL-2269, submitted at the end of 1999 
within the federal chamber of deputies by PROCERGS managers’ DS and union 
colleague, PT federal deputy, Walter Pinheiro (Pinheiro, 1999).  At the time PL-2269 
was submitted, the political context was hostile to the approval of the project as the PT 
was in a relatively weak position in the chamber of deputies, holding just over eleven 
per cent of seats in the chamber and leading a coalition which controlled around twenty 
per cent (Lamournier, 1999; Nylen, 2000: 130).  This, together with the gate keeping 
function of committees (Scartascini, 2008), which made it easy for opponents of F/OSS 
promotion to block a project, meant that as with projects in Argentina, the project had 
limited hope of gaining approval. However, in Brazil, F/OSS advocates were aware of 
this, the principle objective of PL-2269 being to raise the profile of F/OSS and provoke 
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a debate with a view to improving the climate for approval of similar projects at state 
and municipal levels.   
 
PL-2269 achieved PROCERGS managers’ main objectives.  PL-2269 was followed by 
the submission of projects by PT representatives in the legislatures of the state of RS 
and municipality of Porto Alegre (Bohn Gass, 2000; Bonumá, 2000) – also instigated by 
PROCERGS managers – which were subsequently approved (Governador do Estado do 
Rio Grande do Sul, 2002; see Proposicion.org.ar, 2004).  The submission of Pinheiro’s 
bill also raised the profile of F/OSS as an international as well as national level (Teza, 
2011).  Raising the political capital associated with F/OSS, PL-2269 sparked the 
submission of a series of similar projects at the national level by legislators representing 
parties across the political spectrum (Alves, 2003; Bittencourt, 2001; Miranda, 2002; 
Wanderer, 2000) as well as in state and municipal governments across Brazil (see 
Proposicion.org.ar, 2004). 
Mobilizing a Coalition 
 
Contrasting Argentinean F/OSS advocates’ isolation from actors in wider society, the 
PSL was able to attract and mobilise a range of actors encompassing all three levels of 
the Brazilian state, private firms, universities, business associations, third sector NGOs, 
the F/OSS community and wider society (Abreu, 2005a).  Through its control over state 
resources, the PSL’s coordinators were able to attract participation by offering selective 
benefits – whilst access to knowledge surrounding F/OSS was notionally free, the costs 
of obtaining such knowledge were generally high and by investing in aggregating this 
knowledge, the PSL lowered these costs for participants. 
 
The PSL thus attracted participation, support and resources for the same material 
reasons that motivated the initiation of the PSL: gaining knowledge to leverage the 
benefits of F/OSS and harnessing the productive forces of networks.  Due to the 
importance of the health of developer communities as a source of quality, speed in 
software development cycles and support (see Weber, 2004), users as well as producers 
of F/OSS possessed interests in contributing to PSL initiatives such as the FISL with a 
view to motivating participation in F/OSS projects.   
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At the centre of the PSL was the FISL, the first edition of which attracted over 2,100 
participants (Teza, 2000).  Because the value of the FISL was related to its content 
which was in turn related to the level of diversity the event was able to attract in terms 
of participation – participants contributing to content through panels, seminars, 
workshops and general discussion – this value increased with the size and breadth of 
participation.  By attracting more participants, the FISL had a propensity to generate 
positive feedback.  Figure 3-1 reflects participant numbers in the FISL between 2000 
and 2002.  Whilst numbers appear to drop slightly in the event’s second year, they 
climb by almost a third in 2002, reflecting a substantial increase in interest in attending 
the event. 
 
Figure 3-1 – FISL Participant Numbers (2000-2002) 
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Source: Data elaborated from Abreu (2005).  
 
With a view to maximising participation, the PSL sought to provide a greater and wider 
array of attractions than on offer elsewhere (Teza, 2000; 2011).  Existing F/OSS events 
reflected a business or technical focus (Teza, 2000) and to differentiate the FISL, in 
terms of content, the event was to be no more than two thirds technically focused and 
embrace philosophical and cultural themes as well as business interests (Teza, 2000; 
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2004b).  The PSL’s coordinators were able to attract participation in the FISL through a 
number of mechanisms. 
 
Through resources the PSL’s coordinators were able to mobilise through PROCERGS 
and wider sponsorship, they were able to attract high profile speakers.  For the very first 
FISL, the PSL paid for free software guru Richard Stallman to attend (Zúñiga and 
Couture, 2005).  Mobilisation of resources through the state and wider sponsorship 
meant they were less dependent upon entrance fees to mobilise resources.  To make the 
event as accessible to the widest possible audience the cost of entry was set at a nominal 
fee (Teza, 2000).  Representing the largest event of its kind in Brazil, the FISL’s 
potential as a platform for disseminating information could be utilised to attract a range 
of participants.  Advertising and marketing opportunities allowed the PSL to attract 
sponsors.  The first FISL attracted sponsorship from private as well as public companies 
– including the US software firm, RealNetworks, the company behind the Brazilian 
Linux distribution, Conectiva and the telecommunications provider, Embratel (Abreu, 
2005a).  Figures for the value of sponsorship are not available although Figure 3-2 
suggests the importance of state entities in funding the event. 
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Figure 3-2 – Sponsorship of the FISL (2000-2002) 
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Source: Data elaborated from Abreu (2005).  
 
Further to offering financial resources, sponsors also supported the FISL in other ways.  
Access to the resources that PROCERGS and PROCEMPA managed allowed provision 
of Internet services through government ISPs and general computing resources (Branco, 
2011; Teza, 2011).  Opportunities to disseminate knowledge also attracted panellists, 
speakers and participation in workshops and seminars.  The PSL coordinators’ union 
ties enabled them to attract participation from unions.  Within the first edition of the 
FISL, the National Gathering of Public Sector IT Personnel (ENAPIP) was staged, an 
event that was coordinated by the National Federation of Data Processing Workers’ 
Syndicates (FENADADOS)(ibid.).   
Sectors Attracted 
 
Where in Argentina, leftist sections of the F/OSS community alienated business actors, 
the PSL’s coordinators recognised these actors as key to the success of the mobilisation 
around F/OSS and actively engaged them.  Businessmen were incorporated into the 
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coordination of the PSL (Parera et al., 2000).  Firms were attracted for the same reasons 
as other actors, although the wide range of interests that participants embodied also 
offered firms possibilities to network and forge contacts, learn about potential business 
opportunities, keep up with the latest market developments and develop relationships 
with the wider F/OSS community.   
  
FISL attracted participation from organisations representing the software sector, such as 
ASSESPRO and SOFTSUL (Abreu, 2005a), a local state linked association involved in 
promoting the local software sector.  FISL supported small software firms by offering 
them opportunities to showcase their solutions at a fraction of what it generally cost in 
more commercially orientated trade fairs (Teza, 2004b). 
 
By gaining support from the business sector, F/OSS advocates ameliorated potential 
opposition from this sector and gained powerful allies.  Having business on-side was 
important for the material support the business community was capable of furnishing.  It 
also meant the endorsement of a constituency that embodied a powerful political as well 
as economic actor (Branco, 2011).  Helping to dispel the anti-capitalist trappings 
associated with F/OSS, the backing of firms would also offset the disproportionately 
greater power of actors with interests’ threatened by the increased prevalence of F/OSS 
vis-à-vis the PSL.  The endorsement of business would also help to legitimate F/OSS as 
a serious technical solution. 
 
Universities were important as a source of sponsorship and support.  In the first FISL, 
universities submitted 28 proposals for workshops, 19 of which were approved for 
inclusion in the event (Teza, 2000).  Another actor which supported the FISL was the 
Brazilian Computer Society (SBC).   
 
F/OSS advocates’ ties with unions and social movements facilitated their ability to 
attract participation from sectors in wider society.  By offering opportunities to attain 
technical knowledge and skills, the PSL and FISL were able to appeal to the members of 
unions and social movements (see Teza, 2000).  As observed above, the FISL attracted 
involvement from FENADADOS.  Through the first World Social Forum (WSF), which 
was held in Porto Alegre in 2001, F/OSS activists established contact with the Landless 
Workers Movement (MST)(Teza, 2005b), a movement with a high profile.  Leveraging 
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the synergies that existed between the philosophy of free software and wider themes 
such as digital inclusion, indigenous rights and democratization, the PSL was able to 
raise awareness amongst wider constituencies by associating free software with 
advancing these themes (Silveira, 2011).  Engaging with and attracting support from 
high profile groups like the MST also helped to raise the profile of F/OSS in the general 
population.   
 
The involvement of the state government of RS in the staging of the WSF in 2001 and 
2002 offered PROCERGS mangers opportunities to raise awareness of F/OSS through 
this event as well.   
Sao Paulo 
 
The nexus’ activities in RS prompted the emergence of F/OSS promotion in other PT 
controlled sub-national governments, the most prominent example being the municipal 
government of Sao Paulo (SP).  If RS was significant primarily for mobilisation around 
F/OSS, SP was significant for the implementation of F/OSS in an initiative which 
would prove F/OSS’ viability.   
 
Assuming control of the municipal government of SP in 2001, PT mayor Marta Suplicy 
appointed Sergio Amadeu, a party activist who had worked for her in the Florestan 
Fernandez Public Policy Institute to coordinate electronic governance, a position which 
included responsibility for digital inclusion (Costa, 2011: 164).  Like PROCERGS 
managers, Amadeu was in a strong position to influence policy.  He was proximate to 
political leaders, acting on their behalf and advising them, and he was responsible for 
formulating and executing policy.  After attending the FISL, Amadeu chose to adopt 
F/OSS in a flagship digital inclusion project involving telecentres (see Bacoccina, 
2003).  Commencing in mid 2001, this project would attend around 550,000 people by 
2006 (Reinhard and Macadar, 2006: 244).   
 
Rolled out successfully, the huge scale of the project meant that it held symbolic 
importance in terms of proving F/OSS’ viability (Silveira, 2011).  Not only did the 
project prove that F/OSS could be deployed on a large scale.  Attending to users with 
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little or no prior experience of computers, the project also dispelled the arguments of 
F/OSS’ detractors that F/OSS was too complicated for the average user (Silveira, 2011). 
F/OSS Advocates’ Failure to Persuade Federal Government to Adopt F/OSS in Absence 
of Ties 
 
Notwithstanding the capacity of F/OSS advocates to mobilise support for F/OSS 
promotion in Brazil, these actors were unable to precipitate F/OSS promotion in the 
federal government.  The federal executive was controlled by the Brazilian Social 
Democracy Party (PSDB), a party to which the PT sat in opposition in the legislative 
branch, and the F/OSS advocates of RS subsequently lacked strong ties with incumbent 
political forces and thus political access that might have facilitated their ability to 
persuade national political leaders to promote F/OSS. 
3.4 Opposition to F/OSS Promotion in T1 Brazil 
 
As in Argentina, mobilisation in opposition to F/OSS promotion was low around the 
turn of the century as despite the emergence of activism surrounding F/OSS, there was 
little to suggest the executive was considering promoting F/OSS.  However, PS 
advocates in Brazil looked to be in a stronger position than their Argentinean 
counterparts to block the uptake of F/OSS promotion had the government decided to 
adopt such a policy.  Brazil protected IT in the 1970s and 1980s and as a result, whilst 
policy concentrated on protecting hardware, a relatively important local software sector 
developed.  At the beginning of the 1990s, protection was removed, leading to the 
demise of local software production as cheaper, imported PS flooded the market.  
However, the institutional representation of the sector and sectoral ties to the 
government survived, leaving a sector with interests increasingly dominated by foreign 
PS that in comparison to Argentina was relatively well represented at the turn of the 
century.  With the Brazilian software sector dominated by interests in PS, organised and 
connected to government, PS advocates looked to be in an advantageous position to 
mobilise the local sector and lobby the government to prevent the adoption of F/OSS 
promotion. 
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Sectoral Association 
 
Brazil’s IT policies of the 1970s and 1980s were important in shaping the characteristics 
of the local software sector.  The Brazilian government began protecting the mini and 
microcomputer segments of the hardware sector in the 1970s to encourage the 
development of national hardware producers and advance economic development and 
technological autonomy (Bastos, 1992: 241; V. Dantas, 1988; M. Dantas, 1989; Evans 
et al., 1992; Evans, 1995; Tigre, 1983: 65; 1984; 1987; Schmitz and Hewitt, 1992).14  
The protection of these segments stimulated software activity, spawning local software 
production in the 1980s (Botelho et al., 2005; Commander, 2005: 9; Evans, 1995; 
Schware, 1992b).   
 
As a nascent software sector emerged, it developed into a significant player in national 
politics (Bastos, 1992) with a number of actors appearing to represent sectoral interests.  
The Association of Informatics Services Firms (ASSESPRO) was founded in 1976 to 
represent the interests of local data processing firms, its interests developing over the 
subsequent decade in response to changes in technology through the 1980s.  Identified 
primarily with firms that developed software locally, ASSESPRO’s interests were 
primarily nationalist in orientation.  In the mid 1980s, as the Brazilian government came 
under foreign pressure to allow the local sale of Microsoft’s DOS (Bastos, 1994; Felder 
and Hurrell, 1988; Schoonmaker, 1992) a number of firms which sought to import 
Microsoft’s software broke away from ASSESPRO to form a new association, the 
Brazilian Association of Software Firms (ABES)(ABES B, 2011; ASSESPRO A, 2011; 
Schoonmaker, 1995: 382).  In 1990, there emerged a National Federation of Informatics 
Firms (FENAINFO) which aggregated the interests of state level, IT sector employers’ 
syndicates and whose primary focus concerned employers’ fiscal obligations 
(FENAINFO A, 2011).   
                                                 
14
 Brazil’s efforts in developing local production of informatics were linked to the Brazilian military’s 
interests in developing nuclear and aeronautics technology (Hirst, 1996) as well as controlling foreign 
purchased military hardware (Adler, 1987).  The Brazilian navy became interested in developing 
computer technology around the turn of the 1970s after purchasing frigates from the British (V. Dantas, 
1988; M. Dantas, 1989; Evans, 1995: 118; Helena, 1984).  These ships were controlled by computers 
produced by the British firm, Ferranti (Erber, 1995; Evans, 1995: 136; Soares, 2002: 3), which was averse 
to giving up knowledge as to how these computers worked.  Taking the view that Brazil could not depend 
on foreign firms to guarantee its security, the Brazilian navy sought to develop their own computers.  This 
experience led to a keen appreciation in Brazil of the significance of control over technology and the 
notion of technological autonomy (Adler, 1987). 
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In the early 1990s, as Brazil moved towards neoliberal policies under President Collor, 
protectionist IT policies were dismantled (Schoonmaker, 1995; 2002).  The opening of 
the market led to the demise of national software producers in the face of a flood of 
cheaper software imports (Schoonmaker, 2002; see also Botelho et al., 2005; Marques, 
2009).  Figure 3-3 illustrates both the suddenness and degree to which software imports 
increased in the 1990s.  With local producers of software either going out of business or 
moving to the resale and distribution of imported software, the interests of the sector 
came to be dominated by interests in foreign produced PS in the 1990s.   
 
In 2004, 70% of companies operating within the industry were dedicated to distribution 
and marketing (ABES, 2005) – an activity generally associated with PS – and 73% of 
the $5.98 billion spent on software was developed overseas (ibid.).  As in Argentina, 
Microsoft came to dominate the software sector in Brazil.  With Microsoft’s products 
comprising a substantial share of these imports – the firm’s revenues from Brazilian 
software sales in 2005 exceeding those of the two next highest selling firms, IBM and 
Oracle put together and exceeding by almost four times those of the largest Brazilian 
owned firm (Marques, 2009: 75) – the firm became the largest in the sector, dominating 
the sector both politically and economically.  As in Argentina, forward linkages enabled 
Microsoft to exert influence over local resellers, distributors and firms which developed 
software using Microsoft’s technologies.   
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Figure 3-3 – Brazilian Software Imports (Licensing Royalties) in the 1990s 
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Compiled by SEPIN (SEPIN, n.d.). 
 
Whilst local software production diminished rapidly with the opening of the market and 
with it, the political influence of the sector (FENAINFO A, 2011), the protectionist IT 
policies of the 1980s left an institutional legacy.  Although the interests of the sector 
changed, the institutional representation of the sector survived along with institutional 
ties to the government.   
 
At the turn of the 2000s, ASSESPRO, ABES and FENAINFO remained active in 
representing sectoral interests.  ASSESPRO remained both a principal representative of 
the sector and maintained an association with SMEs based around national capital.  
Organised in a federal structure, it possessed state level affiliates throughout Brazil and 
thus represented sectoral interests across the country as a whole.  Based in São Paulo, 
ABES aggregated the interests of foreign software firms and their local partners and was 
synonymous with Microsoft (ASSESPRO A, 2011; BRASSCOM, 2011; FENAINFO 
A, 2011; Softex B, 2011).  With the activity ABES represented generally rooted in 
foreign produced PS, its priorities centred around protecting the PS business model, 
including campaigning for strong IP protection and fighting software piracy.  
FENAINFO was funded through the state by IT firms’ fiscal contributions and so 
represented all firms in the sector by default.   
 
The sector’s relations with the government not only reflected institutionalised channels 
of liaison but also suggested the government took an interest in software, implying the 
sector retained influence over policy.  With regard to sectoral policy, the sector liaised 
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with secretariats within the Ministry for Industry (MDIC) and MCT.  In the MCT, the 
sector participated in policymaking through the Committee for the Area of IT (CATI) 
within the Secretariat of Informatics Policy (SEPIN), on which four sectoral 
representatives sat alongside four representatives of wider civil society (Nunes, 2011).  
The CATI provided the software sector a formal, institutional forum by which it could 
liaise with the government, contrasting the absence of formal government-sector links 
in Argentina.  With regard to the MDIC, the sector liaised with the Secretariat of 
Industrial Technology (STI).   
 
The government’s continued interest in the software sector was indicated by the Softex 
program which was initiated in the 1990s and affiliated with the MCT (Botelho et al., 
2005; Commander, 2005; Marques, 2009; Softex, 2009).  Involving support from a 
range of government institutions including banks, such as Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), and entities concerned with fomenting R&D, such as the Funding Authority 
for Studies and Projects (FINEP), Softex offered support such as finance, training and 
subsidised certification schemes with a view to increasing the competitiveness of 
Brazilian software firms (Marques, 2009; Softex, 2000; 2009; Softex B, 2011). 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that weak institutional embeddedness limited F/OSS advocates’ 
capacity to persuade national political leaders to promote F/OSS in both Argentina and 
Brazil.    
 
In Argentina, the emergence of F/OSS advocates out of the fractious, generally 
politically indifferent F/OSS community resulted in these actors possessing little 
capacity to lobby the government.  Reflecting the heterogeneous interests of the F/OSS 
community, the groups that emerged were limited in the resources they were able to 
mobilise and unable to work effectively together.  Where anti-capitalist leanings 
alienated business actors that might have provided greater resources, F/OSS advocates’ 
anti-politics stance meant they failed to garner the support of the social movements that 
emerged in the wake of the crisis.  Crucially, as a result of the anti-state and anti-politics 
stance to be found in the wider F/OSS community, F/OSS advocates passed up 
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opportunities to forge ties with the state and mainstream political parties.  Had these 
actors forged such ties, they would have raised their chances of both overcoming the 
costs of mobilising resources and gaining influence within the government.  As it was, 
effectively cut-off from the executive, these actors lacked ties with both political leaders 
– the support of whom was necessary if F/OSS was to be promoted in the face of 
opposition from PS advocates – and IT administrators – whose support was crucial if 
F/OSS promotion was to be administratively viable.   
 
The situation in Brazil contrasted that in Argentina.  There, the emergence of F/OSS 
advocates was the result of a combination of state and political institutions which 
brought together the volition, political authority and administrative capacity necessary 
for F/OSS to be promoted.  The combination of institutions that existed in the 
government of RS resulted in politicised state IT managers with the resources and 
connections to mobilise support for F/OSS both within the state and in wider society.  
The resources these managers were able to deploy allowed them to overcome the 
collective action issues faced by Argentinean F/OSS advocates and unify the F/OSS 
community, enabling them to build a movement that drew on the support of the F/OSS 
community as a whole.  These resources also allowed them to attract business actors, 
ameliorating potential opposition from the software sector as well as further boosting 
resources.  Through the ties that their involvement in a leftist party offered, these actors 
were able to attract allies outside the F/OSS community through social movements and 
unions and launch legislative proposals nationally and locally.  The success of F/OSS 
advocates in RS in mobilising support reflected how embeddedness within the state and 
political institutions could strengthen these actors.  Yet their failure to precipitate F/OSS 
promotion at the national level, in spite of the support they were able to mobilise, 
speaks to the importance of ties.  Affiliated with a political party sitting in opposition to 
that holding power at the national level, the F/OSS advocates of RS lacked ties with – 
and as a consequence, influence within – the national executive, reducing their 
opportunities to garner the backing of national political leaders. 
 
Another contrast between F/OSS advocates in Argentina and Brazil concerned the 
framing of F/OSS, holding implications for both garnering support in wider society and 
backing from political leaders.  In Argentina, if inadvertently, F/OSS was effectively 
framed in such a way that it failed to offer discernable benefits over PS.  F/OSS was 
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also associated with social exclusion and in a context where unlicensed use of PS 
effectively offered a form of social inclusion, such a frame made it less likely that use of 
F/OSS would increase in the wider population.  In Brazil, by contrast, F/OSS was 
framed in ways that drew attention to its political dimensions such that it offered 
benefits that PS could not.  Such a frame not only allowed F/OSS to compete with PS, 
making it more likely that F/OSS use would increase in the wider population, but also 
contributed to political leaders’ support for F/OSS’ promotion. 
 
By detailing the causal pathways that linked software sector cohesion and F/OSS 
advocates’ institutional embeddedness to policy choices in T1 Argentina and Brazil, this 
chapter has shown how both these factors contributed to the choices that were taken in 
these countries in this period.  Figure 3-4 shows the associations between combinations 
of these factors and policy outcomes across both countries in T1.  It can be seen that 
weakness on both factors was associated with policies favourable to PS in both 
Argentina and Brazil.  This result is consistent with what the power asymmetries 
between F/OSS advocates and PS advocates would predict.  Because PS advocates 
ordinarily enjoy significantly greater lobbying power than F/OSS advocates, where the 
power of both sets of actors is limited by surrounding associational and institutional 
conditions, PS advocates will be the stronger of the two sets of actor and policy is likely 
to favour PS as a result.    
 
Figure 3-4 – Combinations of F/OSS Advocates’ Institutional Embeddedness and 
Software Sector Cohesion in T1 Argentina and Brazil 
 
 
 T1 Argentina T1 Brazil 
   
F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness  
Weak Weak 
Software sector cohesion Weak Weak 
Software licensing policy outcome Favourable to 
use of PS 
Favourable to 
use of PS 
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4 The Politics of Software Licensing Policy under the 
Kirchner Governments in Argentina (2003 – 2010) 
 
Under the Kirchner governments, as Argentina began to recover from the crisis and 
politicians’ horizons expanded beyond economic fire-fighting, F/OSS promotion looked 
more likely than ever.  The Kirchners’ public embrace of popular causes such as human 
rights (Panizza, 2014) and national self-determination (Riggirozzi, 2009) suggested 
F/OSS promotion would become integral to these governments’ wider political project: 
not only was use of F/OSS congruent with advancing the causes supported by the 
Kirchners – causes cited as motivation for promoting F/OSS by the Kirchners’ allies in 
Venezuela and Ecuador – its promotion also offered an easy means of doing something 
likely to win the government popularity.  F/OSS promotion was consistent with the 
Kirchners’ defiant stance in the international arena.  The intransigence these 
governments displayed vis-à-vis the IMF and international banks in negotiating 
Argentina’s international debt obligations (Etchemendy and Garay, 2011; Riggirozzi, 
2009; Vernengo, 2005) suggested they were unlikely to be deterred from promoting 
F/OSS for fear of upsetting the US, a country inclined to take a dim view of such a 
policy.  The Kirchners’ willingness to intervene in the market and take-on private sector 
actors (Etchemendy and Garay, 2011; Panizza, 2014) – not least multinational firms 
which they often pilloried in their rhetoric – implied they were also unlikely to care 
about deviating from free market norms, including orthodox interpretations of IP, or 
riling international PS firms.  As the government of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner 
looked to move further to the left towards the end of the 2000s, the prospects of F/OSS 
promotion only appeared to increase.   
 
Outwardly, the Kirchner governments manifested support for F/OSS promotion.  As 
Kirchner assumed power in 2003, the president’s media secretariat pronounced 
overtures to this effect, announcing a public sector F/OSS initiative.  Around the same 
time in the legislature, F/OSS promotion bills enjoyed the support of legislators 
affiliated with incumbent political forces.  F/OSS was considered in education policies, 
most notably in relation to proposals to participate in Nicolas Negroponte’s One Laptop 
per Child Project (Lanacion.com, 2005).  Perhaps the clearest gesture of support for 
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promoting F/OSS came in 2010, when the Cabinet Chief declared that free software was 
a state policy in a widely publicised speech.   
 
However, if support for F/OSS promotion was expressed, practical efforts suggested a 
rather different policy.  Actions under the Kirchner governments were more conducive 
to promoting PS than F/OSS.  F/OSS promotion initiatives within the government were 
abandoned.  In the provision of computers for schools, the OLPC project was dropped 
in favour of a Wintel solution (Calvo, 2009) and in a 2004 initiative where F/OSS was 
adopted, implementation was found wanting, making the software of limited value.  
Despite approval of a F/OSS promotion bill in the lower house of congress appearing 
likely in 2008, the project mysteriously disappeared from the legislative agenda before 
reaching a vote.  Whilst F/OSS promotion floundered, de facto promotion of PS 
occurred in initiatives concerning the use of software in government, education, social 
access to ICTs, and employment and sectoral policy. 
 
This chapter explains the Kirchner governments’ unexpected resistance to promoting 
F/OSS, arguing that this outcome was mainly a result of a strengthening in the cohesion 
of the software sector in T2 while F/OSS advocates remained isolated from the 
government.  In T2, cohesion in the organisation of the software sector strengthened as 
sectoral associativism increased in the wake of the crisis and the interests of the sector 
came to be aggregated largely beneath a single business association.  The sectoral 
business association lobbied for government policy support and against the backdrop of 
a boom in IT service outsourcing to developing countries and a local currency 
devaluation which made Argentina attractive as a destination for these services, the 
government responded by inviting the sector to participate in policymaking.  Sectoral 
participation in policymaking boosted the lobbying power of the sector by strengthening 
ties between the sectoral business association and the government, thereby facilitating 
access to political decision makers, and consolidating the concentration of sectoral 
interests within this association, thus boosting its capacity to mobilise resources.  
Stronger sectoral cohesion simultaneously strengthened the capacity of multinational PS 
firms such as Microsoft to coordinate the sector and the presentation of sectoral 
interests; with the sector largely represented by a single actor, which these firms 
dominated, sectoral representation reflected these firms’ pro-PS interests.  Even before 
policies to promote the sector specifically came into effect, the revenues of the sector 
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began to grow rapidly following the devaluation.  The sector’s economic growth 
augmented its lobbying power further and as this power became stronger, the sector 
presented an increasingly formidable obstacle to F/OSS promotion as it lobbied to 
forestall the emergence of such a policy.  By the time of the second Kirchner 
administration, whilst a move to the left suggested adoption of F/OSS was more likely, 
the government instead resisted such a policy as PS actors enjoyed influence up to the 
level of the president herself.  At the same time, F/OSS advocates remained isolated 
from incumbent political forces and the government in general as a result of their 
rejection of mainstream politics and the state, attenuating their capacity to mobilise 
resources and forge ties with political leaders.  With their power remaining weak, they 
possessed little ability to counter the efforts of opponents of F/OSS promotion.  
 
The case of Argentina illustrates the significance of path dependency and the limits to 
which policy choices may be determined by ideas and agency alone.  Even if the 
Kirchner governments wished to adopt F/OSS promotion as evinced by the limited 
efforts that were made, the capacity of government actors supportive of such moves to 
shape policy was surpassed by that of opponents whose influence within the executive 
increased as they began to participate in policymaking and consolidate ties with 
political decision-makers.  If, in the second half of the 2000s the government’s capacity 
to translate support for F/OSS promotion into policy was increasingly constrained, such 
constraint stemmed from the previous actions of the government itself in engaging with 
a pro-PS actor.  Effectively strengthening a pro-PS constituency, the government 
became locked into the maintenance and adoption of policies that favoured PS.   
 
The chapter first analyses the characteristics of collective action around F/OSS 
promotion and PS in T2 before examining the fortunes of government initiatives related 
to software licensing to elucidate how lobbying power – mediated by institutional 
embeddedness in the case of F/OSS advocates and software sector cohesion in the case 
of opponents of F/OSS promotion – conditioned software licensing policy outcomes. 
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4.1 F/OSS Advocates’ Institutional Embeddedness Remains 
Weak  
 
This subsection analyses collective action around F/OSS promotion in T2 Argentina, 
arguing that F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness remained weak and that this 
continued to limit F/OSS advocates’ power by attenuating the capacity of these actors to 
mobilise resources and forge ties with state actors.  In 2003 and 2004, as government 
began promoting F/OSS in neighbouring Brazil, conditions looked conducive for F/OSS 
advocates to strengthen their institutional embeddedness by forging ties with 
government IT administrators who expressed interest in adopting F/OSS.  At the same 
time, there emerged a potentially important opportunity for F/OSS advocates to build 
alliances with politically important constituencies and forge ties with incumbent 
political forces.  However, at just the moment when conditions looked conducive to 
F/OSS advocates mobilising greater support for F/OSS promotion and increasing their 
institutional embeddedness, the mobilisation around F/OSS promotion experienced 
deepening divisions such that these opportunities were missed.   
F/OSS advocates’ ties with government remain weak 
 
The institutional embeddedness of F/OSS advocates in T2 Argentina remained weak, 
with F/OSS advocates continuing to generally avoid engagement with government IT 
administrators and incumbent political forces.  F/OSS advocates’ interests in 
cooperating with government IT administrators suffered following the launch of a new 
executive F/OSS initiative in mid 2003, the Ámbito de Software Libre en el Estado 
(ASLE).  Instigated autonomously by IT administrators within the government, the 
ASLE was distinct from yet possessed similar goals to the FRI, its aims encompassing 
the sharing of knowledge through a forum (Presidencia de la República Argentina, 
2003).  Launched at a moment when IT budgets were still badly affected by the crisis, 
the ASLE also sought to draw upon the F/OSS community to supply and maintain the 
software needs of the state.  SoLAr participated in the ASLE but quickly became 
disillusioned on the realisation that participation would not be recompensed (SoLAr B, 
2011), making the group more wary of engaging with the state as a consequence.  In the 
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case of engaging with incumbent political forces, F/OSS advocates were wary for fear 
of cooption (interviews, 2011) or F/OSS promotion becoming conflated with partisan 
bias (FVL A, 2010b).   
 
In terms of strategies, F/OSS advocates continued to focus on legislative proposals as a 
means of instigating F/OSS promotion.  SoLAr adopted an entryist strategy whereby 
members would seek to obtain bureaucratic positions which might offer opportunities to 
influence the uptake of F/OSS.  However, strong links between SoLAr and incumbent 
political forces generally absent, the positions which SoLAr’s members were able to 
obtain were relatively low level.  Observers within the state argued that the strategy 
overlooked the primacy of political power in determining bureaucratic outcomes 
(interviews, 2010).  
 
In 2004, F/OSS advocates were presented with an opportunity to forge an alliance with 
the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, a group that emerged during Argentina’s 1976 to 1982 
military dictatorship in response to the disappearances of their children at the hands of 
this government and campaigned for human rights (Brysk, 1994; Wagner and Sánchez, 
2009).  The Madres offered opportunities for F/OSS advocates to garner support for 
F/OSS promotion in the wider population as they worked with social movements such 
as the Piqueteros, which represented poorer sections of the population (Di Marco, 2003) 
and make potential inroads into the government as the Madres became a base of support 
for the Kirchner government (see Lewis, 2009: 155; Zelaznik, 2011: 97), many figures 
proximate to the Madres in subsequent years coming to gain positions in the 
government with access to resources (see Escudé, 2007; Journalist A, 2012; SoLAr A, 
2011).   
 
In August 2004, Richard Stallman, head of the Free Software Foundation and 
international champion of free software visited Argentina (Kukso, 2004; Lavaca.org, 
2009).  With an itinerary organised by members of Hipatia and SoLAr, Stallman was 
scheduled to speak the Universidad Popular Madres de Plaza de Mayo (UPMPM) in 
Buenos Aires.  At the time, FVL worked closely with Stallman and on the basis of the 
Madres’ political affiliations, FVL recommended Stallman avoid speaking at the 
UPMPM to prevent F/OSS becoming associated with partisan politics, a 
recommendation on which Stallman acted (Lavaca.org, 2009).  Distrustful of the US in 
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light of the US’ role in supporting the Argentine military governments (Sheinin, 2006: 
157–164) – governments anathema to the notion of freedom – the Madres were leery of 
receiving messages about freedom from Americans like Stallman and his cancellation 
only served to reinforce the Madres prejudices and alienate them (SoLAr A, 2011).  The 
cancellation of the worlds leading proponent of free software harmed the image of 
F/OSS and that of the wider F/OSS community, helping to alienate rather than garner 
political support for F/OSS promotion within the wider population.  In a further 
example of negative framing, F/OSS was once again associated with connotations of 
social exclusion rather than inclusion, serving to undermine the construction of F/OSS 
as a progressive issue.  Amongst F/OSS advocates themselves, FVL’s intervention acted 
to deepen divisions between actors, reducing possibilities for cooperation and 
coordinated action.   
F/OSS Advocates’ Lobbying Power Remains Weak 
 
Remaining isolated from the government and incumbent political forces and 
experiencing a deepening of divisions between actors, F/OSS advocates in T2 Argentina 
continued to possess weak ties, if any, with actors within the government and were 
capable of mobilising relatively limited resources.  As a consequence, mobilisation 
around F/OSS promotion in T2 Argentina remained modest, and F/OSS advocates’ 
capacity to influence policy continued to be weak.   
4.2 Software Sector Cohesion Strengthens    
 
This subsection analyses collective action around PS in T2 Argentina, arguing that 
cohesion in the software sector strengthened in T2 and that this strengthening enabled 
PS advocates to block government promotion of F/OSS.  The upswing in associativism 
behind the CESSI that followed the crisis strengthened the lobbying power of the sector 
as a whole by aggregating sectoral interests largely beneath a single business 
association.  These conditions also allowed multinational PS firms to coordinate 
sectoral interests and present their interests as coherent with those of the sector as a 
whole due to these firms’ ability to shoulder collective action costs and consequently 
dominate associations in which they participated.  However, heightened sectoral 
cohesion might have dissipated had the government not responded to the sector’s 
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petitions to promote the software industry.  Inviting the CESSI to participate in the 
formulation of sectoral policy – a move which marked the beginning of increasing 
involvement of the association in policymaking across a range of areas – the 
government reinforced sectoral cohesion by establishing ties with the CESSI, thus 
strengthening incentives for associativism behind it.  The government’s actions served 
to entrench PS advocates’ political domination of the sector as well as augment their 
lobbying power.  Yet this lobbying power ballooned largely for another factor that 
contributed to the government’s decision to promote the sector in the first place.  
Independently of promotional policies which only came into effect in the second half of 
the 2000s, exports in IT related services began to grow rapidly following the 
devaluation, yielding substantial economic growth in activity nominally associated with 
software.  As Argentina recovered from crisis, strong economic performance in activity 
symbolic of high added value and an advanced level of development boosted the 
political capital associated with this activity.  Whilst IT services often had little to do 
with software – proprietary or otherwise – the highly concentrated organisation of the 
software sector allowed PS advocates to capture the political benefits of growth in this 
activity, which in turn boosted their lobbying power.  If economic growth in IT services 
was a principle driver of PS advocates’ strong lobbying power, it was the consolidation 
of sectoral cohesion resulting from the government’s engagement of the sector which 
made this possible.  Had the government not consolidated sectoral cohesion by 
engaging the sector, growth in IT services would have had limited impact if any upon 
PS advocates’ lobbying power because these actors’ association with this activity would 
have been tenuous.  By intervening in the software sector, the government’s actions 
were thus decisive in enabling PS advocates to subsequently restrict policy choices to 
those favourable to PS. 
Software Sector Cohesion Begins to Strengthen 
 
Associativism began to increase within the software sector at the turn of the millennium 
as declining internal demand prompted national firms to call for policies to facilitate 
exports (CESSI B, 2012a; CESSI C, 2012).  At the beginning of 2002, a devaluation 
provoked panic throughout the sector.  Business associativism tends to increase when 
the private sector faces threats to its interests (Schneider, 2004; Durand and Silva, 
1997), and in the wake of the devaluation, interest in cooperation and association within 
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the sector rose sharply (CESSI B, 2012a; CESSI C, 2012).  Changes in the character of 
relations between firms, where the extensity and strength of inter-firm ties increase, may 
also facilitate business mobilization (Plotke, 1992: 190) and such a factor also played a 
role in the upswing in associativism within the Argentinean software sector at this time.  
Through a government organised trade mission to Miami in 2001 (Carrizo, 2001), 
businessmen from the software sector who had previously had little to do with one 
another met and forged ties which engendered cooperation (CESSI B, 2012a; CESSI C, 
2012; CESSI D, 2012).  Combined with the existing institutional structures which 
represented the sector, elevated interest in business cooperation resulted in the 
concentration of sectoral representation within one business association as the interests 
of firms across the sector came to be aggregated under the CESSI. 
 
In the wake of the devaluation, more firms began to participate in the CESSI and as 
participation grew, the association came to represent the principal representative of the 
software sector.  Both CICOMRA and CESSI representing activity associated with 
software and ICT more widely, relations between the two associations was characterised 
by a degree of rivalry (CESSI A, 2011), yet as participation in the CESSI increased, its 
leadership in the area of software became undisputed.  With CICOMRA focused upon 
telecommunications and largely representing multinationals, the increasing profile of 
national firms within the CESSI meant it became more representative of not only 
software but also firms across the software sector.   
 
The crisis also precipitated greater cooperation within the CESSI itself.  Although 
multinational firms had joined the CESSI in the 1990s, those that represented these 
firms within the CESSI had often recognised limited interest in participating in 
discussions inside the association (CESSI B, 2012a).  With national SMEs under threat 
and the domestic market generally in disarray, these managers began to participate 
within the CESSI as they came to fear for their jobs.  Although the market for software 
in Argentina was relatively small, multinational employees had an interest in the health 
of national firms because these firms were their clients and supplied revenue upon 
which these employees’ jobs depended.     
 
Geography may affect patterns of business organisation (Schneider, 2004), and in 
Argentina, with the software sector located mainly in and around the capital, Buenos 
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Aires, the sector’s spatial distribution facilitated concentration in its organisation as 
associativism rose in the wake of the crisis.  The sector’s concentration in Buenos Aires 
not only lowered the costs of organisation but also enhanced the sector’s capacity to 
liaise with the national government which was also based there.   
 
With the interests of the software sector unified within the CESSI, sectoral cohesion was 
strong and coordination of sectoral interests was enhanced.  Fairfield (2011: 428) 
observes that “[u]nity and coordination [may] legitimate business demands and improve 
business’ bargaining position”.  With sectoral interests effectively represented by one 
actor, the sector was in a stronger position to project its demands.  
Government Receptiveness to Sectoral Demands Increases  
 
As the coherence of the software sector strengthened, other factors made it more likely 
that the government would respond to the sector’s demands.  The crisis also created 
economic and political conditions conducive to political receptiveness to sectoral 
demands.  Against the backdrop of the devaluation and a global boom in IT outsourcing 
the software sector encountered backing of its policy demands within the legislature in 
2002 (Briozzo, 2002a; 2002b).  Interest in policy promotion of the sector gained traction 
in the executive in the second half of 2003, culminating in the Ministry of Economy 
inviting the sector to participate in the formulation of a policy (Briozzo, 2007: 15; 
SICPME, 2003).  Four factors facilitated greater receptiveness the sector’s demands 
within government. 
 
The political context made politicians’ receptiveness to the sector’s demands more 
likely because of the considerable political uncertainty generated by the crisis.  This 
context made it more likely that politicians would respond to demands from economic 
sectors with the potential to strengthen political support.  In May 2003, Nestor Kirchner 
assumed power in a position that appeared weak (Levitsky, 2008: 111).  Winning just 
22% of the vote in the first round of presidential elections, Kirchner won these elections 
after Carlos Menem, the candidate Kirchner would have stood against in a runoff, 
pulled out before the second round went to a vote (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007: 97).  
At a time when public distrust of politicians remained high, Kirchner had an interest in 
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strengthening his mandate and with the economic situation still looming large economic 
recovery was crucial to this goal (Lewis, 2009: 154).    
 
Within a month of Kirchner coming to power, the Minister of Economy, Roberto 
Lavagna, began to consider the feasibility of promoting the software sector (Dumont, 
2012).  Shortly after, the Ministry of Economy (MEcon) backed the legislative projects 
for the promotion of the sector which had been effectively stalled through the first half 
of 2003.  The support of the executive meant these projects not only remained on the 
legislative agenda but that they began to advance.   
 
The devaluation made politicians’ receptiveness to the sector’s demands more likely 
because the exports were viewed as crucial to addressing the economic crisis and the 
software sector was well placed to export.  Argentina was cut-off from external credit 
markets after defaulting on its international debt obligations (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 
2007) and consequently, exports were considered crucial to kick start production, soak 
up high unemployment and provide fiscal resources to allow the government to fund 
welfare programmes (Riggirozzi, 2009).  The devaluation of the Argentine currency 
increased the competitiveness of Argentine exports (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007).  
Labour is the primary factor of production for the software sector (Commander, 2005: 
1) and by lowering the local cost of labour in relation to international prices, the 
devaluation increased the international competitiveness of Argentinean software firms 
(Chudnovsky and López, 2005).  Whilst the devaluation made local software firms 
internationally competitive, it also raised the costs to these firms of exploring 
opportunities in external markets (CESSI B, 2012a; PJ deputy B, 2012).   
 
The external context made politicians’ receptiveness to the sector’s demands more 
likely because of a boom in the out-souring of IT services to developing countries, India 
being an emblematic case (Ascutia, 2002; see Desai, 2005: 46–47; McGivering, 2002).  
The take-off in economic activity related to software in India and Ireland provided 
examples which raised political confidence in the viability of an export focused strategy 
for the software sector (PJ deputy B, 2012; PJ deputy C, 2012).  Coupled with the 
devaluation, the global boom in IT out-souring increased the political incentives for 
adopting policies to attract software related investment (ibid.).     
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Politicians’ were more likely to be receptive to the sector’s demands because of a 
change in the direction of economic policy in the wake of the crisis.  Through the 
1990s, strict adherence to orthodox principles in economic policymaking meant that 
sectoral policies were deemed undesirable (Chudnovsky and López, 2007).  Under 
Duhalde administration, economic policy turned away from the neoliberal prescriptions 
of the 1990s toward a more interventionist stance that emphasised reactivating industrial 
activity (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007; Panizza, 2009).  In response to the acute 
economic problems that beset Argentina, Duhalde’s Minister of Economy, Roberto 
Lavagna, instigated an industrial support programme to kick start production (Godio, 
2004; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007).  This change in economic policy goals, which 
continued under Kirchner (Levitsky, 2008: 113), meant politicians were suddenly open 
to policies to promote specific sectors such as software. 
Incentives for Sate to Engage the Software Sector 
 
Interests on the side of the executive also played a part in the decision to back policy 
support for the software sector.  Minister of Economy, Roberto Lavagna was interested 
in developing sectors which capitalised on Argentina’s comparative advantages 
(Lavagna, 2012).  Argentina possessed a workforce which was relatively skilled in 
relation to those of other developing countries and Lavagna was interested in 
developing economic activity that might take advantage of this skilled workforce (ibid.).  
IT services fitted this aim and were thus looked upon favourably for promotion through 
sectoral policy. 
 
Policymakers may engage the private sector to signal the government’s commitment to 
private investment (Haggard et al., 1997: 41).  Although the devaluation improved 
conditions for investment, investment was adversely affected by the backdrop of the 
crisis.  In relation to IT specifically, Argentina lacked a reputation internationally as a 
base for IT related economic activity (Sametband, 2002).  A key motivation for the 
adoption of a sectoral policy for software was to publicise the fact that investment 
opportunities existed and signal to the world that the Argentinean government was 
serious about supporting investment (Dumont, 2012; Lavagna, 2012). 
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Policymakers may involve the private sector in policymaking as a result of aims and 
resources, to facilitate policy implementation and/or to improve the likelihood of policy 
success (Cawson, 1985; Maxfield and Schneider, 1997; Schneider, 2004: 26).  
Following the executive’s decision to adopt a sectoral policy for software, it 
subsequently decided to involve the sector in the formulation of this policy (SICPME, 
2003; 2004).  For the MEcon, the participation of the sector lowered the costs of policy 
formulation and increased the probability of successful implementation (Lavagna, 
2012).   
 
With wider political and economic factors increasing incentives for the government to 
promote the software sector, strong sectoral cohesion played a role in politicians’ 
decision to act on adopting a sectoral policy for software.  CESSI’s aggregation of the 
interests of firms across the sector increased the legitimacy of the association’s demands 
because it was viewed as representing the interests of the sector as a whole.  With the 
interests of the sector aggregated under the CESSI, the sector projected a strong, 
coherent voice which signalled that the private sector was interested and receptive 
towards the idea of sectoral policy (Lavagna, 2012).  The coordination of the sector 
behind a single business association also meant there existed a clearly identifiable 
interlocutor with which the government could liaise, reducing the costs of negotiating 
with the sector (Dumont, 2012).  The organisation of the sector also lowered the costs of 
putting a policy together by offering information. 
 
The information possessed by the private sector may offer incentives for the state to 
engage with private sector actors (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997: 7–9).  CESSI had 
developed detailed blueprints for sectoral support (CESSI, 2003; Garcia, 2002) which 
had benefited from the association’s participation in the legislative process (CESSI B, 
2012b).  These plans provided ready proposals which might be translated into policy 
(Dumont, 2012).  In the second half of 2003, the MEcon considered nine sectors for 
promotion.  Of all of these, software was the easiest for government to do something 
about as there already existed policy proposals in the guise of legislative proposals, a 
text which had been elaborated as well as the plans put together by the CESSI (Dumont, 
2012).   
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Government Intervention Consolidates Software Sector Cohesion 
 
The upswing in private sector associativism which tends to occur during crises often 
dissipates as conditions normalise and incentives for individual actors to invest in 
organisation diminish (Schneider, 2004: 38).  State intervention in the private sector 
may encourage and thus maintain business collective action by offering benefits such as 
political access or participation in policymaking (ibid.).  In addition to motivations 
based around the formulation or implementation of policy, the state may also engage 
with the private sector as a source of political support (Schneider, 2004: 27).  In the 
second half of the 2000s, in addition to involving the sector in policymaking and 
consultation, the government would also draw on the sector as a source of political 
support.  In T2 Argentina, by engaging with and involving the software sector in 
policymaking, the government helped to consolidate the sectoral cohesion precipitated 
by the crisis by maintaining incentives for collective action.  Government engagement 
effectively precipitated positive feedback, as illustrated in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1 – Transformation of Software Sector Cohesion between T1 and T2 in 
Argentina 
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The government’s engagement with the software sector offered sectoral representatives 
a range of benefits that were likely to encourage collective action. 
 
Government engagement of the sector offered access to policymakers and senior 
politicians.  Presidents of the CESSI met with politicians up to presidential level on 
trade missions.  CESSI’s then president spoke with the vice-president on a trade mission 
to Mexico in 2003 (CESSI B, 2012a) and the president, Nestor Kirchner in 2004 
(CESSI B, 2012b).   
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Government engagement of the sector offered sectoral representatives appointments 
within the government.  Representatives of the CESSI, or those proximate to the 
association were appointed to positions in government or government run initiatives.  
One of CESSI’s director’s took up a position in the Secretariat of Industry (interviews, 
2012) and another left the association to represent the private sector as a coordinator on 
a government consultation exercise (CESSI E, 2011). 
 
Firms’ participation in business associations is motivated by access to selective benefits, 
the origin of which may lie within the state (Olson, 1965; Schneider, 2004: 12).  
CESSI’s privileged role in the formulation of sectoral policy, facilitating its ability to 
influence policy, attracted participation within the association.  With CESSI 
representing the single most important representative of the sector, this mechanism 
reinforced sectoral cohesion. 
 
Government involvement of the sector in policymaking offered sectoral representatives 
a leading role in the formulation of a sectoral policy for software which would become 
law (Nº 25.922) in 2004 (Honorable Senado de la Nación Argentina, 2004).15  The 
government consulted the sector through a 2004 forum, the Foro de Software y 
Servicios Informáticos (FdSSI)(Gutman et al., 2006; SICPME, 2004) which involved 
the participation of actors from across the government, private sector, academia and 
wider civil society (Gutman et al., 2006).  The FdSSI produced plans for sectoral 
development and fed into the discussion of the draft sectoral promotion law being 
discussed in the senate at the time (Briozzo, 2007).  To coordinate the FdSSI, the 
government recruited external consultants who were either aligned with or worked 
closely with the CESSI (Consultant A, 2010).  The CESSI subsequently possessed 
significant influence in steering discussion in the forum.  CESSI also possessed direct 
influence over defining the content of the policy: individuals proximate to the CESSI 
were involved in drawing up the regulations which would be implemented in the 
                                                 
15
 Law 25,922 provided fiscal benefits for eligible economic activity and established a fund to support 
R&D and human capital development to run for ten years commencing in September 2004 (Presidencia 
de la República Argentina, 2004)(extended to 2019 in 2011 (CESSI, 2011b)).  The fiscal regime offered 
firms relief of up to 60% on tax paid on revenue earned in eligible activities and the possibility to claim 
back up to 70% of employers’ social security contributions in credits (López and Ramos, 2008: 64).  The 
law also instituted the Fondo Fiduciario de Promoción de la Industria de Software (FONSOFT), an entity 
based within the Ministry responsible for science and technology (MECyT) which was responsible for 
evaluating and funding R&D projects (Briozzo, 2007).   
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promotion law after it had been approved in the senate and signed into law by the 
executive (interviews, 2010; 2012).   
 
Government engagement of the sector involved regular sectoral consultation, allowing 
sectoral representatives to feed into government initiatives and policy generally.  
Following the FdSSI, institutional channels were established between business 
associations and the various government departments with a purview over policy areas 
touching upon sectoral interests.  The government consulted the sector on virtually any 
area that touched upon sectoral interests (CESSI F, 2011).    
 
Sectoral representatives’ political access was facilitated as the government drew upon 
the sector as a source of political support.  Under the administration of President 
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, reciprocity between the sector and the government 
grew (CESSI F, 2011; IP lawyer A, 2011).  The president courted the sector as a symbol 
of national development and a source of private sector support during a period in which 
the government faced opposition from the agrarian sector (Díaz Echenique et al., 2011; 
Fairfield, 2011; Picardi, 2012).  Speaking at sectoral events (CanalAR, 2009) and 
receiving firms such as Microsoft publicly (Comuzzi, 2010; Gobierno de Buenos Aires, 
2009; Microsoft, 2009), the president’s courtship of the sector offered representatives of 
sectoral business associations – and their members – high level political access. 
PS Advocates’ Capacity to Coordinate Sectoral Interests Strengthens  
 
Increased cohesion within the software sector allowed PS advocates greater capacity to 
coordinate sectoral interests.  As the CESSI effectively became the single most 
important representative of the sector, the interests of national as well as multinational 
firms came to be represented by just one actor.  Large firms are likely to command 
greater power than smaller local firms within an association even if the latter greatly 
outnumber the latter (Hart, 2004).  Multinational PS firms’ dominant position within the 
CESSI offered these firms a strong hand in determining the association’s preferences.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the CESSI’s software licensing policy preferences were pro-PS.  
CESSI’s presidents and directors from the 1990s to the 2000s expressed strong 
opposition to F/OSS promotion (interviews, 2011; 2012).  Aggregation of sectoral 
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interests largely beneath a single organisation with pro-PS preferences meant these 
interests were presented as pro-PS.   
 
Facilitating PS advocates’ capacity to influence the preferences of the CESSI was their 
role in the mobilisation of resources.  MNCs may exert influence within business 
associations through the provision of resources (Hart, 2004: 50).  Microsoft had 
supported the CESSI through the difficult periods in which the association had struggled 
to mobilise resources (CESSI E, 2011).  The continued significance of Microsoft within 
the organisation in relation to raising resources was signalled by its role as treasurer 
throughout the 2000s.  Figure 4-2, which details the composition of the CESSI’s board 
between 2002 and 2007, shows Microsoft remained treasurer throughout this period.   
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Figure 4-2 – Composition of Board of CESSI 
 
      Position 
 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
   President National 
SME 
National 
SME 
     Vice-president 1 MNC National 
SME 
National SME  
   Vice-president 2 National 
SME 
National SME 
    Secretary National 
SME 
National SME National SME 
     Pro-secretary National 
SME 
National 
SME 
National SME  
  Treasurer  Microsoft 
  Pro-treasurer 1 MNC  (IT services/consulting) 
    Pro-treasurer 2 National 
SME 
MNC MNC 
Source: CESSI (n.d.). 
 
Strong sectoral cohesion allowed multinational PS firms to capture political benefits 
from economic activity to which they contributed little in economic terms yet with 
which they were associated through the sector’s institutional representation.  As 
illustrated in Figure 4-3, the software sector witnessed rapid growth after 2003.  Whilst 
throughout the 2000s, the Argentinean software sector’s participation in GDP and total 
exports remained under 1%16 (see Chapter 1), sectoral revenues and exports each grew 
by around a fifth year on year between 2003 and 2008.  In 2003 alone, exports grew by 
almost 42% (Lanacion.com, 2003b).  The sector was one of Argentina’s fastest 
growing, its rate of annual growth out-pacing that of the economy as a whole (Valente, 
                                                 
16
 Based on data from CESSI and World Bank. 
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2007).  In the wake of the crisis, the government welcomed this growth, boosting the 
sector’s political capital and the lobbing power of sectoral representatives. 
 
Figure 4-3 – Revenues, Exports and Employment in Argentinean Software Sector, 
2003 – 2010 
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Source: CESSI 
 
The growth of sectoral revenues and exports largely stemmed from IT services such as 
business process operations, call centres, body shopping17 and software factories (López 
and Ramos, 2008) – economic activity with little to do with the commercialisation of PS 
(see López and Ramos, 2009: 34).  Yet multinational PS firms – whose primary activity 
in Argentina concerned the commercialisation of PS – were able to share the political 
benefits deriving from this activity.  Strong sectoral cohesion and coordination 
permitted multinational PS firms to pass off their interests as those of the sector overall, 
helping to legitimate and strengthen these firms’ arguments that PS contributed to 
economic growth.  With government focused on the economic benefits the sector could 
provide and PS firms able to pass off their interests as convergent with those of the 
sector as a whole – and country at large – these firms were in a stronger position to 
persuade politicians to oppose F/OSS promotion, which could be portrayed as adverse 
to the interests of the sector and government alike. 
 
                                                 
17
 Provision of human resources, where a supplier provides a client with personnel to work within the 
client’s organisation, either on or off-site. 
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PS advocates’ ability to benefit politically from growth in IT services reflects the crucial 
role the government’s intervention in the sector played in strengthening these actors’ 
lobbying power by consolidating sectoral cohesion.  This role may be highlighted by 
invoking a counterfactual scenario: had the government not intervened in the sector, it is 
unlikely sectoral cohesion would have consolidated, reducing the likelihood that 
multinational PS firms would have been able to benefit from economic activity with 
which they were not directly associated.  If PS advocates’ lobbying power strengthened 
as a result of sectoral growth, it was not this growth per se that yielded this effect but 
the combination of growth and strong sectoral cohesion – cohesion precipitated by 
government intervention. 
PS Advocates’ Lobbying Power Strengthens 
 
The sector’s increased ties with the government, stronger cohesiveness and economic 
growth all strengthened its lobbying power and by extension, the lobbying power of PS 
advocates within it.  As mentioned above, the sector’s ties with the government 
encompassed government appointments, participation in policymaking, formal channels 
for consultation, the sector as a source of political support for the government and 
informal contact.  The proliferation of government-sector ties which emerged in T2 
Argentina and the influence the sector gained within the government as a result of them 
marked a stark contrast to T1, when the sector lacked both.  Where the sector’s 
influence within the government was inconsequential before the crisis, it became 
involved in policymaking in virtually any area that touched upon sectoral interests from 
2004 (CESSI F, 2011).    
State-Sector Relations: Increased Opportunities for Lobbying  
 
Ties between the CESSI or individuals close to the association and the government were 
represented by the high level political access of these individuals as well as their 
appointment to government positions.  As noted above, representatives of the CESSI 
met with politicians up to the level of the presidency, meeting the vice-president and 
president on trade missions.  Representatives of the CESSI took up positions in the 
Secretariat of Industry (interviews, 2012) and on the coordinating committee of the 
FdSSI (CESSI E, 2011). 
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Involvement of Business in Policymaking  
 
The government’s involvement of the sector in policymaking facilitated the 
strengthening of CESSI’s power in multiple dimensions.  CESSI’s capacity to mobilise 
resources increased: the selective benefits the association was able to dispense 
encouraged associativism behind it.  CESSI’s influence over the output of the FdSSI and 
content of the sectoral promotion law allowed the association to strengthen its position 
as principle representative of the software sector.  As noted above, the CESSI possessed 
significant influence over discussion in the forum because coordinators of the forum 
were either aligned with or worked closely with the association (Consultant A, 2010).  
CESSI’s influence was reflected in the plans for sectoral development formulated in the 
FdSSI.  These plans, published in a report (Briozzo, 2007), reflected recommendations 
advanced by the CESSI in its own 2003 plan (CESSI, 2003).  CESSI influenced the 
content of the sectoral promotion law both directly and indirectly.  Indirectly, its ability 
to coordinate the forum allowed it to wield influence.  The decree by which 
implementation of the law was approved recommended the law reflect the guidelines 
formulated and set out during the FdSSI (Presidencia de la República Argentina, 2004).  
Directly, the association wielded influence through the involvement of personnel with 
close links to the CESSI in defining the regulations to be implemented in the law.  
Those involved in or close to this process asserted that the level and scope of the 
benefits of the law saw significant expansion during the definition of these regulations 
(CESSI D, 2012; Consultant A, 2010; PJ deputy C, 2012).   
 
The institution of the FdSSI itself reflected the influence of the CESSI as it embodied 
the answer to the association’s call for a policymaking committee through which the 
sector might coordinate with all those government entities with responsibility for areas 
that connected to its interests (Lanacion.com, 2003a; PJ deputy C, 2012).  The FdSSI 
lowered the costs CESSI faced in coordinating with the government.  Through the 
FdSSI, CESSI established and consolidated links with actors across the government 
including the MEcon, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MECyT)18, 
Ministry of Employment (MTEySS) and Ministry of Foreign Relations amongst others 
                                                 
18
 The MECyT later split to become two separate ministries, the Ministry of Education (ME) and Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MCyT). 
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(Briozzo, 2007: 23; SICPME, 2004).  These links constituted channels through which 
the CESSI would subsequently become involved in regular consultation in the 
formulation of initiatives and policy in the areas of industrial policy, employment, 
education, government procurement and foreign trade (see Briozzo, 2007; López and 
Ramos, 2008).   
 
In the MEcon (which would subsequently become the Ministry of Industry) the sector 
maintained a close working relationship with the Secretariat of Industry, the entity 
responsible for the administration of the sectoral promotion regime (interviews, 2011; 
2012).  In the MCyT, CESSI worked with FONSOFT in the development of a range of 
initiatives associated with promoting innovation.  In the ME, a committee was setup on 
which the CESSI liaised with the Secretariat for University Policy in the formulation of 
policies in higher education (ME, 2012).  In the MTEySS, the CESSI together with 
multinational IT firms coordinated with the Employment Secretariat in the formulation 
of a number of initiatives to develop workers’ IT skills (MTEySS, 2012; MTEySS A, 
2012; MTEySS B, 2012). 
 
The FdSSI answered the sector’s demand for a committee involving all areas of the 
government which connected to software but as a consultation exercise it was only 
temporary.  At the insistence of the CESSI (CESSI D, 2012), a permanent embodiment 
of this forum was instituted in June 2009 in the shape of the Fundación Sadosky 
(Presidencia de la República Argentina, 2009b), which united both public and private 
sector entities.  Another similar initiative was the Agenda Digital (Presidencia de la 
República Argentina, 2009a), which was proposed by the sector (CABASE et al., 2008) 
as a forum for the private sector to participate in policymaking in the area of ICTs.   
Business as Source of Political Support for the State 
 
Business may increase its power as the state comes to rely on it as a source of political 
support.  The state may use business to “seek only to generate support and minimize 
opposition” (Schneider, 2004: 27) or to “play once sector off against another” (ibid.).  
Business may also represent a constituency for incumbent political forces (Fairfield, 
2011: 428).  Even if business does not represent a core constituency for incumbent 
political forces, business support is important to a government’s capacity to govern 
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effectively (Lindblom, 1980).  The economic significance of a sector may also play a 
role in the state’s relationship with business actors (Gourevitch, 1986).   
 
Business did not constitute a core constituency for the Kirchner governments (Corrales, 
2008) but certain business sectors associated with domestic industry were supportive of 
the government (see Lewis, 2009: 163; Wylde, 2012: 126) as they benefited from the 
Kirchners’ drive to revive national productive forces (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007; 
Riggirozzi, 2009) especially in relation to exporting sectors (Wylde, 2010: 1).  
Nominally representing the interests of national firms – and headed up by 
representatives of such firms – CESSI embodied such a sector. 
 
Certain business sectors may provide a source of support where other business sectors 
withdraw support (Schneider, 2004).  When confronting opposition from business the 
Kirchner governments would employ strategies which drew upon bases of support 
elsewhere, including other areas of the business community (Bonvecchi, 2011).  In 
2008, the government of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner faced opposition from the 
agrarian sector as it sought to raise taxes on agricultural exports (Díaz Echenique et al., 
2011; Fairfield, 2011; Picardi, 2012; Vivares et al., 2009: 207).  Against the backdrop of 
this crisis, the government maintained cordial relations with the software sector, 
relations which were indicative of business support which offset opposition from 
elsewhere in the private sector.   
 
The economic significance of the sector represented another factor in the political 
support the sector offered the government.  Whilst the sector contributed a tiny share of 
Argentina’s total GDP and exports (see above), its rapid growth and the relatively 
skilled employment which it provided afforded it a political significance 
disproportionate to its share of total production.  More than a source of economic 
growth, the software sector represented an advertisement for the government’s 
stewardship of the economy, nominally symbolising high-added value economic 
activity and an advanced level of development.   
 
The mutual interest in the sector’s economic success shared between the private sector 
and the government facilitated reciprocity between the two, bolstering the power of 
sectoral representatives.  As discussed above, strong sectoral cohesion and coordination 
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allowed PS advocates to capture the political benefits bestowed upon the software 
sector. 
 
Government support for the sector as a whole was reflected in the President’s 
attendance at sectoral events (CanalAR, 2009), the institution of the Agenda Digital and 
the Fundación Sadosky in 2009 and her petition to congress that legislators approve a 
bill extending the period under which firms could benefit from the promotional regime 
(Law 25.922) from 2014 to 2019 (Dergarabedian, 2010; Taringa!, 2010).  The way in 
which PS advocates unrelated to the sector’s growth were able to benefit politically is 
signalled by the President’s public reception of Microsoft in 2009 and 2010 (Comuzzi, 
2010; Cortina and Torres, 2010; Gobierno de Buenos Aires, 2009; Microsoft, 2009). 
4.3 Software Licensing Related Initiatives in T2 Argentina 
 
This subsection examines the fortunes of legislative and executive initiatives associated 
with software licensing policy in T2 Argentina to elucidate the ways in which actors’ 
power – mediated by institutional embeddedness in the case of F/OSS advocates and 
software sector cohesion in the case of PS advocates – conditioned software licensing 
policy outcomes.  Unsurprisingly, given the strength of PS advocates’ ties with the 
executive in terms of extensity and level of political access, together with the political 
support the software sector received from the highest levels of the executive, PS 
advocates attained the outcomes they sought with apparent ease.  On the other hand, by 
avoiding engagement with the executive, F/OSS advocates effectively excluded 
themselves from spaces within the government providing opportunities to influence 
policy decisions through policymaking or advisory roles to politicians, leaving PS 
advocates with a virtual monopoly over societal input into software licensing policy.   
Executive Initiatives 
 
In T2, software licensing policy was characterised by actions which acted to favour the 
use of PS.  Despite occasional expressions of support for F/OSS – the most notable by 
the Cabinet Chief at the very end of T2 in 2010 (CanalAR, 2010) – an official position 
on software licensing policy was not enunciated by the executive in the period.  This 
notwithstanding, there was a consensus across all actors – be they located within or 
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outside the state, F/OSS advocates and PS advocates alike – that this position was 
‘neutral’ in so far as the government favoured neither PS nor F/OSS (interviews, 2011).  
In de facto terms however, the actions of the government tended to favour use of PS 
over F/OSS.  Where actors within the government initiated initiatives which looked 
likely to increase F/OSS adoption, these initiatives were curtailed.  Where government 
adopted initiatives involving software, they tended to involve partnerships with 
multinational PS firms and feature PS.  Whilst PS advocates sought to prevent the 
appearance of F/OSS promotion and made their opposition to F/OSS promotion clear to 
those in government (CESSI F, 2011), where government adopted initiatives featuring 
PS, outcomes were as much a result of lobbying as they were a function of politicians’ 
imperfect knowledge and the dominance of PS advocates within the teams involved in 
advising politicians on technology related matters.  
The ASLE 
 
As already mentioned above, the ASLE was launched by IT administrators in mid 2003, 
separate to the FRI but with similar aims in terms of sharing knowledge through a 
forum to facilitate the utilisation of F/OSS within the government.  Like the FRI, the 
ASLE emerged independently of the F/OSS community.  However, unlike the FRI, 
which operated within exclusively within the state and involved only public sector 
employees, the ASLE engaged the F/OSS community.  At a time when the government 
was still suffering from the effects of the crisis, the initiative marked an attempt to 
overcome resource constraints whilst avoiding use of unlicensed PS (see Román, 2003) 
and sought to draw on the F/OSS community as a source of knowledge and even labour 
(Couture, 2006: 59); participants in SoLAr offered their skills on a voluntary basis to 
develop software (SoLAr B, 2011).  Although the ASLE involved the F/OSS 
community, including F/OSS advocates, it was controlled by its protagonists within the 
government who were careful to downplay any threat the initiative might pose to the 
interests of PS firms; these protagonists stressed that they did not advocate preferential 
use of F/OSS over PS (see Irigoyen, 2003; Román, 2003).  For the protagonists of the 
ASLE, F/OSS represented a means to an end rather than an end in itself and motivations 
for its use were essentially financial such that like the FRI, the initiative was 
characterised by a pragmatic rationale.  Without wider motivations for adopting F/OSS, 
the basis for the ASLE dissolved where financial issues could be overcome.  Unlike the 
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FRI, the ASLE was conducted in a way which maximised its profile, its launch being 
publicised through the media secretariat of the offices of the presidency where one of its 
protagonists worked (interviews, 2011; 2012; see Irigoyen, 2003).  The high profile of 
the ASLE made it a target for opposition from PS advocates and its emergence at a time 
when the software sector was beginning to gain increased access to the executive and 
influence within it facilitated PS advocates’ capacity to stymie the initiative.  Lodging 
objections to the political superiors of those responsible for the ASLE, the CESSI argued 
that the initiative ran counter to the objectives of the legislative proposals to promote 
the sector which at the time had received the support of the Minster of Economy, 
Roberto Lavagna and the protagonists of the ASLE were asked to drop the initiative 
(interviews, 2012).  The susceptibility of F/OSS initiatives based principally upon 
financial motivations to be neutralised by PS advocates was signalled by ASLE’s 
protagonists’ subsequent involvement in a migration to Microsoft software.  In July 
2004, little over a year from the inception of the ASLE, the initiative’s instigators 
adopted software donated by Microsoft for the operation of the public media platform, 
the Sistema Nacional de Medios Públicos (Busaniche, 2004; Microsoft, 2004) in a high 
profile agreement signed off by Argentina’s vice-president, Daniel Scioli 
(Cronista.com, 2004).  Whilst ASLE’s demise and the subsequent migration signalled 
PS vendors’ capacity to buy-off F/OSS initiatives based mainly upon cost, it also 
signalled the limited rationale for such initiatives where financial conditions improved.  
By 2004, as Argentina’s economy recovered (Chudnovsky and López, 2007), the 
resource constraints in the government began to ameliorate (Carllinni, 2012), 
diminishing the rationale on which the ASLE was based.  The episode also telegraphed 
PS advocates’ increasing influence within the government as their lobbying power grew 
as well as the low influence of F/OSS advocates.  Without influence within the 
executive, F/OSS advocates were unable to persuade politicians to adopt F/OSS for 
wider, non-financial reasons which might facilitate the resilience of F/OSS initiatives. 
Executive Initiatives Concerning PS 
 
In the wake of the ASLE, PS advocates’ capacity to translate their preferences into 
executive initiatives was demonstrated in several other examples.  In 2004, the MECyT 
– which worked closely with the software sector on a consultative basis (CESSI B, 
2012; see López and Ramos, 2008; ME, 2012) – signed an agreement with Microsoft to 
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provide software and training through the firm’s Education Alliance programme in 
relation to a computers for schools initiative (Busaniche, 2004; MECyT, 2004).  This 
agreement demonstrated both the ease with which PS advocates could translate their 
preferences into initiatives and the difficulties F/OSS advocates with low institutional 
embeddedness faced in doing so.   
 
F/OSS advocates lobbied the MECyT to adopt Linux instead of Microsoft Windows in 
the computers for schools initiative – efforts which included a meeting between Richard 
Stallman and the Minister for Education (Educ.ar, 2004; Lavaca.org, 2009).  However, 
F/OSS advocates’ fragmented organisation and distance from the government reduced 
their capacity to advance a viable solution for implementing F/OSS.  Administrators 
responsible for organising the initiative within the MECyT lacked recourse to in-house 
personnel with knowledge of F/OSS who they could trust to advise them and assist with 
implementation; faced with piecemeal offers of assistance from small firms linked to 
F/OSS advocates, these administrators instead favoured signing an agreement with 
Microsoft which could arrange implementation at lower costs and provide training to 
boot (MECyT A, 2011).  Lack of cohesion in F/OSS advocates’ organisation reduced 
their capacity to advance a credible and efficient proposal for implementation of F/OSS; 
lack of institutional embeddedness, which may have enhanced F/OSS advocates’ ability 
to mobilise resources and organise more effectively, also reduced the viability of 
adopting F/OSS in the eyes of administrators within the MECyT; external to the 
government, F/OSS advocates lacked administrators’ trust and reduced the knowledge 
available to administrators in decision making.  The MECyT initiative ultimately 
represented a partial win for F/OSS advocates as the Ministry agreed to implement a 
dual-boot solution featuring both Windows and Linux (see Educ.ar, 2004; MECyT A, 
2011).  However, there was criticism that the Linux implementation did not boot (FVL 
A, 2010a) and with training only available for Microsoft’s software and knowledge of 
Linux scarce, the degree to which Linux was actually utilised by recipients of the 
initiative is questionable. 
 
In March 2005, the MEcon, which had played a key role in the formulation of the 
sectoral policy for software, launched in conjunction with Microsoft, Mi PC, an 
initiative which aimed to stimulate economic activity through local hardware assembly 
and at the same time improve social access to ICTs (Cassia, 2005; Clarín, 2005; 
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Finquelievich, 2005: 17).  From 2005, the MTEySS, which also worked with the CESSI 
on a consultative basis, launched a number of workforce ICT training initiatives in 
conjunction with Microsoft, Oracle and other multinational IT firms (MTEySS A, 2012; 
MTEySS B, 2012).   
The FRI 
 
PS advocates’ ability to neutralise F/OSS related initiatives within the executive was 
signalled again with relation to the winding down of the FRI in 2008.  In the second half 
of the 2000s, the FRI and its F/OSS related activities began to attain a higher profile 
following the participation of its coordinator and his boss, the head of the ONTI, in the 
2005 edition of the Jornadas Argentinas de Informática (JAIIO), an annual IT event 
which drew participants from across Argentina and neighbouring countries (Carllinni, 
2012; see Meffe, 2005).  In 2006 the FRI began to focus on interoperability (Carllinni, 
2007) and push the adoption of the Open Document Format (ODF) as a government 
wide standard (Carllinni, 2012).  The ODF was an ISO approved open standard which 
allowed users to migrate away from Microsoft’s desktop publishing Office suite – a key 
source of revenue for the firm (Curtis, 2009: 232) – to F/OSS equivalents such as 
StarOffice and Open Office.  The ODF marked an important threat to Microsoft and the 
firm responded by seeking to get its own OpenXML standard recognised as an open 
standard in international standard bodies (Curtis, 2009: 237; Foley, 2008: 54).  The 
company also pressured governments considering adopting the ODF format to drop the 
idea (Curtis, 2009: 263).  Microsoft was opposed to the ONTI’s plans to adopt the ODF 
as a government wide standard and following lobbying at the highest levels of the 
government, the FRI’s coordinator and the head of the ONTI were dismissed from their 
positions (Busaniche, 2008; Heinz, 2008; interviews, 2011; 2012).   
 
Following the dismissals, a new director favoured by the private sector was appointed to 
head up the ONTI and the activities of the FRI were wound down (interviews, 2010; 
2011).  The subsequent influence of the private sector within the ONTI was signalled in 
the launching of the Agenda Digital (Díaz Rato, 2008), an initiative put together by the 
sector (see CABASE et al., 2008), which sought to centralise coordination of 
government policy towards ICTs.   
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Legislative Initiatives 
 
In T2, F/OSS advocates continued to focus upon the legislature in their desire to see the 
government promote F/OSS, supporting re-submitted versions of the legislative project 
originally authored by Dragan which called for mandated use of F/OSS in the 
government.  However, F/OSS advocates’ chosen strategy for getting the government to 
adopt F/OSS promotion saw little chance of success, not least because the legislative 
projects they supported were submitted by legislators affiliated to minority parties in 
opposition to incumbent political forces, forces which enjoyed a strong position in the 
legislature and amongst which PS advocates were gaining increasing influence. 
 
PS advocates’ increasing influence within the executive in T2 enhanced their capacity to 
impress their preferences on software licensing policy in the legislature too, due to the 
executive’s capacity to control behaviour in the legislative branch.  In general terms, 
political forces incumbent in the executive between 2003 and 2010 enjoyed either 
straight majorities or alliances providing a dominant position within the legislature 
which allowed the executive a strong hand in setting the legislative agenda and outcome 
of legislative initiatives throughout this period (Jones and Hwang, 2005: 127; Jones and 
Micozzi, 2011).  Strong party discipline within the Argentine congress in general 
(Jones, 2002), the strong capacity of incumbent parties to influence the legislative 
behaviour of their party through both institutional and party-based mechanisms (Jones, 
1997) and the strong capacity of majority parties or coalitions to determine the 
legislative agenda and outcome of legislative initiatives (Calvo, 2007) leveraged the 
executive’s capacity to influence activity in the legislature.  Further to the influence PS 
advocates could wield within the legislature indirectly through the executive, they also 
exert influence directly through lobbying a committee’s president, who controlled the 
legislative agenda and outcome of projects placed before a committee (Legislative 
assistant B, 2011).  In both 2003 and 2008, the F/OSS promotion bills were discussed in 
the committee for communications and technology, a committee which was headed up 
legislators affiliated with incumbent political forces between 2003 to 2010 (PJ deputy 
A, 2011; PJ deputy B, 2011) allowing the executive significant room to influence the 
progress of these bills.   
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In both 2003 and 2008, the re-submitted version of Dragan’s proposal was also merged 
with projects sponsored by legislators affiliated to the government, representing another 
mechanism by which the executive might influence the progress of F/OSS promotion 
initiatives.  Under the rules of the lower house, a project’s author was offered greater 
time to speak during debate over their project and thus greater control over its content 
(Legislative assistant B, 2011; Surdo, 2011); the submission of a project similar to one 
already in existence albeit by a political faction rivalling that responsible for the earlier 
project marked a strategy to prevent a rival faction controlling a project (ibid.); similar 
bills would be merged and the leverage each faction would wield over a bill’s content 
would be more equally matched.   
 
In 2003, due to PS advocates’ opposition to F/OSS promotion, the author of the project 
associated with the government (see Fontdevila, 2002) opted for a softer line than the 
mandate called for in Dragan’s project (see Dragan et al., 2002), instead calling for a 
preference with a view to increasing the chances of the project gaining approval (PJ 
deputy B, 2012).  However, F/OSS advocates refused to support anything other than 
mandated use of F/OSS; in the eyes of F/OSS advocates seeking openness and 
accountability – conditions which could only be guaranteed through use of free software 
– anything other than a mandate was pointless.  With no overlap between PS advocates’ 
and F/OSS advocates’ preferences and both sides refusing to compromise, legislators 
were left with little possibility of drafting a project with any chance of gaining approval.  
The timing of the resurgence of discussion of F/OSS promotion in the legislature in 
2003 coincided with discussion of the bills to promote the software sector (see Román, 
2003), bills which were also debated in the committee for communications and 
technology.  The CESSI voiced strong opposition to any promotion of F/OSS (ibid.) and 
with its strong connections to participants in the committee for communications and 
technology and its influence increasing within the government, the project failed to 
advance. 
 
In 2008, by, the project submitted by a minority, opposition party (Macaluse, 2008) was 
again merged with a similar proposal sponsored by legislators affiliated with the 
government (Cordoba, 2008; Tomoyose, 2008).  It appears support within the 
committee itself was sufficient for the project to gain approval (Busaniche, 2008; 
Legislative assistant B, 2011; Macaluse, 2008).  However, PS advocates, now enjoying 
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support within the executive up to the level of the presidency, were able to stymie the 
bill through lobbying.  One of the mechanisms by which the passage of legislation may 
be affected is through lack of engagement (Jones, 1997: 279).  Recognising the 
importance of ONTI’s buy-in to the viability of the proposal, the committee invited 
ONTI to attend discussion of the bill (Legislative assistant A, 2011).  However, with 
ONTI now closer to the software sector in the wake of the dismissal of the FRI 
coordinator and his boss, ONTI failed to attend the committee meetings and its lack of 
engagement, presumed to reflect disinterest, cast doubt over the viability of the project 
(ibid.).  Notwithstanding ONTI’s lack of engagement, progress of the bill was ultimately 
halted through its removal from the legislative agenda following pressure from 
representatives of the software sector (interviews, 2010; 2011).  Where the majority 
party opposed legislative initiatives, such initiatives would be placed in a draw or 
“cajoneada” (Calvo, 2007: 265; HCDN A, 2011) and such was the outcome of the 2008 
F/OSS promotion bill (interviews, 2010; 2011). 
 
By pursuing F/OSS promotion through the legislature, F/OSS advocates pinned their 
hopes on a strategy with a slim chance of success in the absence of widespread support 
in either wider society or the government. 
Technological Neutrality 
 
Another indication of PS advocates’ influence within the government concerned a 2007 
legislative declaration which called upon the executive to observe principles of  
‘technological neutrality’ where adopting technology and resist making choices on the 
basis of licensing schemes (see Nemirovsci, 2007; Wegbrait, 2009).  This project was 
initiated at the request of PS advocates (CESSI C, 2012; PJ deputy A, 2011) at a time 
when the FRI was involved in pushing the ODF format and marked a response to what 
PS advocates perceived as a growing threat from F/OSS promotion within the 
government. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, it has been argued that the Argentinean government’s predisposition to 
intervene in the software sector strengthened a pro-PS constituency, subsequently 
constraining the government’s ability to promote F/OSS.  The case of T2 Argentina 
illustrates how path dependency may lock governments into pursuing particular policy 
choices.  By engaging with the software sector in the wake of the crisis, the government 
consolidated sectoral cohesion, strengthening multinational PS firms’ political 
domination of the sector and allowing them to benefit politically from growth in IT 
services with which they would otherwise have been unassociated.  The lobbying power 
of PS advocates increasing as the government welcomed growth of a sector associated 
with high added value economic activity and an advanced level of development, this 
power enabled these actors to persuade the government to resist promoting F/OSS and 
maintain policies favourable to PS as calls for F/OSS promotion and government F/OSS 
initiatives emerged.   
 
As PS advocates’ lobbying power strengthened, F/OSS advocates effectively passed up 
opportunities to strengthen theirs.  Remaining aloof from the government, incumbent 
political forces and social movements with ties to the government, F/OSS advocates 
lacked access to political decision-makers and were able to mobilise limited resources.  
Unlike the F/OSS advocates of RS in Brazil who were able to mobilise and coordinate a 
coalition through access to state resources, Argentinean F/OSS advocates were unable 
to mobilise wider support for F/OSS as cooperation amongst them was confounded by 
heterogeneous interests.  Even when opportunities arose to forge stronger government 
ties and mobilise wider public support, these opportunities were missed for the 
differences that existed between F/OSS advocates. 
 
By illustrating the ways in which software sector cohesion and F/OSS advocates’ 
institutional embeddedness connected to policy choices in T2 Argentina, this chapter 
has shown how both these factors contributed to the choices that were taken.  Figure 4-4 
shows how combinations of these factors co-vary with policy outcomes across T1 and 
T2 in Argentina.  It can be seen that policy remained favourable to PS as software sector 
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cohesion strengthened in T2.  As in the cases of T1 Argentina and Brazil, the policy 
outcome is consistent with what the power asymmetries between F/OSS advocates and 
PS advocates would predict.  If policy favours PS under the combination of factors 
found in T1 – a combination in which PS advocates enjoy superior lobbying power to 
F/OSS advocates due to the power asymmetries between the two sets of actors – a 
strengthening of PS advocates’ power on account of strong software sector cohesion 
only suggests policy is even more likely to favour PS.    
 
Figure 4-4 – Combinations of F/OSS Advocates’ Institutional Embeddedness and 
Software Sector Cohesion in T1 and T2 Argentina 
 
 
 T1 (1999-2003) T2 (2003-2010) 
   
F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness  
Weak Weak 
Software sector cohesion Weak Strong 
Software licensing policy outcome Favourable to 
use of PS 
Favourable to 
use of PS 
 
The findings of this chapter demonstrate how politics rather than technical or financial 
considerations may determine policy toward software licensing.  Whilst cost 
considerations motivated government IT administrators to initiate F/OSS initiatives, the 
political context put a stop to these initiatives and resulted in politicians resisting calls 
to promote F/OSS through policy.  The findings highlight how pragmatic motivations 
for adopting F/OSS are in themselves likely to be insufficient as a basis for policy 
promotion of F/OSS.  Because PS vendors have the incentives and capacity to heavily 
discount PS, offering governments deals that may make PS appear more financially 
attractive than F/OSS in the short term, F/OSS is only likely to be promoted where 
motivations transcend financial and technical considerations.  To employ the 
terminology of Richard Stallman, politicians have to appreciate F/OSS as free speech 
rather than free beer if they are to recognise benefits in promoting it.
 152 
5 The Politics of Software Licensing Policy under the 
Lula Governments in Brazil (2003 – 2010) 
 
As Lula came to power, F/OSS promotion seemed as improbable as ever.  Typically 
regarded as a byword for antipathy toward the US and capitalism, F/OSS evoked the 
polar opposite of the image projected by the Lula government.  With a view to allaying 
the fears of international investors concerned at the PT’s leftwing credentials, Lula 
committed to maintain the market friendly policies of the preceding Cardoso 
administration (Hunter, 2008; 2011; Panizza, 2009; Power, 2008).  With its reputation 
for moderation and support for economic orthodoxy, this government looked likely to 
resist calls to promote F/OSS.  Resistance appeared likely because such a policy sat 
uneasily with the tenets of laissez-faire and contradicted conventional interpretations of 
IP as a mechanism for appropriating knowledge.  Resistance appeared likely in relation 
to foreign policy stance as well.  Notwithstanding its pursuit of greater independence 
from the US than had been the case under Cardoso, the Lula government’s cordial ties 
with its northern neighbour (Baiocchi and Checa, 2008; Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007) 
suggested it was unlikely to adopt a policy which might upset this bilateral relationship.  
In its wider international relations, this government’s continued emphasis upon 
collaboration and multilateralism implied it would act in accordance with the liberal 
norms of the international environment and avoid policies that were markedly radical. 
 
In line with the incumbent PT’s strategy of assuaging business interests, control of the 
ministry responsible for industry (MDIC) in the incoming Lula government was handed 
to a pro-market figure, implying the ministry’s receptiveness to the views of the private 
sector.  With the local software sector dominated by proprietary software (PS) and the 
presumably strong say the MDIC would have possessed in decisions over any policy 
affecting the sector’s interests, the government would apparently have left the private 
sector to decide how software should be licensed. 
 
Within the local software sector, as Lula came to power, the expectation was that the 
incoming administration would favour local firms which developed PS products.  The 
inclusion of software within a strategic export programme signalled that the MDIC took 
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a strong interest in the PS dominated software sector and the minister for industry even 
spoke out in favour of promoting PS. 
 
If the Lula governments suggested a political context apparently hostile to F/OSS 
promotion, they surprisingly became avid supporters of this policy, gaining a reputation 
for being a world leader in F/OSS promotion.  Brazil arguably did more than any other 
country anywhere to promote F/OSS, adopting F/OSS initiatives in a range of policy 
areas including social access to ICTs, education, public IT administration and industrial 
policy.  The Brazilian foreign ministry even pushed for F/OSS’ to be recognised as an 
opportunity for developing countries to address the digital divide in the declaration of 
the World Summit of the Information Society.   
 
This chapter explains the unexpected uptake of F/OSS promotion by the Lula 
governments, arguing that this outcome was largely down to a strengthening in F/OSS 
advocates’ embeddedness within the government in T2 while cohesion in the 
organisation of the software sector remained weak.  In T2, F/OSS advocates gained 
influence amongst political leaders in the federal executive through high-level 
government appointments and partisan ties when the PT gained power at the national 
level.  F/OSS advocates’ strong ties to the leadership of the executive – the support of 
which was crucial for the adoption of a general policy conducive to use of F/OSS – 
facilitated their capacity to persuade political leaders to back F/OSS promotion.  
Brazilian F/OSS advocates’ ability to mobilise resources through the federal 
government enabled them to unify and coordinate the heterogeneous interests 
surrounding F/OSS.   
 
As the federal government adopted a F/OSS promotion policy, opponents of F/OSS 
promotion found their capacity to stymie F/OSS initiatives undermined by the 
fragmented organisation of the software sector.  Represented by several actors 
displaying varying preferences towards F/OSS promotion, ranging from strong 
opposition to ambivalence, the software sector was organised in such a way that it not 
only reduced the influence of the sector as a whole within the executive but also left 
collective actors representing the interests of multinational PS firms and their local 
affiliates isolated within the sector.  Historically weak institutional links between the 
sector and the government and political leaders’ backing of F/OSS advocates left 
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opponents of F/OSS promotion effectively locked-out of those areas of the government 
with the capacity to control F/OSS promotion. 
 
On the one hand, the case of Brazil reflects how actors that would ordinarily be weak 
and unlikely to translate their preferences into policy may do so through institutional 
structures such as the state and political parties.  Institutions strengthened F/OSS 
advocates’ lobbying power by facilitating their capacity to forge ties with government 
and mobilize resources.  On the other hand, this case reflects how interest based factors 
might confound amongst the most powerful actors from translating their preferences 
into policy.  Weak coherence in private sector organisation prevented multinational 
firms from presenting their interests as coherent with those of the wider software sector 
and mobilising a more powerful alliance.  A combination of fragmented interests and 
institutional ‘lock-out’ showed that combinations of interests and institutions may 
prevent even the most powerful actors from getting what they want. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, the character of F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness within the Lula governments is examined, explaining how this 
strengthened and how stronger embeddedness enabled F/OSS advocates to translate 
their preferences into policy through ties to politicians and by mobilising support in 
wider society through access to resources.  The second section examines how continued 
weakness in the cohesion of the software sector attenuated PS advocates’ ability to 
rollback F/OSS promotion. 
5.1 F/OSS Advocates’ Institutional Embeddedness Strengthens 
 
This subsection explains how F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness 
strengthened at the national level in Brazil in T2 and how this strengthening enabled 
these actors to translate their preferences into policy.  As active members of the PT and 
participants in PT-held, sub-national governments in the years leading up to 2003, 
leading F/OSS advocates’ existing embeddedness within the PT and the state facilitated 
their ability to forge ties with the government when the PT won power at the national 
level.  The character of these ties and the way they mapped onto the contours of 
government made political support for F/OSS more likely for multiple reasons.   
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Ties to government – encompassing government appointments and relationships with 
policymakers and politicians – enhance actors’ power by increasing the likelihood that 
“deliberate political actions” such as “lobbying … participat[ion] in policymaking … or 
collective action” (Fairfield, 2011: 428) will be successful.  The influence of the 
structure of the state upon what actors might be capable of (or not)(Adler, 1986; 
Sikkink, 1991) meant that the usefulness of these ties in terms of lobbying power was 
affected by where in the state ties connected actors, either directly through appointments 
or indirectly by way of relationships with others.   
 
In view of the fact that F/OSS advocates’ interests involved influencing IT adoption, 
ties to those areas of the state with faculties relating to IT were important to these 
actors’ ambitions.  Three areas of the government were important in this respect 
(Sobota, 2011).  The first was the federal data processing agency, SERPRO, an entity 
attached to the Ministry of Finance which performed a function similar to PROCERGS 
albeit at the federal level.  Whilst SERPRO lacked policy faculties, it was able to 
influence technology use in the wider population as well as within the federal 
government through network effects.  Representing the largest IT company in Latin 
America (Schoonmaker, 2009) with around 9,000 employees (Botelho et al., 2005), 
SERPRO was the principle supplier of IT services to the federal government (Mazoni, 
2011).  Because the government represented a principle source of demand within the 
Brazilian market for IT goods and services (Marques, 2009; Schoonmaker, 2009) and 
the services it provided affected the lives of ordinary Brazilians, the choices SERPRO 
made in software adoption impacted the wider population as well as those working 
within the government.  The second was the Secretariat of Logistics and IT (SLTI), 
located within the Ministry of Planning.  The SLTI offered opportunities to influence 
technology adoption within the government as the entity charged with formulating 
government guidelines for IT adoption (Santanna, 2011) – a function analogous to that 
performed by ONTI in the Argentinean government.  The third was the IT policy 
secretariat, SEPIN, within the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT).  Responsible 
for the formulation and execution of policy toward the IT sector (SEPIN A, 2008), 
SEPIN potentially offered the greatest opportunities to influence technology adoption 
through policy. 
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During the first Lula government, F/OSS advocates gained a significant presence within 
SERPRO and the SLTI and would encounter sympathy from the director of SEPIN.  
However, it was from within an area of the state lying away from those typically 
associated with holding influence over IT policy that F/OSS promotion would be 
spearheaded.   
Ties: Mobilisation of Support for F/OSS Promotion within the Government 
 
F/OSS advocates’ ties and positions within the PT relative to senior party figures and 
internal party factions conditioned those ties they were able to forge with the 
government.  With regard to appointments, the internal party organisation – specifically 
the politics surrounding internal party factions – affected who received government 
jobs.  Appointments were controlled by the moderate Articulação faction (interviews, 
2011) which was headed up from Sao Paulo where the PT emerged.  Articulação, held 
the majority of seats on the PT’s national executive, was the dominant party faction and 
its leadership represented the locus of power within the party (Flynn, 2005; Kucinski, 
2005: 38–40).  In the years leading up to Lula’s presidential election win, Articulação 
had sidelined more leftist factions such as Democracia Socialista (DS), to which the 
leading proponents of F/OSS in RS were affiliated.  When it came to allocating 
appointments, a deal with smaller parties which had formed a coalition with the PT, 
meant that smaller PT factions lost out to these parties and more dominant factions.   
 
With the marginalisation of smaller, leftwing factions in the allocation of appointments, 
the highest profile RS F/OSS proponents, as DS affiliates, initially remained outside the 
government (Branco, 2005b).  However, whilst Articulação’s role in coordinating 
appointments did little to enhance the ability of F/OSS advocates from RS to obtain 
government positions, the opposite was the case for Sao Paulo’s leading F/OSS 
advocate, Sergio Amadeu (interviews, 2008).  Amadeu’s involvement in the PT of Sao 
Paulo meant he possessed ties with the leader of the Articulação faction, Jose Dirceu, 
who became Cabinet Chief in 2003.  As a result of these ties, Amadeu was invited by 
Dirceu personally to take up an appointment heading up the Instituto Nacional de 
Tecnologia da Informação (ITI), an entity responsible for administering Brazil’s public 
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key infrastructure – a system involving software which provided Internet security 
services such as user identity verification and encryption.19 
 
Together with affiliations to internal party factions, allocation of government 
appointments was affected by pre-existing participation within the state.  Where F/OSS 
advocates possessed administrative experience as a result of participation in sub-
national PT held governments or as professional bureaucrats in governments controlled 
by other parties, such experience made it more likely that these actors’ would obtain 
appointments, especially if associated with projects deemed successful within the party.   
 
Amadeu’s participation in the municipal government of SP contributed to his receiving 
an invitation to head up the ITI.  By profession, Amadeu was a sociologist with an 
academic career and his background reflected that his appointment to head an agency 
concerned with cryptography was based on his political, rather than technical, 
credentials.  However, if Amadeu’s appointment rested on political trust, he was 
approached to head up an IT related agency because of the success of the high profile 
Sao Paulo telecentre project which he had coordinated during his time working for the 
municipal government of Sao Paulo.  In addition to Amadeu, a good number of lower 
profile F/OSS advocates with backgrounds working in the state, obtained mid to high 
level IT related appointments.    
 
Although the leading protagonists of F/OSS in RS did not immediately gain 
appointments, they were nonetheless well connected to the federal government as a 
result of the significance of RS as a source of expertise in public administration within 
the PT.  When the PT took power in 2003, it was the first time the party had governed at 
the national level and it turned to its experience of governing at the sub-national level to 
fill appointments.  Representing what were generally considered the PT’s most 
successful experiences of public administration at the time (Bruce, 2004; Goldfrank and 
Schneider, 2003: 159–160), the state government of RS and municipal government of 
Porto Alegre (the state capital of RS), were particularly significant as sources of 
administrative experience and a good number of those who had served in these 
governments went on to take up positions in the Lula administrations.  With these 
                                                 
19
 For a detailed explanation of public key infrastructure, see Adams and Lloyd (2003). 
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personnel having worked alongside the leading F/OSS advocates of RS, they were 
proximate to these F/OSS advocates in informal as well as more formal partisan terms. 
 
It was Amadeu, based within the ITI, who would play a leading role in prompting the 
uptake of F/OSS promotion within the government.  However, it is noteworthy that 
Amadeu was capable of doing so, as the ITI formally lacked the faculties to influence 
wider IT adoption.  Focused upon the administration of the national public key 
infrastructure, the ITI’s resources and purview were accordingly limited.  In terms of 
institutional capacity, lying away from those areas of the state with faculties pertaining 
to wider IT adoption, Amadeu’s situation in the ITI contrasted that of PROCERGS 
managers in the Dutra government.  Unlike PROCERGS, the ITI did not possess 
significant financial resources and lacked large numbers of personnel and control over 
IT infrastructure.  The entity was also relatively insignificant in terms of authority 
within the wider government, the presidency of the ITI – the position which Amadeu 
occupied – being located three tiers below ministerial level in the ministerial hierarchy 
(interviews, 2010).   
 
Amadeu and F/OSS advocates more widely were able to overcome limitations presented 
by their peculiar locations within the state or outside it through their partisan ties.  
Through these ties, F/OSS advocates were well connected with and could consequently 
access senior levels of the government, right up to the level of the President.  F/OSS 
advocates’ participation in the PT – participation that often encompassed active 
involvement within the party from its inception and personal acquaintance if not 
informal bonds with leading party members – made it more likely that senior 
government actors would listen to them on the basis of trust.  Amadeu was located in a 
position proximate to Lula as well as Cabinet Chief, Jose Dirceu, in terms of the formal 
institutional structure of the government as the ITI was attached to the offices of the 
cabinet, the Casa Civil.  Leading F/OSS advocates from RS also enjoyed strong ties to 
the highest levels of the executive as a significant number of their colleagues took up 
senior positions – including appointments within the president’s inner circle and 
ministerial positions. 
 
Ties to government leaders not only facilitated F/OSS advocates’ lobbying power but 
also, where these actors were located within the government, strengthened their 
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positions inside it.  An important factor which affected Amadeu’s capacity to instigate 
F/OSS promotion from within the ITI concerned the way in which power within the PT 
was imposed upon the formal institutional structure of the government.  As well as 
being leader of the Articulação faction – which controlled the allocation of executive 
appointments when Lula came to power – and Cabinet Chief, Jose Dirceu was also 
Lula’s most powerful aide (Flynn 2005).  Dirceu’s strong political position meant that 
his sponsorship bolstered Amadeu’s capacity to act outside his formal institutional role.   
 
Whilst it was under the auspices of Dirceu that Amadeu was able to promote F/OSS, 
Dirceu himself knew little about technology.  Amadeu was able to gain Dirceu’s 
support for the promotion of F/OSS largely on the strength of the SP telecentre project.  
Weir and Skocpol (1985) note that existing policies and competencies affect the policies 
that come to be adopted by conditioning what is deemed acceptable and what is 
possible.  Amadeu’s responsibility for the deployment of F/OSS in the SP telecentre 
project and the success of this deployment in terms of its wide scale and the large 
numbers of users served, strengthened his ability to persuade Dirceu that F/OSS 
adoption was viable and that the competencies to adopt it were present.  
 
The physical location of Amadeu’s offices within the buildings that housed the 
government provided him unique possibilities to lobby the highest levels of the 
executive.  Amadeu’s office was located in an annex of the Palácio do Planalto which 
accommodated the offices of the cabinet and the president, offering Amadeu 
opportunities to speak personally with Lula and Dirceu that would have been the envy 
of any lobbyist.   
 
The ideas that top officials hold has a significant bearing upon the policies that get 
adopted and the role of advisors in shaping these ideas is key (Sikkink, 1991).  
Amadeu’s face-to-face contact with Lula and Dirceu meant he possessed opportunities 
to shape their ideas in a way that actors lacking personal contact could not.  Playing an 
advisory role, he was able to persuade Lula as well as Dirceu to support the promotion 
of F/OSS.  Existing ideas are key to actors’ capacity to frame objectives (Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993; Sikkink, 1991; Weir and Skocpol, 1985) and paralleling the way in 
which PROCERGS managers were able to obtain backing for F/OSS promotion from 
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political leaders in RS in T1, Amadeu convinced Lula to support F/OSS by framing it in 
the context of wider ideas and interests with which Lula identified.   
 
In addition to the ideas used to frame F/OSS in RS – ideas relating to democracy – the 
notion of technological autonomy was also important in Amadeu’s framing of F/OSS 
(see Silveira, 2004: 40; 2007: 52).  Technological autonomy had a long trajectory in 
Brazil, having formed the motivation to develop an indigenous computer industry 
(Adler, 1987; V. Dantas, 1988; M. Dantas, 1989; Helena, 1984).  In a further parallel to 
PROCERGS managers’ ability to gain political backing, Amadeu’s capacity to gain 
Lula’s support rested on the trust afforded through partisan ties.  With his peculiar 
location within the PT, close to the locus of power within the party, Amadeu’s partisan 
credentials made it more likely that his superiors would listen to him than had he been a 
non-partisan, career bureaucrat. 
 
It is important to emphasise that high level support for F/OSS promotion was the 
outcome rather than the cause of F/OSS advocates’ strong embeddedness within the 
government.  Lula and other leading members of the executive possessed limited 
knowledge of IT and consequently, prior to their contact with Amadeu, they knew little 
if anything about F/OSS.  Amadeu’s government appointment, whilst motivated partly 
on the success of the SP telecentre project in which F/OSS had been deployed, stemmed 
from the fact that Dirceu knew Amadeu personally rather than because of any prior 
support for F/OSS on Dirceu’s part.  It was after contact with Amadeu that Dirceu and 
Lula came to learn of F/OSS, signalling that their support for F/OSS was the result 
rather than the inspiration for Amadeu’s appointment.  The direction of causation in the 
uptake of high level support for F/OSS promotion – and by extension, the role of F/OSS 
advocates’ institutional embeddedness in this uptake – may be illustrated by invoking a 
counterfactual scenario: had Amadeu not been invited to take up an appointment 
proximate to political leaders, political leaders would have been unaware of F/OSS and 
they consequently would not have come to support F/OSS promotion.  
 
Whilst ties and proximity to the President and cabinet members enhanced F/OSS 
advocates’ capacity to gain backing for their policy proposals, the policymaking role of 
the chief executive in Brazil together with the executive’s relations with the PT in 
congress and legislature more widely in turn bolstered their political backers’ capacity 
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to have these proposals approved and implemented.  The presidential style of 
government in Brazil meant the president was a crucial actor in policymaking 
(Scartascini, 2008; Sikkink, 1991).  The cabinet was also important to policymaking 
because it could not only initiate policies but was also responsible for their 
implementation (Scartascini, 2008).  The powers of the Brazilian presidency 
concentrated policymaking capacity in the hands of the chief executive (Alston et al., 
2008; Santos and Vilarouca, 2008).  As well as the power to issue ‘provisional decrees’, 
which in effect allowed the president to ordinarily bypass congress (Alston et al., 2008: 
125; Neto, 2002: 57; Shugart and Carey, 1992: 140–141; Shugart and Haggard, 2001: 
73), there were also a number of mechanisms by which the chief executive could gain 
legislators’ acquiesce to have legislation approved in congress (Santos and Vilarouca, 
2008).  The rules of the congress meant party leaders played a key role in determining 
committee appointments and this, combined with the ability of the presidency to 
provide resources (Alston et al., 2008: 127) allowed the chief executive to trade 
inducements for legislative support.  Through control over the distribution of resources, 
Lula was able to build a governing majority within congress despite controlling only a 
minority of seats through a PT-led coalition (Samuels, 2008). 
 
The high level political support F/OSS advocates were able to secure through partisan 
ties enabled these actors to precipitate F/OSS promotion across the government.  With 
relatively modest financial resources at the disposal of the ITI, Amadeu was limited in 
what he was capable of doing to promote F/OSS through the ITI directly.  Instead, he 
advanced a policy of F/OSS promotion by instigating initiatives in and through other 
areas of the government.  His ability to do so was facilitated by his partisan sponsorship.  
Together with the backing he obtained from Lula and Dirceu, another partisan factor 
which aided Amadeu in his ability to mobilise support for F/OSS concerned the 
significance amongst the upper tiers of the government of personnel who had served in 
sub-national administrations in RS.  Even if these personnel knew little about F/OSS 
themselves, having been exposed to F/OSS during their time in RS and often closely 
tied with those who had led the call for it to be promoted there, they were generally 
sympathetic to its promotion if not conversant in the arguments for doing so 
(interviews, 2011). 
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Together with partisan sponsorship, the role of the Casa Civil in formulating and 
implementing policy was important to Amadeu’s ability to advance his agenda.  As 
Cabinet Minister, Dirceu coordinated a programme that had been initiated under the 
preceding Cardoso administration to advance social access to ICTs, the Programa de 
Governo Eletrônico.  In the first meeting of the Comitê Executivo do Governo 
Eletrônico (CEGE) in May 2003, Dirceu announced that Amadeu was to play a key role 
in defining in IT policy broadly (PSL, 2003).  It was through the Governo Eletrônico 
programme that F/OSS would be promoted in two principle areas: government use of 
software and digital inclusion.   
 
To execute and implement the adoption of F/OSS within the government, a Comitê de 
Implementação do Software Livre (CISL) was instituted by decree in October 2003 
(Presidência da Republica do Brasil, 2003).  Amadeu was appointed to coordinate the 
CISL, drawing up guidelines that involved participation from all areas of the 
government (ITI, 2003).  To encourage government-wide engagement with F/OSS 
adoption, the institution of the CISL was followed shortly afterwards with a November 
memorandum from Dirceu which was circulated around all areas of the government.  In 
this memorandum, Dirceu requested that government actors observe a ruling by the 
Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU)20 which recommended that the government use 
F/OSS where such an option was available (ITI A, 2008; Kuhn, 2011: 29).  
Commencing with involvement from 42 government entities – a number which had 
climbed to 93 by 2005 (Zúñiga and Couture, 2005) – CISL involved participation from 
actors across the government (Tema, 2004a). 
 
In terms of digital inclusion, Amadeu influenced the uptake of F/OSS by obtaining 
resources from, as well as mobilising support in, other areas of the government.  
Through support from his superiors and other areas of the government, Amadeu was in 
2005 able to initiate his own telecentre project, Casa Brasil, with initial funding of 
around US$81 million21 from the MCT (Mori, 2011).  The Casa Brasil project was 
coordinated by the ITI but funded – via annual amendments to the national budget – by 
                                                 
20
 A body within the judicial branch of the federal government that holds responsibility for auditing 
public expenditure. 
21
 Converted using 2005 exchange rate (World Development Indicators) from figure quoted in Brazilian 
reales in source. 
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the MCT and implemented by the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e 
Tecnológico (CNPq), an organ dependent on the MCT (Mori, 2011; Sobota, 2011).   
 
Allied with F/OSS advocates and sympathisers inside the government and outside it, 
Amadeu’s ability to mobilise support for F/OSS promotion was further bolstered by the 
media access that his position within the state afforded.  Amadeu’s location within the 
Casa Civil, together with the name of the ITI – which obscured its association with 
cryptography, instead suggesting a focus on IT in general – allowed him to play-up his 
politically appointed role as IT policy architect vis-à-vis the media.  Conducting regular 
interviews with international as well as national media (see Benson, 2005; Kingstone, 
2005; Marques, 2004a) Amadeu was able to raise the profile of F/OSS, helping to 
mobilise public support and enhance the incentives for government actors to back 
F/OSS promotion. 
 
Support from Lula, Dirceu, a number of PT ministers and high ranking officials 
facilitated F/OSS advocates’ ability to garner support for F/OSS across the government.  
A demonstration of this support were the pledges Amadeu received from several 
ministries and heads of autonomous federal government organs to migrate to F/OSS, 
including the MCT, Mines and Energy (MME), Culture (MinC) and Foreign Relations 
(MRE)(Colitt, 2004; Marques, 2004b).  Other areas of the government that adopted 
F/OSS initiatives included the Ministry of Education (PSL, 2004a; 2004b), SERPRO 
(PSL, 2005b) and DATAPREV (Schoonmaker, 2007; Teza, 2004a).  Together with the 
activities of the PSL and FISL, partisan support assisted F/OSS advocates in garnering 
support from ministries controlled by other parties within the PT-led coalition.  The 
Ministry of Culture (controlled by the Green Party), the MCT (controlled by the Partido 
Socialista Brasileiro), Ministry of Communications (MC)(controlled by Partido 
Democrático Trabalhista) (see Estado.com.br, 2004; Queiroz, 2003) and MRE headed 
up by a professional diplomat, all expressed public support for F/OSS promotion. 
 
Those F/OSS advocates situated outside the government were able to assist with the 
mobilisation of support for F/OSS within it through their ties.  Such ties facilitated the 
instigation of a week of free software related activity in the legislature in August 2003 
(Costa, 2011: 170).  F/OSS advocates were able to influence support for F/OSS through 
 164 
the FISL too, attracting politicians, such as Gilberto Gil (ibid.) and functionaries, such 
as the head of SEPIN, Arthur Nunes (Nunes, 2011).   
 
The most high profile and strongest ally of F/OSS advocates was the MinC, where the 
Minister, Gilberto Gil became a vocal advocate of F/OSS (Costa, 2011).  Coming to 
learn about F/OSS through the participation of the MinC in the FISL and the activities 
of F/OSS advocates within the government, Gil allied the MinC to the ITI (ibid.).  A 
musician of international renown (Burkeman, 2005; Dibbell, 2004), Gil’s high-profile 
and pop-star credentials meant his support was important to F/OSS advocates for his 
capacity to raise the visibility and popularity of F/OSS amongst the wider public by 
promoting it through wider themes.  Under Gil, the MinC adopted a digital inclusion 
project featuring F/OSS (Kuhn, 2011: 79; Mori, 2011), worked to migrate internal 
systems to F/OSS, engaged with the F/OSS movement online and through the FISL and 
employed hackers and F/OSS activists to implement projects (Costa, 2011; Fonseca, 
2012; Murilo, 2011).   
 
Within the MCT, the head of SEPIN, Arthur Nunes came to support F/OSS after 
attending the FISL (Nunes, 2011).  Nunes had been involved with the development of 
Brazil’s informatics policies from their inception in the 1970s and identifying with the 
ideas of technological autonomy and development, sympathised with Amadeu’s push to 
promote F/OSS (ibid.).  SEPIN’s support for F/OSS advocates was important because of 
its role in defining policy towards IT generally (Sobota, 2011).  Commissioning studies 
into F/OSS’ commercial viability and government use (see Softex, 2005a; 2005b) and 
initiating a project offering business grants for the development of software licensed 
under F/OSS license schemes (FINEP, 2003), Nunes’ support for F/OSS gave it 
credibility (Teza, 2005a).  Heading up one of the areas of the state with which the 
software sector liaised with the government, Nunes’ support for F/OSS was also 
important as a check on the capacity of opponents of F/OSS promotion to influence 
policy.   
 
The MRE came to support F/OSS promotion during preparations for Brazil’s 
participation in the meetings for the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), 
the first meeting of which was held in 2003 (Lopes da Cruz, 2006).  Amadeu’s role as 
advisor to the government on IT policy meant that he played an influential role in these 
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preparations (ibid.), facilitating his ability to shape Brazil’s positions at the WSIS.  The 
MRE pushed for F/OSS to be included in the WSIS declarations (Amorim, 2011; Lopes 
da Cruz, 2006; Rezende, 2011; see SERPRO, 2005), a proposal which was opposed by 
the US and other industrialised nations but which nonetheless helped to raise F/OSS’ 
profile internationally.  In another example of pre-existing policies affecting policy 
choices (see Weir and Skocpol, 1985), support for F/OSS became institutionalised 
within the MRE as officials tended to look back at past decisions when considering 
policy choices (Sobota, 2011).  
 
F/OSS advocates’ capacity to obtain high-level political backing helped protect F/OSS 
promotion from resistance and opposition towards the policy from within as well as 
outside the government.  The role of this backing in protecting F/OSS promotion from 
threats from within the government was demonstrated during the formulation of the PC 
Conectada initiative.  PC Conectada concerned making locally assembled computers 
more accessible to less affluent sections of the population on favourable credit terms 
(Kuhn, 2011: 70; Schoonmaker, 2009).  Within this programme, computers with F/OSS 
installed were to be made available on preferential rates of credit with a view to 
promoting F/OSS (Godói, 2005).  Apart from pressure from Microsoft to ensure 
Windows was adopted in the programme (Cruz, 2005), the proposal to offer machines 
featuring F/OSS available at preferential rates of credit faced opposition from the 
Ministry of Finance on fiscal grounds (Alvarez, 2011; Aquino, 2011).  The Ministry of 
Finance was one of the most powerful ministries in the government and generally well 
placed to impose its preferences upon policy.  However, having been persuaded of 
F/OSS’ development benefits by Amadeu, Lula stood by his decision to favour F/OSS 
and the proposal was approved in spite of opposition from the Ministry of Finance. 
 
The high-level political backing that F/OSS advocates were able to secure was also key 
to warding off opposition from outside the government.  With F/OSS advocates 
possessing influence within the leadership of the executive, senior politicians were coy 
to Microsoft’s entreaties.  In contrast to T2 Argentina, where the President received 
Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer publically to much media fanfare, President Lula avoided 
meeting Bill Gates when the Microsoft founder sought an audience with the Brazilian 
president in 2005 (Kingstone, 2005; Seattle Times, 2005).  
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With political leaders resistant to opposition to F/OSS promotion, opponents had little 
alternative other than to approach each area of the government separately to sound out 
support, a strategy which was more costly and likely to yield partial success at best.  For 
example, Microsoft approached ministries individually to sound out potential sources of 
support within the government (MDIC A, 2011; SEPIN A, 2011), reflecting its limited 
influence at the top of the executive.   
 
Microsoft’s weak influence within the executive was also signalled by the firm’s attacks 
against government support for F/OSS promotion in the media (Cassidy, 2004; 
Microsoft C, 2011; Wired.com, 2003), reflecting its inability to obtain its objectives by 
working with the government directly.   
 
F/OSS advocates’ strong institutional embeddedness not only limited the capacity of 
opponents of F/OSS to stymie its promotion but also prevented them from dislodging 
F/OSS advocates from their positions within the state.  A high profile example 
concerned Microsoft’s attempt to sue Sergio Amadeu for defamation in 2004 over 
comments made in a magazine interview (Cassidy, 2004; Marques, 2004b; Mcmillan, 
2004), an action widely viewed as an attempt to remove Amadeu from the government 
and thus neutralise the threat from F/OSS promotion.  With support for F/OSS spread 
throughout the government, this action backfired spectacularly, instead serving to 
strengthen Amadeu as government supporters of F/OSS offered solidarity publically 
(Estado.com.br, 2004).  Support for Amadeu from government actors emerging at the 
same time as a mobilisation against Microsoft instigated by the PSL (Branco, 2005a; 
PSL, 2004a), the firm dropped its court action in the face of public outcry.  The 
outcome, in the attempt to remove Amadeu, contrasted that in the case of public 
officials associated with F/OSS in T2 Argentina, where similar attempts succeeded.   
 
Whilst high-level partisan sponsorship benefited Amadeu, allowing him to kick-start a 
movement supportive of promoting F/OSS within the Brazilian government, it also left 
his ability to push F/OSS vulnerable in the event that this sponsorship was withdrawn.  
In 2005, Dirceu became embroiled in a scandal which eventually led him to resign as 
Cabinet Chief (Flynn, 2005).  His source of power gone, Amadeu effectively became a 
lame duck in the wake of Dirceu’s departure.  Unable to push through his plans, he left 
the government shortly afterwards (PSL, 2005d).  However, the way in which F/OSS 
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had been taken up within the government, with F/OSS initiatives being distributed 
across and dependent upon different government areas, meant Amadeu’s departure did 
not directly impinge upon the continuation of these initiatives. 
 
Amadeu served a catalytic function, activating support for F/OSS amongst the highest 
tiers of the executive in a way that would likely have been more difficult had F/OSS 
activists been restricted to lobbying from outside the government.  Following his 
departure from the ITI, having generated momentum, the publicity and pressure that 
other F/OSS advocates within the government and those outside it were able to generate 
ensured that high-level support for F/OSS promotion and F/OSS initiatives themselves 
continued. 
 
In the wake of Amadeu’s departure, the actual deployment and use of F/OSS arguably 
increased.  In terms of maintaining the profile of F/OSS within the government, the 
MinC became the principle actor following Amadeu’s departure.  Further to continuing 
with the activities already mentioned above, in conjunction with F/OSS advocates, 
academic institutions such as the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) and internationally 
renowned academics such as Lawrence Lessig, MinC developed a ‘free culture’ 
programme, which promoted the ideas of freedom and sharing embodied in F/OSS 
through initiatives in the wider ambit of culture (Costa, 2011).  In 2007, the SLTI 
launched the Software Publico initiative which made software developed on behalf of 
the government available under a F/OSS license so it might be re-utilised, developed 
and adapted throughout the public sector (Kuhn, 2011: 32; Meffe, 2011; Natal de 
Souza, 2011).  The SLTI also introduced the e-Ping interoperability initiative which 
made use of the open standard ODF format obligatory within the government (Kuhn, 
2011; Santanna, 2011).  Use of the ODF was important in terms of software licensing 
because it permitted use of free/open source office publishing software.  In 2008, ex-
director of PROCERGS, Marcos Mazoni, was appointed president of SERPRO 
(Bagueros and Bagueros, 2008).  Mazoni had directed PROCERGS under the 1999-
2002 government of Olívio Dutra and was recognised as a champion of F/OSS, not only 
for his involvement with F/OSS whilst at PROCERGS, but also for his promotion of 
F/OSS at the state data processing company of Parana, CELEPAR, which he had gone 
on to direct afterwards.  SERPRO was already a large user of F/OSS in both front-end 
(see Schoonmaker, 2007: 1012) and back end systems (SERPRO, 2006).  However, 
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Mazoni’s appointment reflected tacit approval of consolidating F/OSS adoption 
throughout the government even if he was appointed for other reasons.  Whilst SERPRO 
lacked policymaking faculties, as noted above, its strategic significance as a supplier of 
IT services in Brazil meant that decisions on technology adoption taken within SERPRO 
held ramifications for technology use in the wider population.  Shortly after arriving at 
SERPRO, Mazoni instigated the Demoiselle framework, a F/OSS platform to facilitate 
the integration of existing government systems developed in a range of technologies 
(Tema, 2009). 
Resources: Mobilisation of Support for F/OSS Promotion outside the Government 
 
The ties that F/OSS advocates outside the government possessed with actors within 
facilitated their capacity to grow the mobilisation around F/OSS promotion in wider 
society.  Compared to F/OSS advocates’ previous ties with sub-national government, 
ties with the federal government offered greater political influence and resources.   
 
The leading proponents of F/OSS from RS who initially remained outside the 
government continued to mobilise support through the PSL and the FISL.  The partisan 
– and often informal – ties these actors possessed with the federal government were 
crucial to their ability to continue their activities.  At the same time as Lula won the 
presidential elections in 2002, the PT lost the gubernatorial elections in RS.  Under the 
incoming state administration of RS, PROCERGS – up until 2002 the primary source of 
support for the PSL and FISL – withdrew support for these activities (Branco, 2011).  
This withdrawal resulted in the loss of sponsorship but also human and physical 
resources, for example, the time that PROCERGS employees were able to offer during 
their day jobs.  The PT’s winning of power at the national level allowed the PSL and 
FISL to continue by replacing the resources withdrawn locally.  
 
Resources also became available from the neighbouring state government of Paraná 
when PROCERGS’ outgoing director, Marcos Mazoni, was invited by the governor of 
Paraná, Roberto Requião, to take up direction of Paraná’s state data processing 
company, CELEPAR (Mazoni, 2011).  With his control over CELEPAR, Mazoni was 
able to continue supplying material support and play an important role in the 
coordination of the FISL.   
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The resources that those behind the PSL and FISL were able to mobilise through 
sponsorship – around 60% of which originated from public sources (ASL, 2013) – 
enabled them to setup an NGO, the Free Software Association (ASL), staffed with a 
small professional team, to continue coordinating the FISL (Branco, 2011).  Whilst 
those who worked for the ASL were typically participants of the PSL, the PSL itself 
remained a separate, albeit informal entity (Abreu, 2005b).   
 
The ASL was able to garner resources from the federal government for the same reasons 
that PROCERGS managers had instigated the PSL and FISL during the Dutra 
administration.  With F/OSS being adopted across the federal government, government 
actors had interests in fostering collaboration between the state and F/OSS community 
with a view to facilitating the government’s use of F/OSS.  As well as government IT 
administrators with interests in garnering technical knowledge of F/OSS itself, 
politicians and functionaries more generally were interested in the FISL as a source of 
policy ideas and information.  Attracting participation from leading international figures 
from the F/OSS community and academia – the 2004 edition of the FISL attracted 
F/OSS advocate Jon Maddog Hall and law professor, Lawrence Lessig (Teza, 2004b) – 
the FISL offered a view on the latest ideas at the vanguard of thinking on ICT and 
society as well as the technical side of F/OSS.  As noted above, Minister of Culture 
Gilberto Gil and head of SEPIN, Arthur Nunes attended the FISL and they were 
motivated to do so to learn about F/OSS and inform policy formulation (Costa, 2011; 
Nunes, 2011).   
 
Another factor which attracted government participation within the FISL concerned 
political support.  The F/OSS movement included constituencies which did not 
ordinarily support the PT and the ability of the PSL to mobilise these constituencies 
offered opportunities to incorporate them within the government’s support base and thus 
widen it (Branco, 2011).  Recognising the political capital associated with F/OSS, Lula 
was mindful of involving the F/OSS community in government debate of ICT and 
society (Alvarez, 2011).  Demonstrating the value the government placed in F/OSS, 
President Lula and then Cabinet Chief, Dilma Roussef attended the FISL in 2009 
(ASL/PSL, 2009). 
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Leading F/OSS advocates, encompassing a group within the PT which was capable of 
deploying persuasive arguments at the vanguard of academic thought on ICT and 
society – arguments which connected to wider political interests – the value these 
figures held to politicians increased as the political value of social media came to be 
recognised within the political mainstream following the 2008 US presidential elections 
(Castells, 2009: 230).   Within the leadership of the PT, F/OSS advocates and hackers 
came to be recognised as a means to tap the Internet for political support due to these 
actors’ command of debate on ICT and society.  In a signal of this recognition, leading 
F/OSS advocate, Marcelo Branco, was appointed campaign PR chief in Dilma 
Roussef’s 2010 presidential election campaign (Branco, 2011).  
 
Government actors’ interests in the FISL were signalled by their sponsorship and 
support for the event in the second half of the 2000s.22  Figure 5-1 shows a rise in the 
number of government sponsors/supporters over this period, if only slight – the spike in 
2007 is due to the participation of seven municipalities as sponsors.   
 
                                                 
22
 The term ‘support’ derives from ASL’s reporting of the FISL and may entail provision of non-financial 
resources.  However, it may also reflect sponsorship as some government entities were prohibited from 
appearing as sponsors in reports for legal reasons, even though they provided financial resources. 
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Figure 5-1 – Number of Suppliers of Sponsorship and Support for the FISL 
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Sources: ASL/PSL (2007; 2008; 2009); PSL (2005a; 2006). 
 
Figure 5-2, which is not exhaustive, reflects the breadth of public sector organisations 
which sponsored the FISL.  In this figure it can be seen that federal government 
sponsors rose from 8 in 2006 to 12 in 2008. 
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Figure 5-2 – Public Sector Sponsors of the FISL 
 
 Entity 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Federal government 
Banco do Brasil X X X X X 
Caixa Econômica 
Federal 
X X X X X 
Cobra Tecnologia X   X X 
Correiros   X X X 
DATAPREV  X X X X 
Ministério da Ciência e 
Tecnologia 
X X X X X 
Ministério da Cultura    X  
Ministério da Educação X X  X X 
Ministério da Saúde X   X X 
Ministério do 
Desenvolvimento Social 
 X X   
Ministério do 
Planejamento, 
Orçamento e Gestão 
X X  X X 
Ministério do Trabalho e 
Emprego 
  X   
PETROBRAS    X X 
SERPRO X X  X X 
State government 
Assembléia Legislativa 
do Estado do RS 
X     
CELEPAR   X X X 
PROCERGS X X X  X 
Municipal government      
PROCEMPA X X X X X 
Sources: ASL/PSL (2007; 2008; 2009); PSL (2005a; 2006). 
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As well as attracting support and sponsorship from government actors, FISL also 
attracted growing numbers of non-state suppliers of resources.  Figure 5-1 shows that 
increasing numbers of non-state sponsors/supporters allowed the FISL to attract 
growing numbers of sponsors/supporters overall.  Non-state sponsors/supporters 
encompassed universities, unions, charitable organisations and other NGOs as well as 
firms.  Figure 5-3 illustrates that the FISL was able to attract increasing numbers of 
multinational as well as large national private firms as sponsors as the 2000s advanced.  
Participation by large firms suggests provision of greater resources as well as greater 
publicity. 
 
Figure 5-3 - Private Sponsors of the FISL 
 
 Company 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Multinational firms 
Google   X X X 
Hewlett Packard  X   X 
IBM X  X   
Intel   X X  
Oracle     X 
RedHat     X 
Sun X  X X X 
Telefónica    X  
UNISYS X     
Yahoo    X  
Large national private firms 
Globo    X X 
Terra    X  
UOL    X X 
Oi     X 
Sources: ASL/PSL (2007; 2008; 2009); PSL (2005a; 2006). 
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As FISL attracted increasing numbers of actors willing to offer sponsorship and support, 
it was also able to draw growing numbers of participants.  Figure 5-4 illustrates that 
participant numbers almost doubled in the second half of the 2000s.   
 
Figure 5-4 – Participants attending the FISL (2005-2009) 
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Sources: ASL/PSL (2007; 2008; 2009); PSL (2005a; 2006). 
 
The FISL’s increasing numbers of sponsors and participants in the second half of the 
2000s reflect the event’s growing profile as well as increasing size and importance 
during this period.  As the FISL grew, so too did the wider mobilisation around F/OSS, 
a trend which was reflected in the expansion of the PSL.  By 2005, the original ‘PSL-
RS’ had become the ‘PSL Brasil’, and had spawned local networks in most Brazilian 
states (Zúñiga and Couture, 2005).  Whilst the greater resources that the PSL/ASL were 
able to garner through ties to the federal government bolstered their ability to mobilise 
support, they also enabled a nucleus of F/OSS advocates surrounding the original 
instigators of the PSL in RS to remain at the head of this mobilisation and coordinate it. 
 
In general, the movement around F/OSS was able to continue attracting an ever greater 
number and range of actors.  Within this trend, of note was increasing participation of 
private sector actors outside large firms.  The uptake of F/OSS by the federal 
 175 
government generated business opportunities for national SMEs as well as larger firms 
(Tema, 2004b) creating additional impetus for firms of all sizes to participate in the 
FISL.  The rising importance of F/OSS for the local software sector was telegraphed by 
participation of national industry associations such as ASSESPRO and FENAINFO in 
the FISL.  The only sectoral actors which did not take part in the FISL were the ABES 
and the Business Software Alliance (BSA) – actors with interests predominantly located 
in foreign produced PS.   
 
Another set of actors worthy of mention were those linked to academia.  Universities 
generally continued to play an active role in the technical, IT side of the FISL but the 
event also attracted academic participants outside this sphere that enhanced the value of 
the event as a source of knowledge and ideas.  A salient participant in this respect was 
the Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade of the FGV which launched a Brazilian version 
of the Creative Commons license at the 2004 edition of the FISL (Costa, 2011) and 
assisted the ITI with regard to the legal aspects of using F/OSS within the Brazilian 
government (see Falcão et al., 2007).  Together with the World Social Forum – which 
was hosted in Porto Alegre in 2005 and in which F/OSS advocates participated – the 
FISL also attracted leading international scholars of ICT and society such as Manuel 
Castells, Yochai Benkler (PSL, 2005a) and, as noted above, Lawrence Lessig .  The 
participation of such scholars in these events not only helped to attract and inform the 
thinking of policymakers but also assisted leading F/OSS advocates in developing their 
mobilisation tactics online and honing their arguments for adopting F/OSS (Branco, 
2011). 
 
The federal government’s engagement with F/OSS served to increase international 
interest in the FISL as the government’s F/OSS policy drew attention from the media 
around the world (see Benson, 2005; Kingstone, 2005).  Figure 5-5 reflects the rise in 
international participation in the FISL in the second half of the 2000s.  International 
participation in the FISL allowed Brazilian F/OSS advocates to forge links and alliances 
with actors in the wider, international F/OSS community.  Solidarity from the 
international F/OSS community helped strengthen local actors.  An example concerned 
the attempt by Microsoft to remove Sergio Amadeu from the government, which has 
already been mentioned above.  In a move akin to Keck and Sikkink's (1998) 
boomerang effect, F/OSS advocates placed pressure on Microsoft by mobilising 
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opposition to the firm both internationally as well as locally through online publicity 
(PSL, 2004a) and petitions (Branco, 2005a) which quickly gained the attention of 
international media commentators (Cassidy, 2004; Mcmillan, 2004).  
 
Figure 5-5 – Number of Nationalities Reflected in Participation of the FISL (2005-
2009) 
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Sources: ASL/PSL (2007; 2008; 2009); PSL (2005a; 2006). 
 
5.2 Software Sector Cohesion Remains Weak 
 
This subsection considers the strength of opposition toward F/OSS promotion in T2 
Brazil, arguing that whilst the software sector reflected organisation and formal links 
with the government as a legacy of the sector’s development in the 1980s – attributes 
that might ordinarily be expected to enhance the lobbying power of PS advocates 
opposed to F/OSS promotion – cohesion in the Brazilian software sector was weak, 
attenuating PS advocates’ lobbying power.  If the history of the Brazilian sector had 
endowed it with institutional representation, this same history, along with Brazil’s 
expansive geography, also meant this representation reflected heterogeneous interests 
and fragmented organisation.  Heterogeneous interests impeded the construction of a 
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unified sectoral response to F/OSS promotion and undermined PS advocates’ capacity 
to present the interests of the sector as a whole as hinging around imported PS.  
Responses to F/OSS promotion varied across sectoral representatives, both in terms of 
alignment and the degree to which the issue was prioritised.  Each representative’s 
interests intersected software licensing policy differently with responses to F/OSS 
promotion ranging from support through to staunch opposition.     
 
In contrast to Argentina, where the software sector’s concentration in the capital, 
Buenos Aires, facilitated the strengthening of sectoral cohesion as associativism 
increased in the wake of the crisis, in Brazil, regionalism worked to weaken cohesion.  
Although Brazil’s size is not viewed as affecting business organisation in general 
(Schneider, 2004: 39), balkanisation of the software sector along regional lines (Botelho 
et al., 2005: 113) complicated communication and coordination between actors 
representing the sector (ABES B, 2011; ASSESPRO B, 2011). 
 
Sectoral fragmentation also had to do with the way representation of the sector had 
developed historically.  Whilst by the 2000s interests in foreign produced PS dominated 
the Brazilian software sector – local production having been largely supplanted by 
marketing and distribution of imported PS with the opening of the market in the 1990s – 
the organisation of sectoral interests reflected divisions between actors reflecting a more 
nationalist orientation that had grown up around Brazilian firms that had developed 
software products locally and those wedded to the marketing and distribution of 
imported PS.  To complicate these divisions, there also existed differences between 
small and large firms and business models based on products versus services (Botelho et 
al., 2005: 113).  By the mid 2000s, the sector boasted organisations reflecting a range of 
interests, these organisations including employers syndicates and government 
institutions as well as business associations.  The proliferation of sectoral organisations 
meant over-representation of the sector, resulting in inter-organisational competition for 
resources (ASSESPRO A, 2011) and sectoral leadership (FENAINFO B, 2011).  ABES 
offered an example of the effect that inter-organisational competition could have upon 
organisational resources.  Through the 1990s, as the business association most closely 
associated with PS, ABES had benefited from resources contributed by multinational PS 
firms to fight software piracy.  However, in the 2000s, ABES lost these resources when 
the BSA opened a local branch (interviews, 2011).  Of the wide range of actors that 
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represented sectoral interests, several stood out in relation to the issue of software 
licensing policy. 
 
Unsurprisingly, of all the sectoral representatives, with strong interests in PS, ABES was 
most vociferous in its opposition to F/OSS promotion. As well as representing 
Microsoft, ABES represented firms with business models based around the sale of 
products and services linked to Microsoft’s technologies.  With F/OSS presenting the 
greatest threat to PS in market segments where software was characterised by “low 
application specificity” and “high interest in reproduction” (Softex, 2005b: 58–59) – 
segments which represented Microsoft’s core revenue – firms commercialising 
Microsoft’s software had the most to lose from F/OSS promotion.  As a result, F/OSS 
promotion represented a priority for ABES. 
 
ASSESPRO’s response to F/OSS promotion was characterised by indifference, 
reflecting neither great enthusiasm nor great concern.  Officially acknowledging F/OSS 
as offering opportunities for the Brazilian sector (see SERPRO, 2004), the association 
also cautioned that F/OSS offered no panacea for the issues the sector faced (De Luca, 
2007).  If ASSESPRO criticised F/OSS promotion, it was for over emphasis of the issue 
by the government rather than opposition to the policy per se.  The association was 
more concerned with attaining from the government greater support for local firms 
based around national capital in general.  Whilst ASSESPRO contained firms supportive 
of F/OSS promotion, it also contained firms with interests in PS (ASSESPRO A, 2011).  
However, the PS firms the association represented generally operated in areas of the 
market where software was characterised by higher levels of “application specificity” 
and lower levels of “interest in reproduction” (see Softex, 2005b: 58–59).  As a result, 
these firms did not face from F/OSS promotion the same level of threat as those 
represented by ABES.  Aware that F/OSS promotion marked a priority for ABES, 
ASSESPRO left the issue for ABES to address (ASSESPRO A, 2011). 
 
Reflecting a similar response to ASSESPRO, FENAINFO acknowledged in public that 
F/OSS might offer benefits for Brazilian firms, but its coordinators were more 
concerned with gaining policy support for local firms in general (see Bucher, 2007; 
FENAINFO A, 2011).  Coordinated by a team with feet in Softex as well as ASSESPRO, 
FENAINFO’s preferences were not only influenced by proximity to the government per 
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se.  FENAINFO’s coordinators were proximate to ‘nationalist’ IT sectors in both the 
state (the MCT) and private sector and held sympathies for local firms.  Their affinities 
with ‘nationalist’ sectors shared by the PT, these actors were also allied with the party 
(FENAINFO A, 2011).  Viewing opposition to F/OSS promotion as Microsoft’s battle, 
they left Microsoft and its allies to fight it, as in common with those actors with which 
they were aligned, they possessed little sympathy for Microsoft and its interests. 
 
Further diluting sectoral interests, in 2004 there emerged a new sectoral actor: the 
Brazilian Association of Information Technology and Communication Companies 
(BRASSCOM).  BRASSCOM was comprised of IT multinationals and focused on IT 
services such as BPO and call centres (Marques, 2009; BRASSCOM, 2011) rather than 
the commercialisation of software products.  For BRASSCOM, with its core interests 
lying away from the commercialisation of software products, F/OSS promotion did not 
represent a particular priority.  With BRASSCOM’s multinational members including 
IBM amongst other firms with interests in F/OSS as well as Microsoft, the latter was 
not in a strong position to impose a pro-PS spin on the association’s response to F/OSS 
promotion.  Officially, the association expressed that the market should be left to decide 
how software was licensed (BRASSCOM, 2011), but it did little else in response to 
F/OSS promotion. 
 
Affiliated with the MCT, in which there existed support for F/OSS promotion, Softex 
exhibited support for F/OSS promotion.  Although the organisation was not engaged in 
activism, it was through Softex that the MCT conducted investigations to explore 
F/OSS’ participation in the Brazilian market and the opportunities F/OSS might offer 
for the Brazilian software sector (Softex, 2005b; 2005c). 
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Weak Software Sector Coordination 
 
The fragmented organisation of the Brazilian software sector diminished PS advocates’ 
capacity to mobilise the sector against F/OSS promotion.23  Because fragmentation 
impeded coordination generally, it reduced the political weight of the sector as a whole 
– and thus the political weight of actors such as PS advocates within it – vis-à-vis the 
government.   
 
Fragmentation also reduced the capacity of PS advocates to coordinate the sector and 
present sectoral interests as hinging around PS.  The situation in Brazil contrasted that 
in T2 Argentina, where sectoral representation was largely concentrated behind a single 
business association, offering Microsoft a strong hand in sectoral coordination.  In 
Brazil, with Microsoft’s interests represented principally by one business association 
amongst several other actors reflecting nationalist sympathies, the firm’s interests were 
relatively marginalised.  Under such conditions, the arguments of Microsoft and its 
allies that F/OSS promotion was damaging to the local sector and antithetical to its 
development lacked credibility and garnered little sympathy from government.   
 
With preferences toward software licensing policy and degrees of concern over F/OSS 
promotion varying across sectoral representatives, sectoral coordination on the issue 
was generally absent.  The only exceptions occurred when the government threatened to 
mandate the public sector use of F/OSS in 2005 (see Savazoni, 2005).  As such 
proposals would have forced firms supplying software licensed under any other terms to 
‘open’ their software, they threatened firms across the sector, leading to common 
ground upon which a coordinated sectoral response could be mobilised (FENAINFO A, 
2011).  However, the government never followed through with these proposals such that 
when this sectoral coordination occurred, it resulted in little more than statements 
signed by several sectoral representatives before melting away.  
 
                                                 
23
 Within the government as well as across the Brazilian software sector, it was agreed that the varied 
interests and competition amongst sectoral representatives limited cooperation and a coherent sectoral 
voice (ASSESPRO A, 2011; FENAINFO A, 2011; FENAINFO B, 2011; MDIC B, 2011). 
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Fragmentation also allowed F/OSS advocates to mobilise support amongst nationalist 
orientated sections of the sector as observed above.  Such mobilisation simultaneously 
weakened sectoral opposition to F/OSS promotion whilst strengthening the movement 
surrounding F/OSS. 
 
Presenting another contrast to Argentina, PS advocates in Brazil were also unable to 
capture political benefits from the economic performance of the sector as a result of 
sectoral fragmentation.  If anything, Brazil witnessed greater expansion in software 
exports in the mid 2000s than Argentina, where expansion had allowed the sector to 
garner political support from the government.  Between 2003 and 2006, net revenue 
from outward facing, foreign activities in the Brazilian sector grew at 53.2% per year 
(Softex, 2009: 38).  Over the same period, the annual growth rate in software exports in 
Argentina was 48.8%.24  In 2005 and 2006, Brazilian software exports grew around 
40% whilst the rates in Argentina were around 12% and 22% respectively.25  Like 
Argentina, Brazil was a net importer of software products and it can be safely assumed 
that Brazil’s export growth reflected mainly services, as did Argentina’s.  Between 2004 
and 2005, Brazilian firms providing software services witnessed an increase in foreign 
revenue as a share of their total revenue from 2.7% to 3.6% (Softex, 2009: 38).  
However, whilst growth in software exports was apparently greater in Brazil than in 
Argentina, such activity was principally associated with BRASSCOM, the interests of 
which lay away from PS, making it difficult for PS advocates to capture political 
benefits from this growth. 
Government-Sector Relations 
 
Although the Brazilian software sector possessed institutional links with the 
government as a legacy of its history, these links offered PS advocates limited 
opportunities to roll-back F/OSS promotion.  For starters, the sector as a whole reflected 
a limited capacity to garner the government’s attention.  With cooperation limited, the 
sector articulated a voice which was neither coherent nor carried the weight of the sector 
as a whole behind it (Botelho et al., 2005: 113).  From within the government, the 
coordination issues raised by the sector’s weak cohesion were viewed as an obstacle to 
                                                 
24
 Based on data from CESSI. 
25
 Brazilian rates calculated using data from ABES.  Argentinean rates calculated using data from CESSI. 
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working with the sector and formulating policies that the sector wanted (MDIC B, 
2011).   
 
With its weak voice, the government showed relative disinterest in the sector.  Although 
a 2004 announcement that software was to comprise one of four sectors to be included 
in MDIC’s industrial policy (Marques, 2009; MDIC, 2004) suggested reinvigorated 
interest in the sector on the part of the government and hence opportunities for the 
sector to gain greater influence within the government, little action followed the 
announcement (Botelho et al., 2005). 
 
Compounding the sector’s weakness vis-à-vis the government was a divergence 
between the government’s interests and the sector’s performance.  The move to open IT 
markets in the early 1990s not only destroyed a nationalist software constituency which 
had enjoyed political influence.  It also marked an apparent loss of interest in the 
software sector on the part of the government henceforth (ABES B, 2011; see Bucher, 
2007), signalled by the absence of a specific policy toward software through the 1990s 
(Marques, 2009).  This loss of interest accompanied a divergence between what the 
government sought from the software sector and how the sector actually performed.  In 
the 1990s, the government re-orientated IT policy towards boosting exports, yet with 
the opening of the market, software firms encountered easier pickings marketing and 
distributing imported PS in the domestic market.  Failing to significantly increase 
exports through the 1990s and 2000s, the sector instead represented a negative trade 
balance, importing substantially more than it exported (ibid.).  In 2005, the sector 
accounted for imports of 2.2 billion US dollars to exports of just 247 million (ABES, 
2007), importing almost nine times what it exported.  In this light, the sector possessed 
little political leverage over the government as a function of its economic 
characteristics. 
 
PS advocates’ ability to lobby against F/OSS promotion was not only affected by the 
government’s relative disinterest in the software sector generally but also the character 
of government-sector links.  As observed above, with the leadership of the executive 
supportive of F/OSS promotion and resistant to PS advocates’ entreaties, PS advocates 
effectively found themselves locked out of the one area of the government with the 
capacity to determine software licensing policy.  U
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were restricted to seeking political backing from those areas of the government to which 
they did possess access – the MCT and MDIC.  However, these areas offered PS 
advocates few opportunities to halt F/OSS promotion.   
 
The character of the sector’s links with the MCT together with the preferences of the 
actors with which the sector liaised within the ministry reduced PS advocates’ 
opportunities to garner the MCT as an ally.  In formal terms, the sector liaised with 
SEPIN through the CATI, yet the CATI was viewed by the sector as an ineffective forum 
for influencing policy.  Convened at a relatively low level within the ministerial 
hierarchy, one industry commentator referred to it as little more than a ‘talking shop’ 
(FENAINFO B, 2011).  The limited importance of the committee was signalled by the 
low frequency at which it was convened, meetings ceasing completely from 2005 
(SEPIN A, 2011).  In terms of preferences, as observed above, the head of SEPIN was 
supportive of F/OSS such that receptiveness to PS advocates’ arguments was limited.  
However, the MCT more widely was regarded by industry commentators as being 
sympathetic to F/OSS on the basis of the ministry’s putative leanings toward a more 
interventionist state and close ties with the academic sector in which support for F/OSS 
was strong (ABES B, 2011; ASSESPRO A, 2011). 
 
In the MDIC, PS advocates found an actor more amenable to their petitions, the 
Minister of Industry, Luiz Furlan openly questioning the merits of F/OSS promotion 
(PSL, 2005c).  However, both the weight of the MDIC within the government and the 
way in which F/OSS promotion played out prevented the ministry from doing much to 
impede the policy.  Although the MDIC represented the powerful business constituency, 
in relation to the wider government it was not a particularly powerful ministry, as 
signalled by its resources.  Figure 5-6 shows the budgets of a selection of ministries in 
2003 to illustrate the relatively small resources of the MDIC.  In 2003, the MDIC’s 
budget was US$389 million, around a third of the MCT’s US$1.1 billion budget. 
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Figure 5-6 – Budgets of Selected Ministries in 2003 
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Source: Secretaria de Orçamento Federal, MPOG (http://www.orcamentofederal.gov.br/) 
 
Whilst MDIC reflected opposition to promoting F/OSS, it possessed limited capacity to 
influence the policy in the face of backing from the leadership of the executive and 
support distributed throughout the government.  Whilst the ministry lobbied against 
F/OSS promotion within the government, it found itself politically isolated on the issue 
and its opposition was ineffective.  Whilst MDIC supported PS advocates, their support 
was little use.  A former president of ABES conceded that it made little difference 
speaking to the Minister of Industry when F/OSS promotion was coordinated from the 
Casa Civil (ABES A, 2011).   
5.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, it has been argued that a strengthening in F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness at the national level enhanced these actors’ lobbying power, allowing 
them to translate their preferences into policy despite opposition from powerful 
opponents.  Strong embeddedness within incumbent political forces meant F/OSS 
advocates strengthened ties with the government though government appointments and 
partisan ties.  Through these ties, F/OSS advocates were able to acquire support for 
F/OSS promotion from the highest levels of the executive by gaining the ear of political 
leaders and receiving their reciprocation on the basis of political trust.  The high level 
executive support that F/OSS advocates were able to attain allowed them to mobilise 
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support for F/OSS promotion throughout the government.  Strong embeddedness within 
incumbent political forces also enabled F/OSS activists outside the government to 
garner greater resources, facilitating their ability to strengthen wider societal 
mobilisation around F/OSS.   
 
With the software sector fragmented, PS advocates were unable to roll-back the 
promotion of F/OSS.  Weak sectoral cohesion not only diminished PS advocates’ 
lobbying power by reducing the political weight of the sector as a whole.  It also left 
these actors politically isolated within the sector, attenuating their capacity to coordinate 
sectoral interests and portray them as coherent with PS.  As in Argentina, sectoral 
exports grew as a result of activity in IT services.  Yet unlike their counterparts in 
Argentina, multinational PS firms in Brazil were unassociated with this activity 
politically and consequently unable to derive political benefit from it. 
 
The support for F/OSS promotion that F/OSS advocates were able to secure from the 
most powerful figures in the government meant actors opposed to F/OSS promotion 
within the government also found themselves politically isolated.  Whilst F/OSS 
promotion was backed by the presidency and F/OSS initiatives were executed 
independently by actors distributed throughout the government, those few actors 
opposed to the policy were able to do little to prevent it.   
  
Demonstrating the ways in which configurations of interests and institutions 
surrounding software licensing linked with policy choices in T2 Brazil, this chapter has 
illustrated how both sets of factor contributed to the choices that were taken.  Figure 5-7 
shows how combinations of these factors co-vary with policy outcomes across T1 and 
T2 in Brazil.  Comparing periods T1 and T2, it can be seen that a strengthening in 
F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness whilst software sector cohesion remains 
weak is associated with a change from a policy favourable to PS to one that privileges 
F/OSS instead.  This result suggests that the combination of factors found in T2 may be 
sufficient to reverse the asymmetries in lobbying power between F/OSS advocates and 
PS advocates.  
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Figure 5-7 – Combinations of F/OSS Advocates’ Institutional Embeddedness and 
Software Sector Cohesion in T1 and T2 Brazil 
 
 
 T1 (1999-2003) T2 (2003-2010) 
 
  
F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness  
Weak Strong 
Software sector cohesion Weak Weak 
Software licensing policy outcome Favourable to 
use of PS 
Favourable to 
use of F/OSS 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The research has investigated why outcomes in software licensing policy varied in the 
way they did across Argentina and Brazil through the 2000s.  Software may be licensed 
under terms that are either proprietary and closed which prevent appropriation of 
underlying software source code or ‘free’ or ‘open’ which allow appropriation.  By 
affecting the way in which software is licensed, policy holds both political and 
economic implications for development due to the potential this technology offers for 
technological self-reliance as well as its importance to the generation of wealth.   
 
In the 2000s, some governments began promoting F/OSS.  Media commentary and 
academic discussion has suggested that this policy was associated with left-wing 
political bias.  From patterns of policy variation across Latin America, F/OSS 
promotion appeared to co-vary with radical leftist governments.  In view of this putative 
association, policy outcomes in Argentina and Brazil between 2003 and 2010 present a 
puzzle.  During this period, Argentinean governments were popularly viewed as radical 
and leftist, yet they favoured PS across a range of policy areas.  In Brazil, governments 
were leftist but widely regarded to be more moderate and wedded to liberal norms, yet 
they exhibited staunch promotion of F/OSS.   
 
The contrasting policy outcomes analysed here are a consequence of how the lobbying 
capacities of those actors that surround software licensing were affected by institutions 
and the way in which interests were organised.  Where the lobbying capacity of F/OSS 
advocates was mediated by the extent to which they participated – or were ‘embedded’ 
– within institutions, that of PS advocates was conditioned by the level of concentration 
within the organisation of the software sector. 
 
The structure of incentives for collective action around software licensing together with 
the economics of information goods mean PS advocates’ lobbying power – and 
consequently, their capacity to translate their preferences into policy – will ordinarily be 
far greater than that of F/OSS advocates.  This suggests that policy will typically favour 
PS instead of F/OSS.  By mediating actors’ capacities and lobbying power, surrounding 
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configurations of interests and institutions might reverse the balance of power ordinarily 
to be found between PS advocates and F/OSS advocates, raising the likelihood of 
F/OSS promotion.  Institutions may allow weak actors opportunities to become stronger 
by providing resources that lower collective action costs and ties that offer access to 
political decision-makers.  Where F/OSS advocates are embedded within institutions 
such as incumbent political parties and the state, they may thus find it easier to mobilise 
support and lobby politicians.  At the same time, the way in which interests are 
organised may attenuate the power of strong actors by inhibiting their capacity to 
mobilise and coordinate support.  Where the software sector is characterised by lower 
levels of cohesion, the lobbying power of PS advocates may be diminished in this way.   
 
I have argued that the divergence in policy outcomes in Argentina and Brazil post 2003 
corresponded to changes in F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness and software 
sector cohesion in each country.  Pre-2003, policy was favourable to PS in both 
countries and both F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness and sectoral cohesion 
were weak.  Fragmentation in the organisation of the software sector in Brazil and 
limited development of institutional representation of the sector in Argentina meant that 
in both countries, PS advocates’ lobbying capacity was impeded by the limited political 
weight of the sector overall and limited opportunities to coordinate sectoral interests.  
Yet whilst PS advocates’ lobbying capacity was reduced, the absence of pre-existing 
policy intervention over software licensing – due to the fact that awareness of choice in 
software licensing was only just emerging with awakening recognition of F/OSS – 
meant policy favoured PS by default, due to PS’ market dominance.  Although 
mobilisation around FOSS promotion emerged, F/OSS advocates were isolated from 
government and unable to translate their preferences into policy.  In Brazil, 
embeddedness within the state at the subnational level allowed F/OSS advocates some 
success in mobilising support, yet these actors possessed few opportunities to lobby 
politicians incumbent at the national level for lack of partisan ties.  In Argentina, further 
to lacking ties to politicians, F/OSS advocates were able to mobilise only small numbers 
in the face of differences amongst the fractious F/OSS community.   
 
I have contended that policy continued to favour PS under the Kirchner governments 
because of a strengthening of cohesion in the organisation of the software sector, whilst 
F/OSS advocates’ embeddedness within the government and incumbent political forces 
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remained weak.  Aggregation of software sector interests largely beneath a single 
business association facilitated sectoral organisation, enabling the sector to coordinate 
common positions that strengthened its bargaining position vis-à-vis the government.  
Concentration of sectoral interests also boosted PS advocates’ capacity to coordinate 
sectoral representation and present their narrow interests as coherent with the wider 
interests of the sector as a whole.  The relatively strong lobbying position of sectoral 
actors, together with the presentation of sectoral interests as coherent with PS, meant 
sectoral actors came to play an important role in policymaking and that politicians were 
persuaded to adopt policies that favoured PS.  Whilst PS advocates’ lobbying power 
increased, F/OSS advocates’ influence within the government was weak.  Generally 
shunning association with mainstream political parties and the government, F/OSS 
advocates were remote from political decision makers and possessed few opportunities 
to lobby those responsible for policy directly.  F/OSS advocates’ ability to mobilise 
resources was also limited, disinterest in politics in the wider F/OSS community and 
differences between the groups that sought F/OSS promotion resulting in competition 
for scarce resources.  Amongst F/OSS advocates, leftists alienated business actors 
whilst liberals, wary of the leftist government, undermined possibilities to forge bonds 
with incumbent political forces and government affiliated social movements.  With 
F/OSS advocates unable to mobilise support in the wider population, politicians faced 
few incentives for promoting F/OSS and low tradeoffs for maintaining polices which 
favoured PS. 
   
I have asserted that F/OSS came to be promoted by the Lula governments as a result of 
a strengthening of F/OSS advocates’ embeddedness within the government whilst 
cohesion in the software sector remained weak.  In contrast to their counterparts in 
Argentina, Brazilian F/OSS advocates were able to gain appointments high up in the 
government due to their affiliation with the incumbent PT.  Partisan ties and proximity 
to political leaders allowed Brazilian F/OSS advocates to persuade leading members of 
the executive to back the promotion of F/OSS.  Having secured this backing, F/OSS 
advocates were able to mobilise support for F/OSS throughout the government, 
precipitating F/OSS initiatives across a range of policy areas.  Embeddedness within the 
incumbent PT also facilitated F/OSS advocates’ ability to mobilise wider support by 
securing access to resources.  By mobilising a broad coalition encompassing the private 
sector, social movements, universities and other societal actors, F/OSS advocates 
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signalled to politicians that there existed interest in F/OSS in the wider population, 
raising politicians’ incentives to promote F/OSS.  At the same time, fragmentation in 
the software sector reduced the capacity of PS advocates to stymie the uptake of F/OSS 
promotion.  With several representatives, the voice of the sector was generally 
incoherent, reducing the capacity of sectoral actors to lobby the government.  
Representation of sectoral interests by several actors also left PS advocates relatively 
isolated within the sector as PS marked a priority for only one business association.  
Isolation reduced PS advocates’ capacity to present their narrow interests as coherent 
with those of the sector overall as well as mobilise and coordinate the wider sector. 
Research Contributions 
 
In this thesis, I have made two principle contributions to academic knowledge.  The first 
has been to demonstrate through comparative analysis the importance of configurations 
of interests and institutions in explaining software licensing policy.  This has allowed 
me to address a gap in understanding of why software licensing policies vary across 
developing countries in the way that they do.  Existing scholarship has tended to 
emphasise the role of agency and ideas in explaining these policies.  Such an emphasis 
is implicit in Schoonmaker’s (2007; 2009) analyses of the politics surrounding the 
Brazilian government’s promotion of F/OSS, which focus upon rationale and goals in 
explaining F/OSS promotion.  Shaw (2008; 2011) in explanations of F/OSS advocates’ 
ability to precipitate F/OSS promotion in Brazil on the basis of framing, these actors’ 
technical, managerial and political expertise and their ties to politicians and other actors, 
similarly stresses the role of agency and ideas.  The same emphasis is present in 
Kapczynski’s (2008) explanation of mobilisation around F/OSS more generally on the 
basis of framing.  Although insightful, these explanations leave questions unanswered 
as to why policymakers were persuaded to act upon certain ideas over alternatives when 
making policy choices, or, why certain actors prevailed over others in translating their 
ideas into policy.  Privileging the role of agency and ideas, these explanations omit 
mention of other factors that may be equally, if not more important in shaping policy 
outcomes.  By identifying associations between policy outcomes and conditions relating 
to institutions and the organisation of interests I have shown how these factors may be 
more important in driving policy outcomes than ideas and agency alone.   
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The second contribution I have made has been to explicate the mechanisms by which 
interests and institutions may affect policy.  Through within-case process tracing, which 
complements comparative analysis by offering an independent means of establishing 
causal inference, I have provided evidence to show how these causal factors operate and 
interact with one another, allowing me to demonstrate the ways in which both interests 
and institutions may affect policy simultaneously.  In identifying and explicating how 
causal factors operate, I have provided insights that may be tested or inform hypotheses 
in analyses of policy more broadly.   
 
In addition to contributing to understanding of variation in software licensing policies 
across developing counties, I have also addressed the paucity of information 
surrounding the realities of policies by providing empirical evidence collected through 
extensive fieldwork.  Where software licensing policies are discussed in academic 
writing generally, there is a heavy reliance upon online and journalistic sources that may 
be inaccurate or misleading (see Lerner and Schankerman, 2010: 157; Weber and 
Bussell, 2005: 76). 
 
Although the software licensing policies of Brazil have received scholarly attention, 
those of Argentina feature little in academic discourse.  The picture painted of 
Argentinean policies by the media has often been misleading and confusing.  At the end 
of the 2000s, the technology Web site CNET, published a story suggesting the 
Argentinean government was considering promoting F/OSS (see Asay, 2008).  From 
local reporting, it was unclear whether the government favoured such a policy or not, as 
official statements often appeared inconsistent with government actions.  Perhaps the 
starkest reflection of these inconsistencies was the Cabinet Chief’s assurances that free 
software constituted a state policy (CanalAR, 2010), shortly after president Cristina 
Fernandez signalled government enthusiasm for working with PS by receiving 
Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer in a highly publicised meeting in the Casa Rosada 
(Cortina and Torres, 2010).  In contrast to reports that purported the Kirchner 
governments were seriously considering promoting F/OSS, I have found that these 
governments instead resisted such promotion, instead adopting policies that favoured 
PS.   
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The rest of this chapter is devoted to discussing in greater detail the principle 
contributions, observations and ramifications of this research. 
The Importance of Interests and Institutions 
 
Through spatial and longitudinal comparisons of Argentina and Brazil, I have provided 
findings to suggest that outcomes in software licensing policy may be driven by F/OSS 
advocates’ institutional embeddedness and software sector cohesion.  Moreover, my 
findings suggest that different combinations of these causal factors are associated with 
particular policy outcomes.  Although the research findings are specific to the cases that 
have been studied, they permit contingent generalisations.  From the insights that 
within-case analysis has offered into the operation of causal factors, it is possible to 
comment upon how different combinations of these factors affect policy whilst 
discussing covariation. 
 
It will be noted that pre-existing conditions may play an important role in shaping 
policy outcomes in view of the way policy choices in Argentina were conditioned 
through path dependency.  In focusing upon cases where both F/OSS advocates’ 
institutional embeddedness and software sector cohesion start off weak in T1 and where 
one of these factors subsequently becomes stronger in T2, the research offers limited 
insight into how different configurations of these variables in T1 might affect the way in 
which later changes to configurations affect policy outcomes, if at all.  Moreover, the 
possibility for the dynamics surrounding software licensing and the relevance of the 
issue to change at an international level over time, suggests that policies may vary 
through time even where the combinations of factors investigated in this research 
remain constant at the national level.   
 
Figure 6-1 shows covariation between the two explanatory factors and policy outcomes 
in both cases over two time periods.  In T1, weakness on both causal factors co-varied 
with a policy that was favourable to PS.  This combination makes it more likely that 
policy will favour PS as it neither diminishes nor accentuates the power asymmetries 
that ordinarily favour PS advocates over F/OSS advocates.  In T2 Argentina, a 
combination of strong software sector cohesion and weak embeddedness of F/OSS 
advocates within institutions resulted in the same policy outcome as in T1.  This 
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configuration makes it more likely that policy will favour PS because strong software 
sector cohesion strengthens the lobbying power of PS advocates, accentuating the 
power asymmetries between them and F/OSS advocates and reinforcing policy bias in 
favour of PS.  In T2 Brazil, a combination of strong embeddedness of F/OSS advocates 
within institutions and weak software sector cohesion co-varied with a policy outcome 
that was favourable to F/OSS.  Here, the combination makes it more likely policy will 
favour F/OSS because by strengthening the lobbying power of F/OSS advocates – for 
whom such power is generally weak – whilst limiting that of PS advocates, it may be 
sufficient to reverse the balance of power that typically exists between PS advocates and 
F/OSS advocates. 
 
Figure 6-1 – Covariation between Configurations of Causal Factors and Outcomes 
in Software Licensing Policy in Argentina and Brazil between 1999 and 2010 
 
 
 T1 (1999-2002) 
 
T2 (2003-2010) 
 Argentina/Brazil 
 
Argentina Brazil 
 F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
embeddedness 
Weak Weak Strong 
 Software sector cohesion Weak Strong Weak 
 Policy outcome Favourable to use 
of PS 
Favourable to 
use of PS 
Favourable to 
use of F/OSS 
Insights into How Interests and Institutions Shape Policy 
 
Further to identifying associations between policy and configurations of interests and 
institutions, the research has shown how these factors affect policy by explicating the 
mechanisms by which they operate, interact with other variables and work in parallel to 
yield policy outcomes.  Through within-case process tracing, I have provided evidence 
to delineate the causal pathways that link independent variables and policy outcomes.  
This evidence has not only corroborated the associations suggested by the comparative 
analysis but also allowed me to show how both F/OSS advocates’ institutional 
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embeddedness and software sector cohesion matter to policy outcomes.  Below I 
summarize the contributions the research has made to understanding of the ways in 
which interests and institutions influence policy and how these factors may interact with 
ideas. 
The Role of Interests 
 
The research has emphasised the role that surrounding configurations of interests may 
play in shaping actors’ ability to influence policy by explaining how fragmentation in 
the software sector may limit PS advocates’ capacity to mobilise and coordinate sectoral 
interests.  The business interests that PS advocates encompass – including amongst the 
largest corporations in the world – possess a formidable capacity to influence policy, yet 
it has been shown that their power may be attenuated by weak cohesion in the 
organisation of the software sector.  Moreover, as discussed above, the research 
suggests that where weak sectoral cohesion coincides with F/OSS advocates’ strong 
participation within the state, it may be sufficient to offer F/OSS advocates the upper 
hand in shaping policy. 
 
This finding underlines the importance of interest related factors in explaining business’ 
influence over policy.  Due to market concentration, downstream linkages and heavy 
dependence on imported PS in developing countries, it might be expected that 
ordinarily, multinational PS firms would be able to mobilise software sectors in 
developing countries through their economic position.  These firms might also be 
expected to exert a powerful influence over policymaking because of their structural 
position as leaders of the global industry in knowledge goods.  I have presented 
evidence to show that by conditioning these firms’ ability to coordinate sectoral 
interests, shape their presentation and capture political benefit from economic activity 
linked to software albeit unassociated with PS, the organisation of the sector may play a 
more important role than economic or structural power in conditioning their lobbying 
power.   
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The Role of Institutions 
 
My research has contributed to understanding of the role institutions may play in 
shaping policy choice by mediating the aggregation of interests.  The heterogeneous and 
diffuse interests that surround F/OSS together with low awareness of F/OSS in the 
wider public suggest that F/OSS advocates are ordinarily likely to posses little influence 
over policy for their limited ability to mobilise resources and support.  The findings of 
this thesis suggest that through institutions, ordinarily weak actors such as F/OSS 
advocates may overcome the costs of collective action and transform their strength 
through institutional resources.  Institutions have also been found to shape actors’ 
capacities to lobby policymakers as a source of ties that might provide access to those 
that decide policy.  Institutions may also influence PS advocates’ lobbying power by 
affecting cohesion within the software sector.  I have shown that by involving business 
associations in policymaking and offering these actors access to politicians, the state 
may foster greater sectoral cohesion by allowing these associations to provide selective 
benefits, in turn bolstering PS advocates’ capacity to mobilise and coordinate sectoral 
interests. 
 
I have contributed to discussion in the field of comparative political economy of how 
institutions may affect policy choice and politics more broadly by elucidating the ways 
in which collective action may emerge out of the state.  In the comparative political 
economy literature, the state and its institutions are recognised as important in 
conditioning patterns of association and actors’ abilities to translate their preferences 
into policy (Gourevitch, 1986; Haggard, 1990; Hall, 1997; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; 
Schneider, 2004; Streeck and Schmitter, 1985).  Yet despite acknowledgement that 
actors within the state may instigate collective action of their own accord (Schmitter and 
Streeck, 1999: 31) and seek to influence policy independently of wider societal interests 
(Weir and Skocpol, 1985), the actors that form the focus of discussion tend to be 
distinct from the state and attempt to influence policy from outside it.  I have 
highlighted the role that actors situated within the state may play in mobilising interests 
autonomously and shaping policy to match preferences held independently of groups in 
wider society.  This finding calls for greater attention to be paid towards state actors as 
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independent drivers of association and policy choice and the ways in which their 
institutional settings enable or curtail their abilities to achieve objectives.   
 
The research has provided new perspective on the state’s motivations for shaping 
patterns of societal association.  In existing discussion of state mediation of interest 
representation in comparative political economy – discussion which stems from the 
literature on corporatism – mediation tends to be motivated by political concerns of 
reducing opposition, securing support or ameliorating social conflict (Wilson, 1983), 
management and regulation of the market (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Wilson, 1983) 
and goals more narrowly associated with policymaking, such as attaining information, 
improving policy implementation or compliance (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; 
Schneider, 2004).  Recent study has found that the national state might even mobilise 
societal interests with a view to ensuring sub-national levels of the state implement 
national policies where political authority has been decentralized (Rich, 2013).  I have 
found the state might mobilise societal interests with a view to harnessing their 
productive capacity as a source of knowledge and labour – a motive that starkly 
contrasts those discussed in the existing literature on comparative political economy.  In 
Brazil, government sought to mobilise the F/OSS community, private sector and society 
more widely with a view to tapping the benefits of knowledge sharing and peer 
production.  Such mobilisation might be conceived as a form of public good provision.  
Besides reducing the costs of adopting and developing F/OSS within the state – itself a 
public benefit – this mobilisation reduced the costs to the wider population of adopting 
and using F/OSS by removing obstacles to collective action and coordination, thus 
facilitating access to knowledge.  Whilst state mediation of interests around F/OSS in 
Brazil reflects a symbiosis between state and society to be found in forms of such 
mediation that have previously been discussed, it represents a radical departure from 
previously discussed forms in terms of the character this symbiosis takes.  Reflecting 
the logic of peer production, this ‘new’ symbiosis lacks emphasis upon controlling or 
extracting political support from society on the part of the state.  The object of the 
exchange is to obtain an economic benefit, yet due to the emergent properties of peer 
production, each side stands to gain more than they put in.  Bearing important 
development ramifications and embodying an innovative alternative to neoliberal 
prescriptions on how developing countries might capture the benefits of ICT, state 
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mobilisation around F/OSS in Brazil deserves further investigation to better understand 
its dynamics and benefits.  
 
In the case of both F/OSS advocates and PS advocates, where institutions facilitate 
mobilisation by providing resources, it has been found that they might activate positive 
feedback.  By aggregating interests and fostering unity through the resources they 
provide, the state may strengthen actors’ capacity to mobilise and coordinate interests.  
This in turn may facilitate actors’ capacity to obtain additional resources from the state, 
further strengthening mobilisation.  The positive feedback that can occur where 
mobilisation is strengthened by the state may result in path dependency by entrenching 
the power of particular interests, thereby increasing their power to block policies they 
oppose.  In Argentina, by involving the software sector in policymaking and offering 
political access, the government activated a feedback loop that strengthened sectoral 
cohesion and in turn, PS advocates’ lobbying power.  By strengthening a pro-PS 
constituency, the government constrained future policy choices.  Whilst official 
statements suggested the government might have liked to promote F/OSS, the strength 
of PS advocates prevented this. 
 
The research has demonstrated that actors’ capacities are conditioned by the topography 
of institutional structures and actors’ situation in relation to this topography – either 
outside of or inside institutional structures.  The way policy towards software was 
handled by the state, the way responsibility for software was distributed across areas 
within the state, the resources and faculties these areas possessed and the character of 
the institutional links between state actors and the software sector – all these factors 
mediated the capacities of sectoral actors to influence policy in both Argentina and 
Brazil.  In Argentina between 1999 and 2002, and in Brazil both prior to and after 2003, 
PS advocates’ influence over policy was impeded either by the absence of institutional 
ties to the state or ties that linked these actors to the state, yet linked them to areas that 
either lacked sympathy for PS advocates’ interests or possessed limited power to 
determine policy.  In Brazil, F/OSS advocates’ capacity to translate their preferences 
into policy was facilitated by their situation or ties to the highest levels of political 
authority and areas of the state possessing levers over policy connecting to software 
licensing.  Where figures of political authority helped legitimise and mobilise support 
for F/OSS promotion, areas of the state responsible for administering or formulating 
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policy towards IT ensured the policy was viable, by carrying it out.  The distribution of 
support for F/OSS and F/OSS initiatives across the Brazilian government together with 
support from the highest levels of the executive also impeded the capacity of 
government actors opposed to F/OSS promotion to reverse this policy. 
The Role of Ideas 
 
The research contributes to understanding of the way ideas matter to policy choice by 
explicating the interrelationships between ideational factors on the one hand, and 
interest and institutional factors on the other, and showing how the impact that ideas 
might have upon policy is contingent upon surrounding interests and institutions.  
 
I have presented findings that show how interests may condition the effect that ideas 
might have upon policy by mediating the availability of ideas.  In the cases studied, it 
was the ideas of those actors most successful in mobilising a wider constituency and 
forging ties with political decision-makers that came to influence policy.  In Argentina, 
where strong cohesion in the software sector facilitated sectoral mobilisation and 
sectoral representatives forged close ties with politicians, the ideas of sectoral 
representatives informed policy toward IT generally as well as software licensing.  In 
Brazil, where F/OSS advocates were successful in mobilising the wider public and 
enjoyed the confidence of senior politicians, F/OSS advocates’ ideas influenced policy 
debate with relation to technology, IP and society generally in addition to software 
licensing policy. 
 
The research has shown how, as with actors’ capacities, the availability of ideas in 
informing policy decisions is also conditioned by institutional structures and actors’ 
situation in relation to them, or inside them.  For F/OSS promotion to emerge, there not 
only needs to exist support from political leaders but also buy-in from technical 
personnel to make the policy viable.  It has been found that institutional configurations 
may facilitate or inhibit possibilities for F/OSS promotion to emerge by separating or 
uniting the necessary desire for such a policy, technical expertise to carry out and 
implement it and political authority to push its adoption through. 
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In Argentina, mutual separation of the motivation to promote F/OSS, technical 
knowledge in IT and political authority reduced politicians’ access to ideas and 
knowledge concerning the political ramifications of software licensing.  At the same 
time, PS advocates’ strong participation in policymaking privileged awareness and 
understanding of software licensing in terms of the financial costs associated with 
adopting and using software.  This imbalance in the supply of ideas privileged a framing 
of F/OSS as ‘free beer’, in which F/OSS was understood as little more than a means to 
avoid paying license fees for PS. 
 
In Brazil, the motivation to promote F/OSS, technical knowledge in IT and political 
authority were unified, providing politicians access to ideas and knowledge relating to 
the political ramifications of software licensing.  At the same time, PS advocates’ 
relatively weak influence over policy diminished the prevalence of their presentation of 
the software licensing debate.  The balance in the supply of ideas in Brazil privileged a 
framing of F/OSS as ‘free speech’, in which F/OSS was understood as a means to 
promote democracy and autonomy.  
 
The research has presented findings to suggest that institutions influence opportunities 
for political mobilisation through the ideas that are embedded within them.  In Brazil, 
F/OSS advocates were able to mobilise support for F/OSS promotion within the state by 
framing F/OSS in the context of the ideas, values and goals of an incumbent political 
party.  It has also been found that the ideas embedded within institutions influence 
policy choices by conditioning which choices are viewed as attractive.  In Brazil, 
politicians viewed F/OSS promotion as desirable because of the perceived coherence 
between the philosophy of free software and partisan ideas and goals. 
 
As well as showing how interests and institutions may affect the propensity of ideas to 
influence policy choices and mobilisation, the research has also demonstrated how ideas 
may shape opportunities for mobilisation.  Through framing, ideas influenced the 
success of wider societal mobilisation around F/OSS promotion in both cases examined.  
Through framing, Brazilian F/OSS advocates exploited ideas to overcome the 
informational asymmetries that militate against the recognition of interests in F/OSS 
within the wider public.  By framing F/OSS in the context of values and ideas such as 
democracy and empowerment, F/OSS advocates were able to garner the support of the 
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wider public, including poorer sections of society that represented important 
constituencies for their size.  In Argentina, F/OSS advocates’ association with 
conservative political forces linked with the country’s economic woes at a time of crisis, 
served to reduce the likelihood of wider support for F/OSS promotion.  By coming to be 
associated with political forces widely viewed as inimical to democracy and social 
mobility, F/OSS was framed in a way that served to alienate wider public support, 
especially amongst poorer sections of the population that represented an important 
constituency. 
 
The research has provided insight into the way in which ideas themselves might affect 
policy choice.  In Argentina, the apparent utility of promoting F/OSS was low in the 
context of a presentation of the software licensing debate as one about the financial 
costs of using software and a framing of F/OSS as ‘free beer’.  Where software was 
socially accessible due to the prevalence of pirate PS and PS vendors had the capacity 
and faced incentives to lower their prices where software was used within the state, 
viewing software licensing through the prism of financial costs meant there was little 
apparent utility in promoting F/OSS.  
  
In Brazil, the apparent utility of promoting F/OSS was high in the context of a 
presentation of the software licensing debate as one about the political dimensions of 
software as well as the wider economic benefits of peer production and a framing of 
F/OSS as ‘free speech’.  With cognisance of the way in which software intersected 
democracy and autonomy, F/OSS was recognised as offering clear benefits over PS.  In 
this context, PS advocates’ arguments, based around the financial costs of using 
software, possessed little purchase. 
Insight into How Interests and Institutions may affect Software Licensing Policy in 
Combination with Political Bias 
 
The insight the research provides into how different combinations of F/OSS advocates’ 
institutional embeddedness and software sector cohesion affect policy informs 
hypotheses as to the way in which these factors might interact with political bias.  From 
policy outcomes in wider Latin America, it appears that the importance of political bias 
as a driver of policy outcomes tends to increase where political bias is more pronounced 
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either towards the left or the right.  Where political bias is less pronounced in either 
direction, the factor appears less important in driving policy outcomes.  It would seem 
that where political bias is strong, ideas and agency are maybe the primary factors in 
explaining policy outcomes and that where it is weak, configurations of interests and 
institutions replace ideas and agency as the main explanatory factors. 
 
If such an interaction exists between ideas and agency on the one hand and interest and 
institutional factors on the other, it is possible that the configurations of F/OSS 
advocates’ institutional embeddedness and software sector cohesion that existed in 
Argentina and Brazil post 2003, in both countries militated against the policy outcomes 
that political bias in these countries may have otherwise yielded. 
 
Under the Kirchners, it could be said that a strengthening of software sector cohesion 
countered the effects of a ‘wrong left’ political bias that might have otherwise 
precipitated F/OSS promotion, even in the absence of F/OSS advocates’ strong 
institutional embeddedness.  The instigation of F/OSS initiatives by government IT 
administrators and official declarations in favour of F/OSS suggest that had PS 
advocates’ lobbying power not risen in T2, F/OSS might well have been promoted by 
the Kirchner governments. 
 
If the balance of power between PS and F/OSS advocates meant F/OSS promotion was 
resisted under the Kirchner governments in spite of a leftist political bias that suggested 
F/OSS would be promoted, the balance of power between these two sets of actor during 
the Lula governments meant F/OSS was promoted in spite of a more market-orientated 
political bias that suggested the policy would be resisted.  Under the Lula governments, 
it could be said that a strengthening in F/OSS advocate’s institutional embeddedness 
countered the effects of a ‘right left’ political bias that might otherwise have resulted in 
the maintenance of policies favourable to PS.  Had F/OSS advocates not enjoyed strong 
ties to leading members of the executive, there is little to suggest that F/OSS promotion 
would have been taken up as a policy. 
 
If ideas and agency appear to take on greater importance in driving policy outcomes 
where political bias is more pronounced, they are likely to matter to policy under such 
circumstances for different reasons, depending upon whether such bias is to the left or 
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the right.  Where governments reflect a strong orientation to the left, F/OSS promotion 
may be more likely because such governments find (or at least perceive) themselves to 
be in a stronger position politically vis-à-vis business actors than those that reflect a 
more moderate leftwing bias.  To win and maintain power in the face of opposition 
from pro-market sectors, such governments may be expected to possess a stronger 
capacity to resist opposition from PS advocates – or else care less about doing so – than 
those that are more moderate.  The radical leftist governments of Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador – those that went furthest in South America in 
forcing the adoption of F/OSS – governed from positions of strength.  Both presidents 
enjoyed popular mandates, winning elections by significant margins, and benefited from 
the disarray that characterised party systems in their respective countries (Conaghan, 
2011; López Maya, 2011).  Moreover, they also benefited, albeit to a lesser degree in 
the case of Correa in Ecuador, from oil revenues at a time when oil prices were high 
(Panizza and Philip, 2014; Weyland, 2011), strengthening their capacity to ward off 
opposition both at home and abroad.  Governments with a strong leftist bias may 
therefore reflect a higher propensity to promote F/OSS not just because of consistency 
between partisan ideas and the benefits that F/OSS might provide.  Perhaps a more 
important factor in driving policy outcomes in such contexts concerns these 
governments’ political strength, such that governments promote F/OSS ‘because they 
can’. 
 
Where governments reflect a strong orientation to the right, the logic contained within 
ideas themselves is likely to be the principle driver of policy choices.  Even where the 
political ramifications of software licensing are recognised by politicians of a more 
liberal or conservative disposition, these ramifications may be of less concern for the 
values and ideas that these politicians hold.  Conservative politicians are more likely to 
subscribe to a narrower, institutional definition of democracy such that there exists little 
appreciation for the notion of expanding democracy to software.  Politicians on the right 
are also more likely to be closely aligned to the US, such that independence from US 
interests does not represent a priority.  Although right of centre legislators submitted 
F/OSS related legislative proposals at the national level in both Argentina and Brazil – 
none of which were approved – these projects offer little indication as to whether a right 
of centre executive would have backed them.  Whilst right of centre politicians sitting in 
legislatures have interests in submitting legislative proposals that raise their political 
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profile, these politicians are unlikely to support policies that upset constituencies that 
typically support right of centre political forces, such as the business constituency, when 
in power.  As the politicians that submitted F/OSS related legislative proposals in 
Argentina and Brazil were sitting in legislatures at the time and their projects failed to 
gain approval, it remains untested as to whether they would have pushed these 
proposals through had they been in power.  Over and above whether rightist politicians 
see merits in F/OSS, their ideas on the role of the state suggest they are unlikely to 
advocate market interference on behalf of promoting F/OSS.  Furthermore, as has been 
touched upon in Chapter 2, on the basis of free market arguments to which liberals are 
likely to adhere, F/OSS should require no assistance from the state if it is cheaper and 
technically superior to PS. 
Insight into How Policy May be Affected Where Both F/OSS Advocates’ 
Institutional Embeddedness and Software Sector Cohesion are Strong 
 
Due to the power asymmetries between PS and F/OSS advocates, it may be speculated 
that as in the case where both F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness and 
software sector cohesion are weak, policy is also more likely to favour PS where both 
these factors are strong.  However, unlike the scenario where both factors are weak – a 
scenario in which there is a lower likelihood that politicians will appreciate benefits in 
promoting F/OSS due to informational asymmetries – where both factors are strong, 
politicians are more likely to be savvy of the possibilities F/OSS offers because there is 
a greater likelihood that they will have been in contact with and exposed to the ideas of 
F/OSS advocates.  In considering how such a configuration might affect policy 
outcomes, it may be instructive to consider the case of Peru.   
 
Whilst detailed empirical knowledge of the Peruvian case has not been gathered, from 
academic discussion (Chan, 2004), an interview with a Peruvian F/OSS advocate 
(Yucra, 2011) and informal discussions with several other participants in the Peruvian 
F/OSS community, it is known that F/OSS advocates actively engaged with the drafting 
of legislative proposals for F/OSS to be promoted in the early 2000s.  These proposals 
prompted opposition from the US ambassador to Peru as well as from Microsoft (Chan, 
2004).  Yet rather than failing to reach a vote – as occurred with projects in Brazil as 
well as in Argentina – the Peruvian project was eventually approved and signed into law 
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(Congreso de la República del Perú, 2005; Presidencia de la República del Perú, 2006), 
albeit after significant revision.  Instead of promoting F/OSS, the eventual law instead 
demanded observation of neutrality where software was procured or adopted by 
government, including consideration of licensing.  Intriguingly, the law was applauded 
by both the F/OSS community (APESOL, 2005) – which described it as “favourable to 
F/OSS” – and IT industry associations responsible for representing PS firms (Katopis 
and Galan, 2009), suggesting both F/OSS and PS advocates regarded the law as 
coherent with their interests.  As argued in Chapter 1, a neutral policy is unlikely to 
make a significant difference to the prevalence of different licensing schemes.  By 
definition, such a policy seeks to ensure decisions are based on the market and as PS 
firms generally dominate the market, they would appear to be the primary beneficiaries.  
The practical upshot of an explicitly neutral policy is likely to be equivalent to a policy 
characterised by non-action – an implicit neutral stance – or one which actively 
promotes PS albeit without expressing the fact.  An explicitly neutral policy does 
however differ to these other policies in that it acknowledges software licensing as an 
issue. 
Wider Application of Explanatory Framework 
 
Although the theoretical framework adopted in this research has been used to explain 
outcomes in software licensing policy, it may be used as a basis for analysing policy 
choices more widely.  Whilst power asymmetries between activists and business 
interests may be particularly pronounced in the case of software licensing because of the 
high levels of concentration that tend to characterise markets in information goods, the 
balance of power between these two sets of actor – and, likewise, between consumers 
and producers (Gourevitch, 1996) – typically tends to be asymmetrical because of the 
costs of collective action as well as informational asymmetries.  In view of the impact 
that surrounding configurations of interests and institutions might have upon these 
dynamics, my theoretical framework is suited to analysing policy in other areas that 
exhibit struggle between activists or consumers and business interests.   
 
With regard to software licensing policy specifically, the relationships between policy 
and explanatory factors uncovered in this study, together with those hypothesised to 
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exist between interest and intuition based factors and political bias, may be tested in a 
large-N cross-case study.   
Research Implications 
 
The power asymmetries to be found between activists and business actors more widely   
mean the research findings also bear relevance for activism in general as well as that 
relating to F/OSS and related issues at the juncture of informational goods, technology 
and society.  The role that institutions have been shown to play in bolstering F/OSS 
advocates’ ability to influence policy suggests activists’ generally stand to gain from 
participating within them.   
 
With regard to F/OSS specifically, although partisan bias may affect choices in software 
licensing policy by influencing whether the opportunities F/OSS provides are deemed 
valuable and whether or not the state should intervene in promoting F/OSS and if so, 
how, F/OSS advocates’ institutional embeddedness is likely to play a key role in 
deciding whether politicians recognise opportunities in F/OSS in the first place.   
 
It is implicit in emphasising the importance of institutional embeddedness to F/OSS 
advocates’ chances of translating preferences into policy that winning over the 
executive branch of government largely determines whether these actors will be 
successful in achieving their goals.  The executive appears all the more important in this 
respect in light of the research findings that F/OSS advocates were unable to advance 
their policy goals through the legislative branch in either Argentina or Brazil.  The 
failure of F/OSS related legislative projects to gain approval at the national level in 
Argentina and Brazil reflects the odds against F/OSS promotion emerging from the 
legislative branch.  The institutional checks and balances that exist within legislatures 
and between the legislative and executive branch, together with multinational PS 
vendors’ ability to influence legislative actors through lobbying, suggest that without 
the backing of the executive and strong support within the legislature, congressional 
projects have little hope of succeeding.  Outside the executive’s capacity to veto 
legislation, its role in implementing policy mean its support is essential if F/OSS is to be 
promoted. 
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My findings suggest that political parties are likely to represent especial opportunities 
for actors seeking F/OSS promotion because they might raise the likelihood that 
politicians will reciprocate on the basis of partisan trust.  The extent to which F/OSS 
advocates will be able to realise their goals through political parties is contingent on 
many factors, not least their situation within parties and the way in which the party itself 
operates.  Yet if political parties present opportunities for F/OSS advocates to advance 
their aims, they may also present threats.  In Argentina, association with political forces 
that were unpopular only served to undermine wider mobilisation of support for F/OSS.  
There is a possibility where F/OSS promotion comes to be identified as a partisan 
project, that F/OSS promotion is resisted or dropped where opposing political forces 
hold or take power.    
Policy Implications 
 
The research findings suggest that whilst stronger state capacity in the area of IT 
administration might enhance governments’ ability to adopt F/OSS autonomously (i.e. 
without the need to buying in IT solutions from the private sector), weak capacity in this 
area does not preclude the state’s capability to do so.  Although state capacity 
contributed to the emergence of F/OSS promotion in Brazil – institutions with technical 
personnel increasing the potential for F/OSS to be developed and deployed in-house – 
promotion was facilitated by organisational innovation in the guise of the PSL rather 
than state capacity per se.   
 
In RS, despite the state capacity that existed, the PSL was launched to facilitate the 
adoption and development of F/OSS by harnessing the benefits of knowledge sharing 
and peer production.  The initial objectives of the PSL were comparable to those of the 
FRI in Argentina, which played a similar role, albeit restricting the pooling of 
knowledge and peer production to the confines of the state.  The fact that both these 
initiatives were conceived in response to resource shortages suggests they were 
motivated out of weak rather than strong institutional capacity.  In the case of the FRI, 
which was instigated in a context of massive cuts to state spending in the lead up to one 
of the worst economic crises of recent times, F/OSS was viewed as an opportunity to 
overcome acute resource shortages.  The examples of the PSL and FRI and the setting of 
these initiatives in contexts in which state capacity was relatively weak signals that even 
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governments with weak institutional capacity might extract benefits from F/OSS 
through organisational initiatives to promote knowledge sharing and tap peer 
production. 
 
As already touched upon above, the case of Brazil is also informative in demonstrating 
how the state might utilise F/OSS to garner wider development benefits.  The example 
of the FISL shows how the state might encourage synergies between promoting 
economic activity, stimulating research and development, advancing education more 
widely and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the state.   
Software Licensing and Development 
 
At the time of writing, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, F/OSS no 
longer captures the headlines in the way that it did in the 2000s.  Yet, the bearing 
software licensing holds for development is greater than ever.  As ICTs continue to be 
promoted as a source of empowerment and welfare in developing countries, the degree 
to which ICTs actually bring about empowerment and improve welfare will hinge upon 
the way in which software is licensed.  As software ever increasingly underpins the 
operation and functions of the state, productivity of the economy, technological and 
scientific advancement and social interaction, the rules inscribed within software are 
coming to embody programmes for development itself.  By controlling access to these 
rules and by extension the ability to formulate them, software licensing determines 
whether the shape and meaning of development is determined by developing countries 
themselves or imposed from outside. 
 
The centrality of software to the operation of technology generally means that software 
licensing determines whether those who use and who are subject to technology may 
mould it to their own design or work within the parameters set by someone else; it 
determines whether users of technology take an active role in mastering, inventing and 
producing technology for themselves or remain automaton consumers.  Ultimately, it 
determines whether people control technology or technology controls them. 
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In the wake of Stuxnet26 and the Snowden revelations, the ramifications that software 
licensing holds for sovereignty have never been more apparent.  Snowden’s revelations 
have also highlighted the implications software licensing bears for human rights, civil 
liberties and democracy.  As software comes to pervade more and more areas of daily 
life, the possibilities that software offers to monitor, track and regulate populations 
mean opportunities for social surveillance and control have never been greater.  Where 
software is used by organisations and institutions – not least the state – and underlying 
source code is licensed in a way that prevents public oversight, there is no way of 
holding organisations and institutions to account.  When populations and social 
behaviour may be more effectively controlled through software code than through any 
legal institution, if software code is not subject to public scrutiny then democratic 
institutions are meaningless.  With software increasingly undergirding social activity 
and the state’s capacity to govern, freedom and democracy hinges upon the way in 
which software is licensed. 
 
Whilst proprietary licensing schemes present a fundamental threat to autonomy, 
freedom and democracy, possibilities for users of software to move away from PS have 
never been greater.  As the range of software licensed under free/open source terms 
constantly widens and the quality and usability of this software perpetually improves, 
the costs of switching to F/OSS are lower than ever.  Whilst for end users these 
switching costs were sometimes significant at the beginning of the 2000s, in the mid 
2010s it is possible to perform all general computing tasks using F/OSS that supplies 
the same functionality and ease of usability to be found in equivalent PS.  For 
institutional users of IT, as demonstrated by the examples of the PSL and FRI, 
knowledge sharing and peer production offer opportunities to adopt and develop F/OSS 
even where technical knowledge and resources are scarce.
                                                 
26
 A piece of software allegedly developed by the US and Israel to disrupt Iran’s nuclear programme 
(Sanger, 2012; Times of Israel, 2013; The Guardian, 2013). 
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8 Appendix 1 – Software licensing policies and initiatives in Latin America 
 
Note: All policies and initiatives listed are national government level. 
 
Dagger indicates a de facto policy, where a statement of intent, action or inaction raises clear and direct implications for the way in which 
software is licensed yet where acknowledgement of these implications may be absent. 
 
Italics denote Spanish or Portuguese language. 
 
ID Country Institution / Agency Name Type Description Date 
1 Argentina Secretaría para la 
Tecnología, la 
Ciencia y la 
Innovación 
Productiva/Secretaría 
de Comunicaciones 
argentin@internet.todos† 
(subsequently Programa 
Nacional para la Sociedad 
de la Información); Centros 
Tecnológicos Comunitarios 
Social access to 
ICTs 
Telecentre project involving PCs with Microsoft Windows installed. 
1,350 centres were planed throughout Argentina.1 
1999 –
2010 
2 Argentina Secretaría de 
Ciencia, Tecnología e 
Innovación 
Productiva, Banco de 
la Nación 
Argentina Digital† Social access to 
ICTs 
Scheme to offer PCs on preferential rates of credit to facilitate social 
access to ICTs.  The PCs came with Microsoft Windows 98 
installed.2 
2000 
3 Argentina Ministerio de 
Trabajo, Empleo y 
Seguridad Social 
Plan Mas+† (2006-7); Plan 
Entertech† (2006-7); Plan 
InverTI en Vos† (2007); 
Plan Entertech II† (2008); 
Plan Becas CTRL-F† (2009-
11); laboratorios 
informaticos† (2010) 
Economic Several initiatives in which the MTEySS worked with CESSI, 
Cisco, IBM, Microsoft, Oracle and Sun Microsystems to offer 
training courses in programming and software development.  The 
courses encompassed training in the proprietary technologies of the 
firms listed.  Through the ‘laboratotios informaticos’ initiative, the 
MTEySS offered training in IT skills to facilitate IT literacy in the 
general workforce.  The training offered was based on Microsoft’s 
proprietary software.3 
2006 –  
2010 
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national government commenced in 2000, with the submission of a 
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(5613-D-00).  In light of this debate, it may be assumed that from 
the beginning of the 2000s, the government has adopted a neutral 
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7 Argentina Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores 
WSIS declaration Foreign policy The Argentine delegation to the World Summit on the Information 
Society opposed mention of free software in summit declarations.7 
2003/ 
2005 
8 Argentina Banco de la Nación 
(and other Banks), 
Ministerio de 
Economía 
Programa Mi PC† Social access to 
ICTs / Economic 
Scheme to offer PCs on preferential rates of credit to facilitate social 
access to ICTs.  Initiative also involved the local assembly of 
hardware with a view to stimulating local economic activity.  The 
initiative involved Microsoft and Intel.8 
2005 
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9 Brazil 
 
Ministério da 
Educação 
ProInfo Education ProInfo, a federal government funded computers for schools 
initiative, was initiated in 1997 under the government of Fernancdo 
Henrique Cardoso.  In 2004, under the first Lula government, the 
PCs were supplied with F/OSS installed.9 
2004 
10 Brazil Executive N/A† Government 
software use / 
Economic 
Official statements on position unknown; apparently no 
intervention. 
1999 – 
2002 
11 Brazil Instituto Nacional de 
Tecnologia da 
Informação, Casa 
Civil 
Recommended use of free 
software 
Government 
software use 
A 2003 decree on electronic governance instituted a committee for 
the implementation of free software within the federal government.  
An internal memo from the cabinet chief recommending the use of 
free software was circulated in 2003.10 
 
2003 – 
2010 
12 Brazil Casa Civil PC Conectado (later 
Computador para Todos) 
Social access to 
ICTs / Economic 
Scheme to offer computers on preferential credit to facilitate social 
access to ICTs.  The initiative also sought to stimulate economic 
activity through local hardware assembly.  Computers with F/OSS 
installed were available on cheaper finance than available for 
computers with PS installed.11  
2005 
13 Brazil 
 
Ministério do 
Planejamento, 
Orçamento e Gestão 
(SLTI) 
Software Público Government 
software use  / 
Economic 
Initiative to license software developed on behalf of government 
available under F/OSS terms with view to harnessing the benefits of 
peer production and increasing public sector efficiency through 
software re-use.12 
2007 
14 Brazil 
 
Casa Civil, 
Ministério da 
Cultura, Ministério 
das Comunicações, 
Ministério da 
Ciência e 
Tecnologia and 
others 
Digital inclusion telecentre 
projects 
Social access to 
ICTs 
Multiple telecentre projects including Casa Brasil (Casa Civil), 
Pontos da Cultura (MinC), GESAC (MC) and others.  The 
computers in these projects used F/OSS.13 
2003 
15 Brazil Ministério da Ciência 
e Tecnologia (SEPIN, 
CNPq, FINEP) 
Programa de Apoio à 
Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento 
Tecnológico em Software 
Livre 
Economic 4 million reales allocated to fund private sector software projects 
licensed under F/OSS terms.14 
2003 
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16 Brazil Ministério das 
Relações Exteriores 
WSIS declaration Foreign policy The Brazilian delegation to the World Summit on the Information 
Society pushed for mention of free software and the opportunities it 
offers for development to be included in summit declarations.15 
2003/ 
2005 
17 Chile Executive Technological neutrality Government 
software use 
In 2007, the lower chamber of the Chilean legislature issued a 
statement calling upon the executive to observe principles of 
“technological neutrality”.  Microsoft and international IT trade 
body, CompTIA, have reported that the Chilean government 
observes technological neutrality with regard to IT policy generally.  
Chile has also agreed to observe “technology neutral” principles in 
policies and regulations under a 2006 declaration made by the 
APEC Committee on Trade and Investment.16 
1999 – 
2010 
18 Chile Ministerio de 
Educación de Chile 
and Fundación Chile 
Educarchile† Education Ministry of Education Web portal partnered with Microsoft to train 
teaching staff IT literacy and pedagogic use of IT.17 
2006 
19 Colombia Executive Technological neutrality† Government 
software use 
Official statements on position unknown; apparently no 
intervention.  International IT trade body, CompTIA, has reported 
that the Colombian government observes technological neutrality 
with regard to government IT acquisition.18 
1999 – 
2010 
20 Colombia Ministerio de 
Educación Nacional 
Computadores para 
Educar† 
Education Computers for schools initiative.  Ministry of Education partners 
with Microsoft via its Alianza por la Educación initiative to train 
teaching staff in IT literacy and use of IT for pedagogic purposes.19 
2001 
21 Cuba Executive N/A Government 
software use 
Cuba appears to have been amongst the first countries in Latin 
America to express interest in adopting F/OSS, with a workshop on 
F/OSS adoption involving representatives from other Latin 
American countries being staged in Havana in 2001.  During this 
event, the Cuban government stated a preference for the use of 
F/OSS and announced planned migrations.  Government launched a 
free software Web portal in 2006.20 
2001 – 
2010 
22 Ecuador Presidency Decreto 1014 Government 
software use 
Mandate to use F/OSS in public sector.21 2008 
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23 Mexico Secretaría de 
Comunicaciones y 
Transportes 
e-Mexico Social access to 
ICTs 
E-government programme created with a view to coordinating e-
government initiatives throughout the federal government.  This 
initiative included promoting social access to ICTs through 
telecentres (Digital Community Centres).  Microsoft provided free 
or discounted PS for use in these telecentres.22 
2000 
24 Mexico Executive Technological neutrality Government 
software use 
The Mexican government has issued public statements declaring 
that it favours technological neutrality in the adoption of software.  
Microsoft and international IT trade body, CompTIA, have reported 
that the Mexican government observes technological neutrality with 
regard to government IT acquisition.  Mexico has also agreed to 
observe “technology neutral” principles in policies and regulations 
under a 2006 declaration made by the APEC Committee on Trade 
and Investment.23 
1999 – 
2010 
25 Mexico Secretaría de 
Economía 
PROSOFT Economic Programme for the development of the software sector.  Advocates 
technological neutrality.24 
Mid 
2000s 
26 Mexico Secretario de 
Educación 
Pública/Instituto 
Latinoamericano de 
la Comunicación 
Educativa  
Red Escolar† Education Initiative to informatize schools instigated in 1998 under the 
administration of Ernesto Zedillo.  The initiative originally 
deployed GNU/Linux to school computers to save on PS licensing 
fees.  Under President Vincente Fox, who came to power in 2000, 
an agreement was signed with Microsoft to supply the software used 
in this initiative.25 
1998 
27 Mexico Secretaría de 
Relaciones 
Exteriores/Secretaría 
de Comunicaciones y 
Transportes 
WSIS declaration Foreign policy The Mexican delegation to the World Summit on the Information 
Society opposed mention of free software in summit declarations.26 
2003/ 
2005 
28 Paraguay  Ministerio de 
Educación y Cultura 
OLPC Education Computers for schools initiative involving partnership with the 
OLPC programme.  OLPC laptops run F/OSS.  Ministry of 
Education also works in partnership with local NGO in 
implementation of the initiative.27 
2008 
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29 Peru Dirección General de 
Tecnologías 
Educativas, 
Ministerio de 
Educación 
Proyecto Huascarán† Education Computers for schools initiative launched by President Alejandro 
Toledo.  In relation to the initiative, Microsoft offered assistance in 
training of teaching staff in IT literacy and use of IT for pedagogic 
purposes.28 
2001 
30 Peru Presidency Ley No 28612 (Decreto 
Supremo Nº 024-2006-
PCM) 
Government 
software use 
Law obliging government entities to observe neutrality in 
procurement of software and IT goods and services.  Peru has also 
agreed to observe “technology neutral” principles in policies and 
regulations under a 2006 declaration made by the APEC Committee 
on Trade and Investment.29   
2005/ 
2006 
31 Peru Ministerio de 
Educación 
OLPC Education Computers for schools initiative launched under the term of 
President Alan Garcia involving partnership with the OLPC 
programme.  OLPC laptops run F/OSS.30 
2007 – 
2010 
32 Uruguay Executive Mi PC Uruguay† Social access to 
ICTs 
Scheme to offer PCs on preferential rates of credit to facilitate social 
access to ICTs.  The initiative involved the participation of 
Microsoft, which supplied the systems software utilised in the 
initiative.31 
2006 
33 Uruguay Laboratorio 
Tecnológico de 
Uruguay 
Plan Ceibal Education Computers for schools initiative launched under the term of Tabaré 
Vázquez involving partnership with the OLPC programme.  OLPC 
laptops run F/OSS.32 
2008 – 
2010 
34 Uruguay Executive Technological neutrality† Government 
software use 
In 2007, international IT trade body, CompTIA, reported that the 
Uruguayan government observed technological neutrality with 
regard to government IT acquisition.33 
2007 
35 Venezuela Presidency Decreto N° 3.390 Government 
software use 
Mandate to use F/OSS in public sector.34 2004 
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